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PREFACE 
THE first draft of this work was presented to the 
University of London in December 1921, under tile title 
of "The Arab Coilquest of Transoxania", as a tllesis for 
the  degree of Master of Arts, and was al~proved by the 
Senate in January 1922, for publication as such. During 
the  year my attention was taken up in other directions 
and, except for the publicatioll of two studies on the 
subject in the Bulletin of the School of Oriental Studies, 
nothing further was done until by the generosity of tlie 
Trustees of the Forlong Bequest Fund an opportunity 
of publication was offered. In its present forin the worlt 
has  been largely rewritten and revised. I t  makes no 
claim to present a complete lGstorical account of the 
Arabs in Central Asia, but is intended solely as a critical 
s tudy of the authorities in greater detail than has hitherto 
been made. Much is therefore omitted bccaosc it bas 
already been dealt with in the standard histories. In  
order to keep down the cost of publication, the extensive 
references which originally accompanicd tlie text have 
been cut down to a few notes at the end of each chapter. 
N o  references are given when, as in the great majority 
of cases, the authority for thc statements made can 
easily be found in the appropriate place either in Tabari 
or Balzdhuri. 
I regret that several worlcs which are indispensable 
for a thorough study of the subject have, for linguistic 
reasons, been inaccessible to me. Such are van Vloten's 
Opkomst der Abbnsiden, and almost the whole 
range of Russian research work. Through the kindness 
of Sir Denison Ross, however, I have been able to avail 
myself of a draft MS. translation of the most i m p o r t a t  
and valuable of them all, Professor W. Barthold's 
YI/ 
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Tuvkestalz, as well as of his as yet unpublislled London 
lectures on " T h e  Nomads of Central Asia." My sincere 
thanks are due to Sir Denison Ross also for his continued 
interest and inaterial assistance ever since he first intro- 
duced me t o  the  subject ; to Sir Thomas Arnold for much 
encouragement and helpful counsel ; to Professor 
Barthold, who has  read the MS. through and made a 
number of valuable suggestions ; to the Trustees of the 
Forlong Bequest Fund for their ltindness in undertalting 
the  publication ; and in no small nieasure to  my wife, 
who has given much time and labour to preparing the  
MS. for publication. 
London, 
April, 1923. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
I THE OXUS BASIN 
5 Early History. 
The Oxus is a boundary of tradition rather than of ' 
j history. Lying midway between the old frontier of 
Aryan civilisation formed by the Jaxartes and the Pamir 
i and the natural strategic Irontier offered by the  north- 
I eastern escarpment of the plateau of k i n ,  it has never 
j 
i proved a barrier to imperial armies froin either side. 
I It was not on the Oxus but on the Jaxartes that 
i 
I Alexander's strategic insight ,fixed the position of 
1 Alexander Eschate, and when the outposts of Persian 
i dominion were thrust back by the constant pressure of 
I the Central Asian hordes, their retreatwas stayed not on 1 the Oxus but on the MurghBb. Thus when the  tide of conquest turned and the Arabs won back her ancient heritage for Persia, they, like Alexander, were compelled 
I to carry their arms ever further to the East and all un- 
knowing re-establish the frontiers of the Achaemenid 
Empire. I t  was from the legends of S%s%nian times, 
enshrined in the pagee of the historians and the national 
epic of Firdawsi, that the Oxus came to be regardcd as  
the boundary between hiin and Ti i rh .  
Through all the centuries of invasion, however, the  
peoples of Sogdiana and the Oxus basin remained Irania~l 
a t  bottom, preserving an Iranian speech and Iranian 
institutions. But the political conditions of the country 
a t  the period of the Arab conquests were so co~nplex that 
it is necessary to trace briefly the course of their 
devclopmen t. 
The second century B.C, was a period of upheaval in 
Central Asia : the powerful Hiung-Nu peoples were 
dispossessing weaker tribes of their pasture lands and 
forcing them to migate westwards, Between 150 and 
B 
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126 B.C. a succession of nomadic tribes, the last and 
lnost powerful of which were a branch of the Yueh-Chi, 
were driven down into Sogdiana. I t  is now generally 
held that these tribes were of Aryan origin, though the 
question is not perhaps settled with absolute certainty. 
Before long, however, a second group, the Ic'ang, pos- 
sessed themselves of Sogdiana, driving the Yueh Chi on 
into Bactria and the Afghan mouniains (1). In these 
districts they found, alongside the Iranian peasantry, a 
settledpopulationof Tulthari (in Chinese, Ta-Hia), already 
noted in the Chinese annals for their commercial enter- 
prise (2), and tvhile a t  iirst the nomad tribes introduced 
complete confusion, it would seem that they rapidly 
absorbed, or were absorbed by, the native elements, and 
thus assimilated the Hellenistic civilisation of Bactria. 
From this fusion arose, about 60 A.D. ,  the powerful 
Icushan Empire which spread into India on the one side 
and probably maintained some form of suzerainty over 
the Ic'ang ltindgoms of Sogdiana on the other. Under 
the new empire, Buddhism was acclimatised in Turltestan, 
and Sogdiana developed into a great entrepdt for Chinese 
trade with the West. Towards the close of the ihircl 
centu~y the Icushan Empire, wealcelled by attaclts from 
the new national dynasties in India and Persia, reverted 
to its primitive form of small independent principalities, 
which, however, retained sufficient cohesion to prevent 
a Persian reconquest, I t  is practically certain that 
SBsBnian authority never extended beyond Balk11 and 
rarely as far. In the fourth and fifth centuries references 
are made to a fresh horde of nomads in the north-easi, 
the Juan-Juan (Chionitae, Avars) (3), but it does not 
appear that any new settlements were made in the 
Oxus countries. 
In the middle of the fifth century, another people, 
the Ephthalites (Arabic Haytal, Chinese Ye-Tha), per- 
haps a branch of t he  Hiung-nu, not only completely 
overran the former Kushan territories, but by successive 
defeats of the Persian arinics forced the SZsBnid Icings 
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to pay tribute. The Ephthalites appear to have been a 
nomadic people organised as a military caste of the 
familiar Turkish type, smd the existing institutions and 
principalities, in large part a t  least, continued side by  side 
with them (4). Their rule was too transitory to  produce 
any lasting eTIects, or to inflict any serious injury on the 
commerce ant1 prosperity of Sogdiaila. 
The rise of the Central Asian empire of the Turlrs 
proper (Tu-ICueh) dates from their overthrow of the Juan- 
Juan in IlIongolia in 552, under their great Khan, Mokan. 
His brother Istami (the Silzibul of the Byzantine 
historians), tlie semi-independent jabghu of the ten tribes 
of Western Turlts, after co~~solidating his power in the  
Ili and Chu valleys, formed an alliauce with KhusrG 
AnGshiruCin, and in a joint attack between 563 and 568 
the two powers colnpletely overthrew the Ephthalite 
kingdom and divided their territorics. For a brief 
moment the Oxus was the actual boundary between 
friin and TBrBn ; under pressure from the silk traders 
of Sogdiana, howwcr, the alliance was brolten and the 
wealter successors of AntishirwBn could scarcely do more 
than maintain their outpost garrisons on the MurghZb. 
From this time the Ephthalites, lilte tlle Kushans, were 
gradually assimilating to the Iranian populatioll (5) ,  
though the change was less rapid in the Cisoxine lands of 
Lower TukllQristBn, BBdghis, and Herit, where Ephthalite 
principalities were re-constituted, probably with Turlrish 
support, and continued to give Persia much trouble on 
lier north-eastern frontiers (6). 011 the other hand the 
Turlts of the five western tribes (Nu-she-pi), who became 
independent d t c r  the break up of the Great Khanate 
about 582, maintained their suzerainty over Sogcliana 
and the middle Oxus basin by freqnenl expeditions, in 
one case at least as far as Ball<ll. There is no trace in our 
records of extensive Turltisli immigration into the 
conquered lands ; at  most, small groups of Turks 
wanderecl south with their herds, eqecidly, it would 
seem, south of the Iron Gate (7). I11 general, Turkish 
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interference in tlle administration cf the subject princi- 
palities was a t  first limited to tlie appointment of military 
governors ancl the collectio~l of tribute. Thus, in t l ~ e  
semi-legendary account give11 by An-NaysBbfiri of tlie 
Turkish conquest of BulchLra the Bulch?ir I<hudLl~ is 
represented as the cliief dihqan under the Turlcish 
governor. It is possible also that the native princes 
maintained guards of Turlcish mercenaries. 
At this period, therefore, so far from the Oxus 
being a barrier, there was consicleral~le intercommunica- 
tion between the peoples on either side, and at least tlie 
elements of a racial and cultural unity, in spite of political 
divisions. This is a factor of importance in the history 
of the Arab conquests : the conquest of Transoxania is 
intimately linked with the fortunes of Lower TulchBr- 
istiin, and only becainc possible when the latter country 
was completely subdued. On tlie other hand, the 
Jaxartes formecl a natural racial and political frontier. 
" Sllash and Sughd have seldom run together " says 
Vambery, and in spite of nominal annexations on more 
than one occasion Muslim rule was not effectively 
imposed on ShBs11 and FarghCna until some time after 
the final conquest of Transoxania. Their chief im- 
portance for the history of Transoxania is that they 
formed the ju~nping-off place for counter-invasions 
from the East. It is not without significance that of the 
two battles which were decisive in establishing Arab rule 
in Sogdiana one was fought to the west of Balkh ancl the 
I other on the Talas river, far into the Turlcish lands 
beyond the Jaxartes (see pp. 84 and 96). 
Political Divisions, 
Researches into Chinese records have now made it 
possible to  obtain a more definite idea of the political 
conditions of these frontier provillces in the sevel~tlth 
century. All the principalities aclcnowledged the Khan 
of the Western Turlcs as overlord and paid tribute to 
him ullder compulsion, though, as will appear, there is 
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g o o d  cause for doubting whether a Turlcisli army ever 
c a m e  in response to their appeals for support until the 
rise of the Tiirgesh power in 716. 
Geographically the cultivated lands to the west and 
so~zth-wes t  of the middle Jaxartes are diviclecl by the 
I-Iissar mountains into two well-defined areas. The 
n o r t h e r n  area includes the rich valley of the Zarafshdl 
a n d  the lesser streams which descend the northern slope 
of t h e  watershed, the southern comprises the broad 
basin forined by the Oxus ancl its tributaries between 
t h e  mountains of the Pamir and the steppelands. Tlle 
former ;  which as a whole is called Sogdiana in clis- 
t i nc t ion  from the smaller principality of Sughd, was a t  
t h i s  period divided between a number of small states, 
each inclependenl of the others but forming together a 
l o o s e  confederacy in a manner strikingly reminiscent of 
t h e  I-Iellenic city-states. The  strongest bond of union 
was  formed by their mutual interest in the Chinese sillc 
t r a d e ,  the chief stations of which were a t  Samarqand, 
P a y k a n d ,  and I<ish. The preinier city was Samarqand, 
the pre-eminence of which and high culture of whose 
population is voucllecl for by Yuan-Chwang. Special 
emphasis is laid on their enterprise and success in trade, 
a n d  a number of early embassies, doubtless commercial 
nlissions, are recorded from Samarqand and BulthZrS 
t o  the Chinese court. The merchant families of Pay- 
k a i l d ,  according to  Tomascl~elc's rendering of Narshalchi 
(S), were I<usllans, but Iranian elements, reinforced by 
emigrants from the SZsZnid dominions, formed the 
major i ty  in the cities. The agricultural population was 
a l m c s t  if not entirely Iranian. 
A second link between the majority of the cities was 
formecl by the ruling house of the Shao-wu, if, as the 
Chinese records assert, these all belonged to one royal 
f a ~ n i l y .  The head of the clan governed Samarqand and 
was allied by marriage to the Turlcish I<han ; cadet 
branches ruled in Ushrtisana, I<ish, BukhZrB, ancl the 
lesser  principalities in the basin of the ZarafshSn. In 
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the later lists the rulers of Sl~%sh and FarghLna as well as 
the I-Chwiirizm ShZlx are shown as belonging lo  the clan 
also, though with less probability (9). Whether the 
family were of IC'ang origin, or, as the Chinese records 
state, belonged to the Yueh-Chi, they appear in the 
Arabic histories with Persian territorial titles (KlludZh, 
S h ~ h , a n d  the general term diliq2n). Some of the princes 
also possessed Turlcish titles, probably conferred on them 
as vassals of the Khan. The ruler of Samarqand, as 
king of Sughd, is called the Ikhshidh or IkhshEdh, which 
is easily recognised as the Persian khshayathiya. This 
title was borne also, as is well known, by the king of 
FarghZna. It is certain at  least from both Chinese and 
Arabic accounts that these rulers were not Turks. The 
Turkish names by which they are sometimes called %'ere 
given out of deference or compliment to  their Turkish 
suzerains, just as Arabic names begin to appear amoilgst 
them immediately after , the Arab conquests. Par- 
ticdarly misleading is the name Tarkhan which appears 
inore than once in tlie list of princes of Samarqand and 
has been erroneously talcen as the title Tarkhgn; though 
it is in reality only the Arabic transcription of a personal 
name spelt in the Chinese records Tu-hoen. During 
the six or seven hundred years of their rule all these 
princes had become fully identified with their Iranian 
subjects (10). Tile " kingship " moreover was not a 
real monarchy but rather the primacy in an oligarchical 
system. Their authority was far from absolute, and tlie 
lancled aristocracy (dihqgns) and rich merchants pos- 
sessed, as will be seen later, not only a large measure of 
independence but also on occasion the power to depose 
the ruling prince and elect his successor. As the  
succession appears to have been largely hereditary it is 
probable that, according to Iranian custom, eligibility 
was confined to a single royal house. In  some cases, 
it would seem, the succession was regulated during the  
lifetime of the reigning prince by sonle such inethod a s  
association in the principate, probably colnbined wit11 
the  appoint~nent of t h e  reinaini~lg pri~ices to other 
fiefs (111. 
\ ,  
The  " codederacy " of these states, however, \\,as ill 
no  sense all alliance arid probably anlounted to little 
Illore than a anodzls vivendi. Besides the inore iulI>orta.1lt 
princes there existed an enormous nuinber of petty 
autocrats, some possibly Turlcish, others probal)ly 
descended from former conquerors, wliose authority 
m a y  sorneti~nes have scarcely extended beyo~ld the 
limits of their own villages. In lands subject to tlie TurBs 
and  patrolled by nomadic tribes an effective centraliscd 
government was hardly possible. Mutual antagonis~lls 
a n d  wars cannot have bee11 uncoiilinon though we have 
now no record of them, except that during the early Arab 
period there was hostility between Bulthsrs and Ward%~~a, 
b u t  the latter cannot be reckoned among the Shao-wu 
principalities since, according to Narsliakhi, it was 
founded by a S%s%nid prince about 300 a.n. Until thc 
profitable Chinese tracle was threatened by the Arabs 
we find no trustworthy record of combined resistailce 
offered by the country to its piecemeal reduction, and 
only long after the conquests of Qutayba is tliere any 
hint  of a concerted rising. At the same time, the 
strength of the cities and warlike nature of their 
inhabitants may be gauged from the way in which thcy 
no t  only preserved themselves from destruction at the 
hands of their successive nomad invaders, but even 
gained their respect, while this, in some respects perhaps 
t he  most highly civilised of all the lands subdued by the 
Arabs (12), proved also the most difficult to conquer, 
and  most intractable t o  hold. 
The same lack of unity is apparent in the districts 
south of the Iron Gate,  though nominally subject to a 
sillgle authority. I t  is important to bear in mind that 
t h e  ZarafshXn and Oxus valleys were completely inde- 
pendent of olle another-that the difference between tthem 
was not merely one of government, but also of Ianguage, 
alld even, to some extent, of blood, owing to the greater 
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Illixtllre of races in the southern basin. Whell, 
occusiollally, as in the " Miis& legend ", reference is made 
ill tllc Arabic l~istories to colnmon action by  SuglldanJ 
y ~ u k ~ l ~ i s t ~ l l ,  it  is due to  s complete misunderstanding 
of tilc of the country prior to the conquest, and it is  
\vortlly of illat no such reference is to  be found in 
ally rlarrative otllerwise reliable. On his outward 
jollrllcy ill 630, Yua11 Chwang found the  country divided 
into t\vcnty-sc\len petty states under separate rulers, 
with tile cllicf military authority vested in the  Turkisl1 
Sltiid, tile eldest son of the Jabghu of t he  Western Turlcs, 
wllo lind ids scat near the modern Qunduz. During the 
1)cl.iotl of ani~rchy \vliich befell the Western Turks in t he  
lo\ln\\*i~ig years, the whole district was formed into a n  
indcl~endcnt kingdon1 under a sol1 of the former S h ~ d ,  
wllo lo~intlcd the dynasty of Jabglms of Xulth~rist3n.  
blir~or Turkisl~ chiefs and intendants probably seized 
similar authority in their own districts, and  though 
tlur Jal)gliu was rccognised as suzerain of all t h e  lands 
lrorn the Irou Gate to Ziibulistzn and Kapisa and  from 
IIerZt to I<liuttal (13), his authority was littIe more than  
11onlinnl except within his immediate district of Upper 
I'uklrarislan. The lesser princes, in Shiimsn, Khut ta l ,  
kc. ,  illany of wholn were Tu~;ltisll, appear t o  have  acted 
fluitc intlep~iidentl~ and did not hesitate t o  defy their  
suzerain on occasion. Tlle name TukhSristSn is used 
vl-rY loosclp in the Arabic records, with misleading 
rffect (14). 1.10~ relatively unimportant t o  t h e  Arabs 
I'ultharistsll proper was is sllown by  the fact  t h a t  i t s  
rrlcxatioll (see ~ C ~ O I V  1). 38) is passed over in silence. 
I"lc of resistance offered t o  t h e  early A r a b  
conr~uesLs was borne by the princes of Lower Xukhgr- 
?'an- i.6.8 tile riverain districts south of the Iron Gate,  
" l c l u d q  Chagll~nbin and Balkll, together with t he  
@)hihalite ~rincil)alities ill Jfizj*, ~ z d ~ h i ~ ,  and 
'"' Wib1y tlle mOU11tainous fringe of Gharj i s t ~ l l ,  
'Ibir 
wily the Arabs always regarded Ball&, 
'he 'Id rdigious apital of the ~ < u ~ l ~ ~ ~ ~  ~~~i~~ and site 
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of the famous Buddhist shrine of Nawbahiir, as the 
capital of the " Turlcs " ; it was in fact: the centre of what 
we might allnost tenn the " anlphictyony " of Lower 
TukhZrist Ln, comnbining strategic and colnmercial 
importance with religious veneration. Long aftel. the 
Nawbahgr had been destroyed by Ibn 'Amir this s a ~ t i -  
ment continued to exist in the country (16). 
A chance narrative in Tabari (11. 1224 f . ) ,  which, 
though ol BBtiilite origin, can scarcely have been invented, 
indicates the situation in Lower Tulchitristjn in 710. 
In the presence of Qutayba, the ShSd and as-Sabal 
(King of Ichuttal) do homage to the Jabghu, the former 
excusing himself on the ground that though he has joined 
Qutayba against the Jabghu, yet he is the Jabghu's 
vassal. The Ephthalite prince of Badghis thcn docs 
homage to the Shad, who must consequently be regarded 
as the chief prince in Lower T u k h ~ r i s t ~ n .  His indenti- 
ficatioll with the Jabgbu himself in another passage 
(Tab. 11. 1206. 9) is obviously impossible. Though 
certainty on the point is hardly to  be expected, the 
description best suits the king of Chaghjnizn (Chaghan 
Khudah), who consistently adopted an  attitude of co- 
operation with the Arabs. I t  wordd seem too that  the 
lcing of Chaghanizn commanded the armies of Lower 
Tukhkristgn in 652 and again in 737. Moreover, an 
embassy to China on bchalf of TulchhBristZn in 719 was 
actually despatched by the king of ChaghBniHn, which 
implies that he held a status in the kingdom conso~lant 
with the high title of Shad. The concl~~siorl drawn by 
Marquart and Chavannes that the lcing of ChaghaniZn 
and the Jabghu were identical is disproved by the 
Chinese records (16). 
Such conditio~ls of political disunion were naturally 
all in favour of the. Arabs. It might have seemed also 
that the general insecurity, together with the burden 
ol maintaining armies and courts and the ever-recurring 
ravages of invasion, would move the rnass of the popula- 
tion to welcome the prospect of a strong and united 
government, more especially as so large a proporti011 of 
the Muslin1 armies were composed of tlieir Persian lcin. 
For the Arabic records in general are misleading on two 
inlportant points. By tlieir use of the word " Turk" 
, . 
' for all the non-Persian peoples ol the East, they give the 
impression (due perhaps to tlie circumstances of the time 
in wliicli the chief histories were composed) that the 
opponents of the Arabs inTransoxania were the historical 
I Turlts. The truth is that until 720 the Arab invaders were resisted only bv  the local princes with armies 
" - 
composecl almost entirely of ~ranli'ans, except perhaps 
on one or two special occasions when Turlcish forces may 
have intervened. The other error is in interpreting the 
conquests as primarily wars for the Faith. Rebellion, 
for instance, is expressed in terms of apostasy. I t  is now 
well established that this conception is exaggerated ; 
religious questions did not, in fact, enter until much 
later ,and even then chiefly as expressions of political 
relationslips. To the Iranian peasantry, themselves 
steadfastly attached to the national cults, the advent of 
another faith in this meeting-place of all the cultures 
and religions of Asia a t  first carried little significance. 
Two factors in particular combined to provoke a resis- 
tance so stubborn that  it  took the Arabs a century 
merely to reduce the country to sullen submission. The 
first of these was the proud national spirit of the 
Iranians which was eventually to break down the 
supremacy of the Arabs and give birth to the first 
Persian dynasties in IslBm. The few wise governors of 
IChurBsb found in this their strongest support, but, 
outraged again and again by  an arrogant and rapacious 
administration, the subject peoples became embittered 
and sought all means of escape from its tyranny. The ' 
secoild was the interest of the commercial relations on 
which the wealth and prosperity of the country de- 
pended. This again might have disposed the cities to 
accept a rule which proinised not oilly stability, but  a 
wide extension of opportunity. The Arab governors, 
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as we shall see, were 11ot indeed blind to tlds, but  the 
exactiolls of the treasury, and still more the  greed of local 
officials, combined with t he  uilsettlemel~t of col~stant  
invasion to  create an attitude of distrust, which deepened 
later into despair. I t  must not be forgottal t l ~ a t  the  
commercial ties of the Sogdians werc much stronger with 
the  East than wit11 the West, and that this too prompted 
them to cultivate relations with the Turks and Chinese 
rather than with t he  Arabs when the necessity of lnaking 
a choice was forced upon tllein. 
The Arabic Sources. 
The early Arabic sources are remarlcably rich in 
material for the reconstruction of the conquests in 
Kllurissn and Transoxania. For the earlier period the 
narratives of Ya'qfibi and Baladhuri are nearly as full 
as those of Tabari, but the special value of the latter lies 
jn his method of compilatiol~ wllicl~ renders the traditious 
amenable to critical study and thus provides a control 
for all the  othe~s.  Mo~eover, while the other historians, 
regarding the conquests of Qutayba as definitely coinplet- 
ing the reduction of Transoxania, provide only meagre 
notices for the later period, Tabari more than cornpen- 
sates for their silence by the uloimous wealth of detail 
embodied in t he  accounts he quotcs from Al-Madg'iili 
and others of t h e  last thirty years of Uinayyad rule. 
As a general rule, these three historians rely on different 
authorities, t l~ough all use the earlier histories of Al- 
MadB'ini and AbB 'Ubayda to some extent. The mono- 
graph of Narshakhi (d. 969 A.D.) based on both Arabic 
and local sources, with sonle resemblance to Baliidhuri, 
i s  mlIortunately preserved only in a Persian version of 
two centuries later which has obviously been edited, to  
what extent is unlcno\vn, but which probably represents 
the  original as unsatisfactorily as Bal'arni's Persian 
version of Tabari. Even so it preserves to u s  some 
account of the peoples against whom the Arab in- 
vaders were matched, and thus does a little to remedy 
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the tlelects of the other historians in this respect. I t  
may well be doubted, however, wlietlier some of its 
narratives' merit the reliance placed upon them b y  van 
Vloteri (17). Thc inucli later historian Ibrl al-Athir intro- 
duces very littlc new material, but confines himself for 
thc most part to abridgiug and re-editing the narratives 
in Tabari, witli a tendency to follow the Inore exaggeralctl 
accounts. The geographer Ibn IChfirdXdhbih gives a 
list of titles ancl names, which is, however, too confused 
to supply any reliable evidence. 
Reference has already been made to  certain aspects of 
tlie conquests in which the Arab historians are misleading. 
Their information on the Turlcs and the principalities of 
Sogdiana can now, fortunately, be supplemented ancl par LS 
of their narratives controlled from Chinese sources, 
chiefly througl~ Chavannes' valuable " Documents snr 
les Tou-ICiue (Turcs) Occidentaux." But there are  two 
other facts u~hich also detnand attention : one, tha t  tile 
Arabic authorities, as ive possess them, and even witli all 
allowance made for their limitations, are by no means 
exhaustive ; i . ~ . ,  reliance 011 on~issions in the narratives 
is an  unsafe principle of criticisnl : the other, t ha t  by 
critical study it is possiblc to distinguish at  certain poinls 
scveral lines of tendentious tradition or legend, directed 
to  the interests of national feeling or of some pa~t icular  
tribe or faction, and centred in some cases round 
specific persons. 'I'hcse may most conveniently bc 
sum~narised as  follotvs : 
1 .  A Qaysite tradition, centred on the family of 
Ibn KltZzim : 
2. An Azd-Rabi'a tradition, centred on Muhallab 
and hostile to Hajjaj. This became the most 
popular traclition among the Arabs, and is 
followcd by Baladhuri, bu t  opposed by Ya'qitbi : 
3.  A Bshilite tradition, centred on the tribal hero, 
Qutayba b. hluslirn. In  general it found littlc 
favour but is occasioilally quoted solnewhat 
sarcastically by Tabari. 
4. A local BukhhB tradition, Iollowed by Ya'qCbi, 
BalBdhuri and Narshalhi. I t  presents the  
early conquests under the forin of an historical 
romance, centred on the Queen IChXtliu in the 
part of a national Boadicea. Other local 
traditions, which are frequently utilised by 
Tabari, seein to be much more free from serious 
exaggeration : 
5. The few ilotices in Dinawari follow a11 en t i r e l~  
divergent and extreiljely garbled traclition from 
unknown soul.ccs, which inay for the most 
part be neglected : 
6. The quotations inade by Baladhuri (e.g, 422. 10) 
from Abli 'Ubayda show the u~fluencc of a re- 
writing of episodes with an anti-Arab bias, 
directed to the interests of the Shu'fibiya move- 
ment, in which Ab13 'Ubavcla was a prominent 
figure (18). 
A 
7 .  In the later period, there appears also the frag- 
- 
inents of a t;adition of w h i 8  Nasr b. SayyLr is 
the hero. 
Some, if not all, of these Lraditions developedin some 
detail, and where they are not balanced by other versions 
they present a distorted narrative of events, verging in 
some cases on the fictitious. The most noteworthy 
examples of this are the IChXtCn lcgcnd (see below 11. 18) 
and the typical story of the exploits of MCs3. b. IChLzim 
in Transoxania in a style not unworthy of Bedouin 
romance (19). I t  is therefore most important to dis- 
entangle these variant traditions ancl assign i t  proper 
value to each. The BXhilite accounts of Qutayba's 
conquests, for instance, contain wild exaggerations of 
fact, which, nevertheless, have sometimes been utilised 
in all seriousness by modern historians, amonst other 
purposes to establish synchronisms with the Turkisl~ 
inscriptions (SO). 
With these precautions, it is possible to follow up and 
reconstruct, with comparative certainty and completeness, 
that progress of the Arab arms in Central Asia whose 
vicissitudes are o u t l i i l e d  in the following pages. 
(Full Titles in B i b l i o g l . a p 1 i y )  
Isranlce, Bcitragc 41 if., 01. Cordicr, Chine I. 226. 
I f  Marqnnrt's idcntificnlion (Erznshahr. 201f.) is coucct. 
Cordicr I .  229 : Brhnshohr 60 if. 
Yuan Cllwnng I ,  103. Prof. Bnrtllold suggcsts that the connection between 
the  Eplrtllalitcs and lhc I-Iuns may have bcen political only, not rncial. 
Chavannes, Doctlments 166 : crfinahal~r 89. 
Tnb. I. 2886. 13 and 2880. 3 :  Ya'qobl, Histovy, 11. 103 : YFiqi~t (ed,  
WUslcnfcld) I .  402 : BtlFidhuri 403 : Eriinshahr 06 f., 77 1.. and 160. 
BBddlis was still n nomad nnstnrc-around in t l ~ e X I V t h  ccntllrv : Ibn.  
- - " 
Ballfiln, 111, 01 f. 
Yuen Cinva~lg 1. 106 ; 11. 200; Cl~ov. Doc. 101 : nranshahr 260 if. 
Tomnscl~ck, Soghdiann, 110. 
Sco Alsrouart. Chronalocio. 11 : Sllimtori in Ifeleti Szcmlc I11 f1002) foot- 
. . - .  . . 
notc to pp. t22-3. 
Cf. Narsllakhl 20. 4. On the Irnnisation of nolnndic elements, Blochet, 
Introduction a I'Ilistoirc dcr &Iongols, (Lcydcn, 1010) p. 211 n o t e ;  
Pcisl<cr, Tltc Asintic Backgrouxd, pp. 363-0. 
Chsvnnncs, Notes 91, and d, below p. 80. 
Cf, Darthold. in %citschrift fur Assyriologic XXVI (1911) p. 202. 
Yuan ChwangI, 76 n. 2, 102 if: 11 210 : Chav. Doc. 200 f. 
Kg. Tab. 11, 1.148, 1-10 : cf, f.13r~lhnItr 228. 
Cf. Ya'qirbi, Grog. 281 : Tab. I1  1206. 12 : BrRushN~r 00, 81 ff. 
Chavnnnes. Doc. 201. Notes 31. 
Narshakhi's unrcliability is cvcn more mnrkcd in his account of the origins 
of the Sgmiinid dynasty : cf. Bartlxald, Tnrliestan 216 n. 3. 
Sce Goldzihcr, &l~~l~ammndanischc Studicn, I, 106 ff. 
Prof. Bnrthold has drawn my nttcntion to the fact that the story of MGsa 
also includcs (hvice ovcr) an episode Lrom the popular lcgend of Zopyrus. 
See his article ill Zupiski XVIl (100L)) 0141, and Wellhausen, Arabischo 
Rcich, 261, 206. 
E.g. Marquart, Cl~ronologie, p. 8. 
11. THE EARLY RAIDS 
The Conquest o f  Lower TztkkBristBqz. 
Arab legend relates that the Muslim forces, pursuing 
Yazdigird from thc field of Nihxwand in 211642, 1lad 
already come in contact with the " Turks " of Tulth%r- 
i s t ~ n  before the death of 'Omar. But ille final 
destruction of the S%%nid power and iirst iml>osition of 
Arab rule on KhurBs%n only followed ten years later, by 
tlie troops of 'Abdullah ibn 'Arnir, 'OthmCn's goverlior 
in Basra. The Ephthalites of HerM and Badghis sub- 
mitted without a blow, and the first serious check to 
their advance was met in the Murghlb valley, when al- 
Ahnaf b. Qays with an army of 4,000 Arabs and 1,000 
Persians found himself opposed by the organised forces 
of Lower Tukharistan and was compelled to retire on 
Merv-Rfidh. A second expedition under al-Aqra' b. 
Hlbis,  however, defeated a weaker force in Jiizjw, and 
subsequently occupied Jfizjgn, F2ry%b, Txlaq%~i, and 
Balkh. Small divisions made plundering raids into the 
neighbouring territories, e.g., to SiminjBn (a town within 
tlle frontiers of TukhaistBn proper, governed by a 
Turkish prince, the Ru'b IChSn), and to ICllw%~izin, ot 
always with success ; on the other hand, a successful 
raid was made on MByamurgli in Sogdiana in 331654, 
which is mentioned by Abi~ 'Ubayda alone of the Arabic 
authorities (1). A general insurrection which broke 
out sliortly afterwards, headed by a certain Qarin, 
apparently a member of the noble Persian family bearing 
that  name, seems to  have been instrumental in causing 
the Arabs to evacuate KhurlsZn for a time (2), though 
several raids are recorded of 'Ali's governors between 
36 and 38 A.H.  These earliest " conquests," in fact, were 
little more than plundering raids on a large scale, the 
effect of that movement of expansion whose momentum 
was carryillg forward the Arabs irresistibly. According 
I6  
to t he  Cliiuese records, which, however, require to be 
used wit11 cantion at this point, the retreat of the Arabs 
in 655 was iollo\ved up by the army of Tulth?iristgn who 
reinstated PerGz, the son of Yazdigird, as titular lting of 
- - 
Persia (3). 
When i~eace was restored to IslZn~ by the recognition 
of ~u'B\vfi ,a in 41/661, Ibn 'Amir was again entrusted 
wit11 the  conquest of IChurBsBn. The same rough and 
ready metliods were adopted as before ; there appears 
to have been no definite plan of invasion, and even the 
order of governors is tnlcertaiil. Not only are traditions 
relating to A.H. 32 and 42 confused by the different 
autliorities, but a vast anlount of the whole is affected 
by tribal legends. Hints of fierce resistance are given 
from time to time. Qays b, al-Haytham, the governor's 
first legate, was faced with a fresh revolt ill Bgdghis, 
IIerBt, and Balltll. He recaptured the latter and in re- 
taliation destroyecl the famous shrine of Nawbahxr, but 
left t he  Eplilhalites to be dealt with by his successor, 
'Abdullah ibn 1ChB~in1. It is clear that there was no  
ordered progress of the Arab arms until IihurZs%n \was 
brought under the administration of ZiyZd b. Abihi. 
After an  experimental division of the province under 
tribal leaders, a policy obviously dangerous and quicltly 
abancloned, ZiyZcl, realising the danger of allowing 
Persia11 ilationalism a iree liand in the East, baclted up 
by the resources of TulthSristZn, centralised the adminis- 
tration a t  Merv, and organised a preventive campaign. 
I n  47/067 11is lieutenant, al-Haltam b. 'Amr al-GhifZri, 
opened a series of campaigns directed to the conquest 
of Lower TulthZrist%n and Gharjistgn, in the course of 
wliich lle crossed the Oxus and carried his arms into 
Cl~agl~ZniZu, and drove PEr6z back to China in dis- 
comfiture. On his death, three years later, the conquered 
provinces rose in revolt, but the new governor, Rabi' 
b .  i d  1 H i t l i  tlie first conqueror of Sijistzn, 
after reducing Balltll, pursued the Ephthalite army into 
QuhistZn and dispersed it with great slaughter. Again 
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an expedition was sent across the Oxus into Chagllz,li~n 
(clearly indicating the connection between Chag l tg~ l i~~~  
and Lower TukhgristZn), while another directed down tile 
left bank  of the river secured Zamm and Amul, the two 
chief ferry points for Sogdiana. Mention is also made of 
a conquest of IShwiirizm. All these expeditioils seem 
to  point to a methodical plan of conquest, arranged 
betweell ZiyLcl and his governors ; tlie Arab po\ver was 
thus firnlly established, for the moinent at least, in tlle 
Cisoxanian lands, and the way preparcd for Uie invasion 
of Sogdiana. A further important step was the colonisa- 
tion cd ICharLs3n by fifty thousand families froin Basra 
and Kfifa (4), settled according to Arab practice in five 
garrison towns, for the double purpose of securi~ig the 
conquests already made, a n d  providing the forces for their 
further extension. 
The First I?zvasioiz of BztlrhZrZ nqtd Sz6gh.d. 
Although at this junctioil ZiyLd himself died, liis 
policy was carried on by his sons, in particular by 
'UbaydullBh. Scarcely a n y  governor, not even Hajjaj, 
has suffered so much at t h e  hands of the traditionists as 
the " Murderer of Husayn," though his ability and 
devotion to the Urnaygads are beyond questio~~. I t is not 
surprising therefore t h a t  his earlier military successes 
should be so briefly related, in spite of their importance. 
Yet as he was no 111ore than 25 years of age wlien 
appointed b y  Mu'Bwiya to  the province of IchurBiin on 
probation, and only two years later wasselected to fill 
his father's position in 'Iraq, his administration must have 
been marltedly successful. The policy of Ziy5d had now 
firmly secured Khurhsiin and made it  feasible to use i t  as 
a base for the extensioil of the conquests into the rich 
lands across the river. O n  his arrival at Merv, therefore, 
in the  autmnn of 531673, the new governor began Prc- 
parations for an invasion of Bulchaii. 
The  Shao-wu principality 01 Bulchara was at this time 
second in importance on ly  to Sanarqand. I t  illcluded 
C 
I 
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not only the greater part of the oasis (" al-Bulh8riya ") 
t 
then tnuch more thicltly populated than now, but also the 
i great elnporiuln of Paylcand, which controlled the trade 
roote across the Oxus at  Amnl. Of its early history we 1 i 
have ~ \ V O  accounts, both confused, inaccurate in detail, ! 
and often conflicting. From these it ]nay be gatherecl I 
that the prince, who held the high Turltish title of Shad i 
(5 ) ,  resided at Paylcand,the citadel ol BiikhBr?ibeing eitlier 
! 
loui~detl or rcstored by the BulchBr I<hucl?ih Bidfin, probably 
1, in consequence of the Arab invasions. This prince at his i 
cleat11 left a son oiily a few months old on whose behalf ! 
t l ~ e  regency was exercised by the Queen-Mother. This 
lxinccss, Bnowl under the title of' Rh?itim (a Turlcish ! 
for111 of the Sogdian word for " lady ") became the central 
figure in the local traditions, which represent the Arab 
invasions as occurring precisely du~ing  the period of her 
regency. This version is the one accepted by  Baliidhuri, 
Ya'qfibi, and Narshalchi, but thougl~ not altogether 
devoid of historical value, it  is certainly. misplaced, and 
the trne acconnt of tlle early conquests must, for cogent 
reasons, be sought in the brief and widely divergent 
narratives of Tabari. In the first place the KhEtiin- 
lcgencl, like all such legends, has grown by natural 
cla~boration of detail, as in the account given by Narshalchi 
ol IChiitiin's administration of justice and by continual 
accretions Iron1 othcr streams of traclition, as seen, on 
conlparii~g tlle narratives of Balgdhuri and Narshakhi, 
in tlie introclllction of episodes of Ibn Khgzim and Mu- 
llallab. Critical examination also reveals alternative 
traditions and cl~ronological inconsistencies, as, . for 
cxalnple, the birth of Tughshgda after the illvasioll of 
%'id 1). 'Otllln?in, I<hZtfin's reign of 16 years, and others 
mentioned below. There is clear evidence of the  la te  
com~ilation of tile tradition in the frequent refere~lces t o  
" Tarkllim, king of Sughd," though his reign did not begin 
until considerably after 606 (6). It may be noticed t h a t  
in varhnt account of the conquests prefixed t o  t h e  
Persian edition of Narsl~akhi and ascribed to A,,- 
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NaysXbfiri t he re  is no reference at  all- to KhBtiin. More- 
over there a r e  indications that Tabari was aware of the 
local tradition and completely rejected it ; this, a t  least, 
would account o r  the unusual practice of specifying 
Qabaj-IChStfin as " the wife of thc lcing " in 54 n.a. 
Even Balldhuri  rejects the Inore fantastic developments 
of the legenrl. Tabari's narrativcs, however, require to 
be collated with the additioilal material in Balldhuri, 
who hasno t relied entil-ely on thc local tradition. The germ 
of the nat ive version is probably to be found in a con- 
fusion of the Arab conquests with the later war between 
BulthBrl a n d  Wardana (7), whose echoes are heard in 
Qutayba's iiivasions thirty years after. 
In  the spring of 641874 'Ubaydulld~ b. ZiyLd crossed 
the river aild marched directly on Paylcald. After a 
partial success, he led his forces forward towards Bukhlra 
and severely defeated the army of the Bulrhar JChudXh. 
From Tabari 's narrative, which relates only that two 
thousand m e n  of Bulchiirl, slcilful archers, were talten by 
'Ubaydullah to Basra, where they formed his personal 
guard, it i s  left to  bc inferred that a treaty was concluded 
under which the Bulthjr IChudZh became tributary. The 
local~tradition magnifies the expedition by adding a siege 
of Bulth8rH (during the winter) and bringing in an army 
of Turlcs t o  assist KhXtCn, but confirms the success of 
the Arabs. 'Ubaydullah's practice on this occasion of 
lorrning a bodyguard or retinue of captives appears to 
liave been a common one. 'Abdur-Rakman ibn Samura 
hacl previously brought captives from Sijisth to Basra, 
where t h e y  built him a mosque, and later governors of 
I<hurBs~n continued the practice, as will be seen. In 
this may b e  recognised perhaps the germ of the Turkish 
guards recruited b y  the later 'Abbasid Caliphs. 
fUbaydullall's successor, Aslaln 11. Zur'a, remained 
inactive, but in 561676 Sa'id b. 'Othmzn, who had obtained 
tile governorship of I<hur%b by importuning 
MuiXwiyn, cariied the Arab arms more deeply into Trans- 
oxania, defeated the Suglldians in the open field and 
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reduced their city. Talcing fifty young nobles as hostages, . i 
he retired from Sughd and subsequently occupied 
Tinnidh, a11 important fortress on the Oxus colltrollillg 
tile maill North and South trade route, having pre- 
sull~ably n~arched through the Iron Gatc. Thc conquest 
of Sughd was thus definitely co-ordinated'with tha t  of 
Cllagli6ni%nn. T%barils narrative is strangely vague and I 
abrupt ; it contains no mention of BulchBrR nor any 
tleh~iite reierence to Sa~narqand, except for the statement 
Ilkat it was the objective of Sa'id's expedition. Using 
this narrative alone, one ~vould be inclined to suspect 
that the city captured by Sa'id was not Samarqand but 
I<isIl (sincc it has been established by Marquart that 
ICisl~ was fonnerly called Sughd), and that the reference 
lo Sam:\rqand was due lo  a later misunderstanding of 
t l~c  name (8). On the other hancl, both the local 
tradition and Abii 'Ul~ayda speak of a siege of Samarqand 
by Sa'id, tlloug11 their narratives are far from being in 
:~greement in detail, and there are other indications of 
coilfusion between Sa'icl and Salrn b. ZiyBd. All accounts 
except Narsl~altlii's, however, agree that the hostages 
NIIO were carried by Sa'id to Madina and there murdered 
I~im wcre Sughdians (g). BalZdhuri's tradition of Sa'id's 
expedition is as follows. On his crossillg the river, 
I<hLliln at  first renewed lier allegiance, only to  withdraw 
it again on the approach of an army of Turlts, Sughdians+ 
and men of ICisll ant1 Nasaf, 120,000 strong. Sa'id, 
ho\~'ever, completely defeated the enemy and after a 
triumpllal elltry into Bul&ir~, marched on Samarqand, 
his forces swelled by IChBtiin's army, besieged it for three 
days made it tributary. On his return h e  captured 
Tinnidh and while there received the tribute due from 
Iclfitiul alld the allegiance of Khuttal. Narshal&i's 
accoullt is same in essentials, adding only a number of 
ir~laginative details. 
Sa'id was unable to retain his position in I < h u r ~ s ~ n ,  
*or five Years the conquests were stayed (except for  
Simmer raids) under the indolerlt Aslam b, zLlrZa and the 
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avaricious 'Abdur-Rakm,~n b. ZiyBd. In 61/680-681 
Yazid I appointed Salm, another son of Ziyiid, to 
IchurBsxn and S i j i s t ~ n .  Eager to enlulate his brother, 
Sahn, even before leaving Basra, announced his intention 
of renewing the expeditions into Transoxania and enlisted 
a picked force o n  the spot, including such tried leaders as 
Muhallab b. Abi Sufra and 'Abdullah b. I<hBzim. From a 
poem preserved in the Hamxsa of Abti Tammain (10) 
it would appear that somewhat unwilling levies for this 
expedition were raised even in l\iIesopotamia. Towards 
the close of the winter a surprise attaclc was made on 
IChwiirizin, with some success. Tabari gives two versions 
of this expedition, the first of which is a highly embroi- 
dered one from the  Muhallabite tradition. During the 
same year, Salm marched into Sugl~d and occupied 
Samarqand, where he appears to have made his head- 
quarters over t h e  winter. BalZdhuri mentions a sub- 
sidiary raid on i<hujai~da ullder A'shii HanldXn, in which, 
however, the  Muslims w e x  defeated, and a Sughdian 
revolt which was crushed with the loss of its leader, here 
called Bandiin; The name is almost certainly to be read 
as  that of the Bukhzr-IChudiih, Bidall (ll), and in view 
of the  silence of Tabari raises rather a difficult problem. 
It may bc conjectured that what Baliidhuri intended was 
a revolt of t h e  Bulchariots, combined with Sughdiail 
forces. The origin of this statenlent may pcrhaps be 
sought for in t h e  Bulch%rZ tradition, which Bal%d~uii 
does not follow in his general account of the expeditions 
of Saim, but which he may have tried to work in with the 
other. On the  other hand he nowhere refers to Bidfin 
as the Bulhzr  XhudBh. As related by Narshalchi and 
Ya'qBbi Salnl's expedition is directed solely against 
BulchBrB. IChBttn, on promising her hand to TarlthEn, 
receives a reinforcement of 120,000 rnen from Sughd, and 
BTdEn (here sti l l  alive) recruits an army in " Turkistxn," 
including the " Prince of Xbotan." After severe fighting, 
t he  Muslilll forces, numbering 6,000, ld l  Bidfin and rout 
unbelievers, taking so much booty that the share of 
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cacll llorsenlatl alnounts to 2,400 dirllems. IChstfin, ! ! 
t~lorollgl,ly ~lumblecl by this decisive proof of Arab t 
illvillcibi]ity, sues for peace and pays a heavy tribute. 
~ e y o l l c ~  tile fa1tastic exaggerations and incoherencies of 
the legend, there is nothing inherently improbable in a 
Bukllm-iot revolt. 111 support of this view, it lnay be 1. 
reInnrked tllat the death of Bidfin at this point  woulcl 
witll tile sle~~der data we have for thc internal wars 
which proljably formed the original basis of the  IChBtiin- 
legelld, ancl would also provide a foothold for the  later 
rlevelopn~e~~ts of the tradition. Without fuller evidence, 
Ilowever, we can get no further than reasonable 
conjcctnre. 
Aftcr tlie conquests made by Salm, wllich probably 
occo~iecl tlie years 682 and 683, i t  seemed as though the  
Arril)s were on the verge of imposing their rule on 
Trnl~sosanin n111en civil war brolce out in the hear t  of t h e  
E~npire. Even allowing for the fact that these expedi- 
tions were little more than raids, the comparative ease 
~rtitli wliich tile Arabs held to ransom the richest cities 
in the country is asto~iisl~ing. The explanation can lie 
olllp iu their mutual exclusiveness. There is n o t  a hint 
of united action in the field in Taba~i's accounts (12). 
A kctor n~11ic11 may have exercised some influence was 
that Sogdiana was con~pletely isolated during these years 
and unable to look for support from without. The 
power of tlle Western Turks was brolcen by the Chinese 
armies between 046 and 058 ; Chinese forces a re  said to  
llave reached as far west as ICish, and the Empel-or ICao- 
Tslng had officially annexed all the territories forlllerly 
included in the Turkish dominions. In the latter year 
tllcprovinces of Sogdiana and the Jaxartes were organize,-- 
in sixteen districts, including a " Govel.nment of Persia " 
ullder the PErdz already mentioned, situated apparelltly 
in Siiistan, possibly even in Eastern I < l l u r ~ s ~ l ~  (13). 
The immediate practical effect of this change of status 
of little moment, bnt her nominal annexation gave 
Cllina a prestige which was destined to exercise immerlse 
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influence in determining the attitudc of the peol>les of 
Sogdiana to the Arabs. From 670 to 602, ilowever, the 
new power of Tibet held the Chinese armies in cllcclc ill 
the Tarim basin and cut off all possibility of Chi~lcse 
intervention in the West. Tile Sogdiall princes were 
thus throw11 on their own resources, and, @orant as 
yet of the danger behind the Arab raids, thev seem to have 
bowed. to the storm. It must not be forgbtten that the 
cities had never before met such an enemy as  the Arabs. 
They had been accustomed to plundering raids by Tnrlcs, 
wlio disappeared as quicltly as they came, and who, 
dislilting t o  undertake a lengthy siege, were easily 
appeased by  a ransom. Familiar with such nominal 
annexations, [hey would naturally adopt the same tactics 
against the new invaders. Had tlie Arabs maintained 
their pressure, there was thus every prospect that Trans- 
oxania would have bee11 colonised with a tithe of t l ~ e  
expense and loss incurred in its reconquest and would 
liave become as integral a part of ilie Muslirn dominioils 
as I<hur3sBn. But the opportunity was lost in the 
fratricidal struggles of the factions, and when tlie Arabs 
recommenced their encroachments, the deterrnined 
resistance offered to their advancc showed that the lessons 
of the first invasion had not been lost on the native 
princes. 
The Witlzdmwal of the Arabs. 
The tribal feudswliich occupicd the Arabs of Ichui-Ss3n 
left the princes of Transoxmlia free to regain their inde- 
pe~~dence .  I t  would seem even that Lower Tnldl%ristBn 
was not only in part lost to the Arabs but that local 
forces took the offensive and raided IChurZs5n. 00n the 
gradual restoration of order under Umayya, however, 
Lower TukhSristiin again recognised, a t  least in name, 
the Arab suzerainty (14). Meanwhile, a strange episode 
had occurred in Chagll3niiin. M6~5, the son of 'Abdullah 
ibn I(hgzi~n, sent by his father to secure a safe place of 
retreat, had captured tlie strong fortress of Tirmidh, 
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from whicll lie continually raided the neighbouring 
districts. His exploits were worlced up in popular story 
illto an epic of adventure, in which legend has almost I i 
overlaicl historical fact. The most fantastic exaggera- 
tions were devised in order to provide a suitable back- 1 ground for the incredible dceds of valour indulged in I 
by the hero. But in truth his actual exploits were ! 
sufficiently anlazing, and all the efforts of the forces of 
t h e  local rulers (magnified in the legend to huge armies of 
" Turks and I-laytal and Tibetans ") although aided 
o n  one occasion by a force of Khuzg'ites, were unable to 
dislodge him. For fifteen years he remailled in secure 
possession of his stronghold, a refuge for the disaffected ! 
from all sides, and a standing example of the helplessness ! 
of the ru1el.s across the river. 
In 77/006 Umayya re-opened the campaigns into 
Transoxania. An expedition to I<hwBrizm was successful 
(16), another across the Oxus narrowly escaped destruc- 
tion. Baliidht~ri mentions, with doubtful accuracy, a 
successful raid on Khuttal, which may, however, only be a 
variant on this. An expedition directed against BulthBrH, 
which is said to have had Tirmidh as a secoild objective, 
was hurriedly abandoned on the fresh outbreak of revolt 
under Boltayr b. WishBh in Khur%s%n, Though the 
revolt failed in its immediate object, a mos t  serious 
situation had been created. Bnlcayr had endeavoured 
t o  rally the Persians to his side by promising all converts 
remission of I<harBj. The opportunity was undoubtedly I 
seized by largc n~~mbers, and the pacification occasioned 
solne negotiations between Umayya and ThBbit b. Qutba, I 
! 
an influential noble who acted as spoltesman for the . 
rnawiili of Eastern 1<ht~%%11, Umayya's reimposition of 
ICharBj, however, caused widespread unrest (16) and made 
prompt action necessary. 'Abdul-Malilt at once recalled 
his hapless ltisman (~1778) and mqde Khur%s& a depen- i 
dency of 'Iraq under the government of Hajjkj. This 
far-sighted govenlor had already dealt. with a desperate 
situation of the same sort in 'IrBq and reducecl it to 
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outward tranquillity. The same extrenle measures that 
had been adopted there were not necessary in I<liurBs%n; 
its troubles were sue less to insurgent mawiili than to the 
Iactions of Qays. Hajjkj was himself a strong gaysite, 
but he was not the man to put  party before the interests 
of the State. The first necessity was to appoint a 
governor who could be trusted to rcpress both forms of 
anarchy and ill Muhallab soch a man was available. His 
tribe of Azd was not yet strong enough in I<hur%skn to 
cause the rislt of ope11i11g a new challnel for factional 
strife, and his niilita~y reputation fitted him for carrying 
out HajjZj's policy of active campaigning as an antidote 
to internal dissension. I t  is possible that Hajjiij had in 
mind from the first a definite conquest of Transoxailia, 
but for a few years nothing inore than sporadic raicls toolt 
place. 
Muhallab's first care, however, was to  encourage the 
settlement of Azd in I<hurBsBn, until he was supported 
by a division equal in size to any other. After securing 
the crossing at Zamm in 80/G99 he marched into the 
district of Kish and there established his headquarters 
for two years, besieging the city and sending out lnitlor 
expeditions undcr his sons in various directions (17). 
Yazid was sent with a force into Ichuttal, nominally to 
co-operate with a pretender to  the throne, but met with 
little success ; Habib, seut against RabinjZn, found him- 
self countered by the iorces ol Bulthiirk. BalBdhuri's 
account of Muhallab's campaigns is ludicrously exaggera- 
ted ; Tabari quotes Muhallab himself as discouragiug 
any attempts at effecting a conquest. On the death of 
his son al-Mughira in Raja13 82, he came to  terms with 
I<ish and abandoned his expeditions, but died in the 
following Dhu'l-Hijja (Jan. 702) near Merv RLidl~, and 
was succeeded by his son Yazid. 
The Muhallabite tradition which represents the 
appointment as distasteful to Ziajjgj but popular in 
I<liuriisiin is almost certainly influenced by the later 
hostility between Yazid and Hajjaj. It is probable, 
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llol\~cl,cc, tllat Hajjzj, whose policy Was to keep 
golremors (lcpen(1ent on himself, viewed with suspicioll 
tile concclllration of autllority in the hands of the leader 
of a llo\\,erful ]~ostilc clan, but he was content to wait for 
the i ~ ~ e a ~ ~ t i ~ n r  ant1 give Irazid sufficient rope to hang him- 
self. Esccpt lor a11 attempted raid on RllwLrizm 
Yazi(I carried ont no cspeditions, while under his govern- 
I I I C I I ~  the precarious internal balance of I<hurZsEn was 
sooil upset. Tlie quarrels of Qays had been conlposed by 
liluldlab, but they were in no mood to bear wit11 the  
lcadersl~ip of the parvenu Azd ; already before the  
dcatll of Mul~allab, in spite of the Tamimite eulogy 
quoted by Tabari, there x7as a moment when the  feud 
tl~rcatcnctl to break ont. The pronounced factional 
lcauings of Yagid strained the situation still further. 
I3vc11 more serious was the attitude of the mawLli. 
Hu~.;lytIi, Llir brother of Thiibit ibn Qutba, had been left 
brldl~d at ICisl~ by Iiluhallab to collect the tribute, bu t  on 
his rcturn was scoorgccl for disobedience. The disgrace 
cut Ilnrayth deeply ; too late Muhallab realised t h e  
gravity of llis act, but Hurayth spurned his overtures 
and wit11 Tllabit fled to MCsZ a t  Tirmidh. Yazid retdia- 
tctl with foolish severity by maltreating their families, 
wliicll only illflamed the general resentment. Hurayth  
and Thsbit uscd their influence to stir up an  insurrection 
to act iu co~~cert with Mfis?i ; the king of ChaghZniZn 
ant1 his llplitl~alite coufeclerates heacled by NEzak, prince 
of Bgdgllis, readily responded, while Persian interest was 
cscitetl by the return to Tukh~ristZn of the son of PErbz, 
tllc heir of Llle SL3.nids. I t  seems probablethat even some 
of gays mere a party to the scheme (18). Seizing a n  
opllortulliiy tvh~n Yazid was occupiecl with the rebel 
forces of Ibll al-Asllatli on the borders of I(hur&.sjln t h e  
rc\'olt broke out. Yazid \\,as powerless to prevent tile 
csl)l1lsion of his residents from Chaghgnisn and Lower 
T~~kbRristZn, arid MCisri is said to have refrained froln 
in\.:lding ICllurZsZn only fro111 fear that it fall into 
the hallds of '1;hZbit and ffirayth. Even the success 
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claimed for Yazid in BBclghis can have beell of little cifcct 
(19). Fortunately for thc Arabs, Muss's jealousy of 
ThZbit and IIurayth causcd a division ill tllc ranlts of 
their enemies, but though the brothers both fell ill battle, 
the danger remained acute. The so11 of PEr6z still 
lingered in TukharistSn, and even at  tIlere 
was some uneasiness about the situation in Rllurazn (20). 
TO Hajjaj i t  was obvious that the first. essential was 
to reunite the Arabs and that so long as Yazid was in 
power that was impossible. The only difficnlty lvns to 
find a governor acceptable to Qays and to substitute 11irn 
without rislting a revolt of Azd. I t  was solved wit11 
admirable ingenuity. By ordering Yazid to transfer 
his authority to his weaker brother Mufaddal, Ilajjsj 
a t  one stroke removed the man from whom he had most. 
to  fear and prevented him from uniting Azd in opposition, 
although Yazid realised that the fall of his house ir7as 
imminent. At the same time the Caliph's permission 
was sought for the nomination of Qutayba ibn h1usli1n 
as governor of KhurLsBn. Belonging to the neutral tribe 
of B&hila, Qutayba was recboned as allied to Qnys, 
b u t  might be trusted to  hold the scales evenly between 
the factions ; he had already dis t in~~ished himself in 
'Ir8q and in his governorship of Rayy, and was the more 
devoted to HajjEj in that he was protected by no strong 
party of his o m .  The accepted belief that HajjZj took 
no steps to remove the family of Mui~ailab until Mosa was 
put  out of the way is based on a remark attributed to 
Muhallab in the &Ifis%-legend. which is frequently contra- 
dicted elsewhere both expressly and by implication. 
Mufaddal, during his nine monll~s of office in 851704, 
seems to have endcavoured to in~prcss Hajjaj by a show 
of military activity against the rebels in BBdghis. At the 
same time, acting in concert with the local princes 
(magnified in the legend to " Tarlthiin a ~ l d  as-Sabal "), 
he sent an expedition to Tirmidh under 'OthmAn bb. 
~ ~ ~ [ f i d ,  ~ \ f f i ~ g  was cut off ancl ltilled in a sortie ancl his 
S u l a y m ~  surrendered at discretion. Ilajjsj's 
first exclalnation on hcarillg the ilews is said to have been 
one of anger at the insult to Qays, but the last hindrance 
to the appoiutme~lt of the new governor was now removecl 
and towards the close of the year Qutayba b. Muslim 
arrived in M e y v .  
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111. THE CONQUESTS OF QUTAYBA 
THE achievements of the Muslim ar~llies in Central nsia 
during the reign of Walid I wel-e due in the first ,,lace to 
the complete co-operation between tlle directive gcnilIs of 
Hajjzj and the military capacity of Qutayba. Qutayl,n's 
strategic abilities have been somewhat overrated, tl,ougll , 
the Arabic texts are at no pains to  conceal the fact tllat 
his gifts fell something short of genius. On lnorc tllall 
one occasion we are shown in wliat coilstant toucll thc 
viceroy was kept with the progress of his armies, ;ullci llow 
large a part he toolr in drawing up the'plan of campaign, 
though the credit of carrying it throng11 to a succcssiul 
issue rightly belongs to Qutayba. Iiajjiij seems to 11avc 
had the fullest confidence in his lieutenant, ancl if hc did 
not hesitate lo utter reproof and waiming when occnsioll 
required, he was equally quick to express appreciation of 
Qutayba's success. The Arabs of all carties sooil rcalisccl 
that behind their general lay the authority of HajjHj, ihc 
wholesome respect inspired by whom prcventerl a.11~ open 
breach during his lifetime. The second factor wl1ic11 
materially assisted the conquests was that in tlleic prosc- 
cution Qutayba united all parties in I<hurZs%n, l'cl.si;u~s 
and Arabs, Qays and Yemen. It was no small iuatter to 
keep their enthusiasm unabated in the face of campaigns 
so protractecl and severe, nor can the entliusiasm bc 
explained only by the attraction of a rich booty. It is 
by no means improbable that Qutayba's success was 
really due more to his talent for administration than to his 
generalship. He  seems to have realised, a s  no other 
Arab governor in t h e  east had yet done, that  in sucll a 
province as I<hurHsHn the safety and security of the 
Arab government must depend in the long run on the co- 
operation of the Persian populace, who forlned so great 
a majority in the country. The bitterness of f ~ t i o l l a l  
29 
30 ARAB C o ~ g v ~ s - r s  IN CENTRAL ASIA 
strife had sliowii lio~v unsafe it was to rely on the support 
of the Arabs alone, especially in the face of such a move- 
ment as Yazid had provoked. By his coilciliatory 
altitude, therefore, Qutayba earned the conficlence of the 
Pcrsiails and repaid it witli conficlence ; from his constant 
enlployment of Persian agents and liis growing prefes- 
ence for Persian governors, it would seem even tha t  he 
came to regard them as forming the " 'Ashira " he laclced 
among the Arabs. Although it earned him the ill-will 
of the Arabs am1 played a great part in his fall, i t  may be  
that in this he was instrumental in giving the first impulse 
to the recoveiy of a national sentiment amongst the 
1 ! 
Persians of I<l~urasan. 
Tlle situation in Central Asia was also favourable for ! 
a rcnewal of the attempt to annex to the Arab dominions j 
tlie rich lands of Transoxania, though it  is doubtful how 
much information the Arabs possessed on this point. 
In 682, while Cliina, wealtened internally by the intrigues 
of the Empress Wu, hacl her hancls tied by the wars with 
Tibet, the Easten1 or Northern Turlrs had re-asserted i ! 
their indepencleoce. The new Empire never regained 
its authority over all the western territories of the former 
IChans, but by constant campaigns hacl extended its rule 
over tlie Ten Tribes of the Ili and Chu, who, we are 
told, were " almost annihilated." In 701 the Eastern 
'Y~lbs invaded Sogdiana, but there is no reason to assume, 
though it has frequently been suggested, that Mul~allab's I 
forces a t  ICisli were affected by this raid. As the necessity 
of securing hostages for the safety even of the lines of 
i 
co~nn~uiiicatioil shows, the hostility of the local forces is 1. 
suficient to explain all the encounters narrated. The I 
devastation and loss that invariably accompanied these 
raids must have still further wealtened the resources of I ! 
the subject princes, to whom there was small consolation 1 in the appointment of a son of the Khan to command the  
Ten Tribes. 111 any case the unceasing warfare which 
the E a s t e ~ n  Turks had to wage against the Tiisgesh I 
from 699 to 711 eifectnally prevented them from sendulg I 
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assistance in response to  any appeals for sulpport wllicll 
may have reached them from Sogdiana (1). Rqtlally if 
not more impossible was it for the Tiirgesh to intervene 
in Sogdiana during the same period (2). By the " Turlts," 
as we have seen, the Arab historians mean as a general 
rule the local inhabitants, - amongst whom tliere inay 
quite possibly have been included a t  that time Turkisli 
elements. Occasional references to  the 1<118qiin (nnlcss 
they may be talcen to  refer to  local chiefs, wllicli is 
improbable) are obvious falzhr-developments. The 
narrative of 98 A.H. 011 which the theory of Tiirgesl~ 
intervention is mainly based, is a pure Biihilite invention. 
Finally, the experience 'of the Arabs in later yeam shows 
us that, if the resistance of Sogdiana llad been baclted by 
large forces oI Turks, it would have been iinpossible for 
Qutayba to achieve so large a measure of success. 
The conquests of Qutayba fall iiaturally illto iour 
periods : 
1. 861705 : The recovery of Lower Tult1~;lristiin ; 
2. From 871706 to 901709 : The conql~cst of 
Bukh2rB ; 
3. From 91/710 t o  931712 : Consolidation of the 
Arab authority in the Oxus valley and its exteilsion 
into Sughd; 
il.. From 94/713 t o  961716 : Expeditions into thc 
Jaxartes provinces. 
The recovery of Lower Tukh~Zris/drz. 
The first task before Qutayba was to  crush the 
revoll ol Lower Tulrh%ristBn. I n  the spring of 861705 
the army was assembled and marched through Merv 
R6dh and T5laqjn on Ballth. According to one of 
Tabari's narratives the city was surrenderecl ~vithout a 
blow. A second account, which, though not explicitly 
givcn as Bshilite, may be regarded as such, since it 
centres on Qutayba's brother and is inte~lclecl to 
establish a Bxllilite claim on the Barinaltids, speaks of a 
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revolt alllollgst solne of the inhabitants. This lnay 
1 I 
l,L~,.llal~s tllc lrlorc correct version, since we hear  of \ 
~ ( ; ~ l k l ~  bcillg ill a l.ui11ous condition four Years la ter  
1 ,  0 .  1). Thc submission of Ballch was follo~ved 
1,). ~ l ~ ~ ~ t  of 'rislr, king of ChaghZnijll, who had  ~xobabb' 1 
cclolwr;ltctl wit11 Mufaddal in the attack on Tinnidh t h e  1 
\j[ylr llefore. His action was, it  seems, inspired by  a feud I 
\Vitl1 tllc liillg of Slliimxn and Althariul, ill the  upper 
of the Surltllan and Penjab rivers, against 
l,c llo1)cd to use tlie Arab troops in return f o r h i s  assis- 
i 
1 
1:lncc to thcm. Mufaddal had actually projected a n  
cs],ctlitio~l against SliUln&n before his recall, a n d  it was 
IIIJ\V c::~rrictl out by Qutayba, who was perhaps the  Inore 
~.rr:itly to ul~dertake it since i t  assured the safety of t h e  
coi~tllern nplxoacli to the Iron Gate. After t he  submis- 
sil)n of tllc Icing GllislashtHn, who was of Turkish blood, 
:~c.cortling to Yuan-Cliwa~~g, Qlntayba returned t o  Merv ., 
;~lonc>, Ic:rvi~~g t l~c  army to follow under his brother  
Srilik, who carried out a number of minor raids oil t h e  
y .  It is ol,vious that, in spite of Balsdhuri's imagina- 
tive nccciunt, these raids must be located in the districts 
ltc3ifil~bouri~~g on tllc Oxus. The readings in Tabari ' s  
11:irrntive arc, I~@\\~ever, defective (3). Having t h u s  
i~o1:itcrl Nc'zak in BZdghis, the heart of t h e  revolt ,  
[,.!~lta$x~ S\K?II~ the winter months in negotiating wi th  
lli111 tllr(~ng11 Sulayn~ " the Counsellor," an influential 
I't!r~i:lll wllosc sltill in conducti~lg the most difficult 
n~'h'Otiatiolls pro~ccl more illan once of the u tmos t  
\';'lllc to Jjutayba. Nezalc was persuaded to surrellder 
:uld was ~(111dllCt~d to Mcrv, wllere peace was concluded 
on coll(litio11 that Qutayba would not enter ~ g d ~ l ~ i ~  
perso11. AS a precautionaly measure however t h e  
#cl\'cmor al~anged that NezaIc sllould accompany him 
il l  all cspeditions. Thus for the molnent at least, the 
d W c r  of an outbrealc in I<hur~s~l.n was averted, in a 
'nmlllc'c llononrable to both parties, tile son of peraz 
" ~ ) k  IVaY back to China to await a more favourable ol)portn~~ity (4). 
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The Cowquest of BukAltr~. 
In the following year, Qutayba, first making sure of 
the crossings at  Amul and Zamm, opened his calnpaigns 
in B u l ~ h % ~ &  wit11 311 attack on Paylrand, From the 
expressions of Narshakhi, on whose llistory of this 
we may place more reliance since his details as a I-de 
fit in with and supplement the other ilistol.ies, it 
can be gathered that  the principality of BukhSra was 
weakened by civil war and invasion. During the minority 
of TughshCda and the regency of ICh%tiln, the alllbitious 
nobles had struggled between tl~ernselves for the cl~ief 
power ; most of the territories, includi~lg Bukhirfi itself, 
had been seized by the prince of Warrl,~na and the re- 
maining districts seem to have been bmugllt under the 
rule of Khunuk IChudSh, a noble who assulned the title 
of Bulrhar Xhudah (5) ). Paylcand was thus more or less 
isolated and, from Narshalclii's account, secms to have 
been left to its fate. The battle with the Sughdinns 
related in Tabari is an obvious anticipation from thc 
events of the following year. After a siege of some two 
months the city came to tenns with Qutabya, who left 
it under a small garrison and, according to Tabari's 
version, began the return march to Merv. A n  kineute in 
Payltand, however, brought liim back a t  once. It seems 
reasonable to assume that the citizens, illlagining 
Qntayba's attaclz to  hnve been no more than a11 isolated 
raid, tried to expel the garrison as soon as 11e retired. 
The details given in Narshalrhi, that on Qntayba's ad- 
vance towards BukharZ a certain citizen, a ~ ~ a g e d  by
the insulting conduct of the governor, Wlrqa' b. Nasr 
al-Bzxli, attempted t o  murder him, are trivial and 
unconvillcing. Whatever the cause of tllc revolt may 
have been, however, Qutayba took a ierriblc revenge. 
In accordance mediaeval practice the ralegadc city 
was sacked, its fighting'lnen put to death, and its wornel' 
and children enslaved. The booty taken from t'lisl the 
first of the great trading cities of Central Asia be 
forcibly captured by the Arabs, furnidle(l inexhaustible 
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for the exaggerated details of later tradition. 
~l~~ ]nost ilnportant part nf the spoil was an arsenal of 
\\rcapons and ar.mour, the excellence of which was s11ch 
that the " forging of Sugl~d " appears in contenlporary 
alongri(le the traditional " forging of Davicl " for 
sclperlativc craftsmanship (6). With the consent of 
IlajjSj, these weapons were not incIuded in the division 
tllc booty but used to re-equip t h e  army. The  s tate-  
lllc~,t hat there were only 350 suits of armour in the whole 
army bcfore this is, however, of Bshilite provenance and 
scarcely worthy of credence. The  exemplary punish- 
I U C I I ~  thns meted out by Qutayba to Paykalld at t h e  
I~rgin~~ing of his career was a stern warning to  N~za lc  a n d  
t l ~ c  Sogdia~~s. Those wl~o accepted Arab dominion would 
I)c 1n1111a11cly trcatccl, but any attempt at  rebellio~l would 
11c ii~cxorably cruslled. Nevertlleless the sentence o n  
I ' a ~ ~ k a ~ ~ d  was so~newl~at mitigated in the sequel, as 
N;~rsl~akl~i allds that tlle captives were ra~lsorned by t h e  
~nrrc:l~a~~ts of Payltancl on their return from the a n n u a l  
irntlit~g cxl>cclition to China, ancl the city, after lying in  
ruins for n1r111y years, was eventnally rebuilt. 
The clisxster at Payltand roused the princes ancl 
nlcrcl~ants of Trnnsoxania to the danger of neglecting t h e  
illv;l(lcrs. Tl~e feud between WardZna and BukhZr3 
(\.;IS pakhcd up ; round Wariljn I < h u d ~ ~ l ~ ,  the cen t ra l  
figure arld oganiser of t l ~ c  struggle for independence, 
g:ltllere(l the forces of all the nearer principalities. T h u s  
wllcn Quta~~ba, OII renewing his expedition in 881707, 
take11 the outlying town of Tiimushltdh (not Nfiln- 
usllkatll, wvllich was the earlier nalne of Bukharz) 
Ksnfith:lna (or Rzmtin), 11e iound llis communications 
cllt tllc troops of Ward?ina, B u k h x r ~ ,  and Sughd. 
It is llot, ~ e r l l a ~ s ,  ilnpossible that the prince of Fargh%na 
dlcl'llrl have cooperated wit11 the Suglldialls, as  stated in 
afadz'illi's account. On the other halld tile Arabic 
narrati"cs are far from explicit, and tile Sughdians here 
refrrrect arc lnucll lnore probably those of l(ish than of 
Salnarqand, a suspicion wIlic11 is by the 
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ia~nous  punning order of Hajjiij : " Crush ICish, destroy 
Nasal, and drive Wardill] back." Narshakhi and Ya'- 
qnbi gives an account of the negotiations between 
Hayyan an-Nabati, representing Qutayba, and Tarkhan 
king of Sughd, which is certainly to be put, with Tabari, 
aftel: the conquest of Bulhiirii two years later. Through- 
out all these campaigns there is manifest a tendency, 
common to the early chronicles of all nations, t o  exagger- 
ate the numbers ancl composition of the opposing forces. 
As usual the Bd~ili te account carries this to the point of 
absurdity by introducing a Tiirgesh force of no lcss than 
200,000 men, an obvious ai~achronism, influenced by the 
later Tiil-gesh invasions. The connection is nlade clear 
by the inention of IICfir Maghalfin, whom we find nearly 
thirty years later (Tab. 11. 1602. 2) as " one of the chiefs 
of the Tiirgesh." The true account would seem to be 
that Qutayba did not attempt to fight a pitched battle, 
but by dilatory tactics wearied out the allies and gave 
time for their natural inclination towards disunion to  
operate, then evaded ihcm by a rapid march through the 
Iron Gate ancl, except for a rcarguard skirmish with the 
enemy's cavalry, got his army clear across the river at 
Tirmidh. The appointmalt of 'Abdur-RahmZn ibn 
Muslirn to command the real-guard gives us the  clue, as 
it was to this brother that Qutayba regularly entrusted 
all the most difficult commands. In the following year 
Qutayba was still unable to make beadway against the 
united forces of Wardiin IIChudiih, ICish and Nasaf, and 
after protracted fighting (in spite of the double victory 
claimed by the Bghilites) returned to Merv. For this 
weakness he was severely reprimanded by Hajjzj, who, 
with the aid of a map, drew up a plan of attack. The 
i~ivasion of 00/709 seems to have taken Wardiin IIChudBh 
by surprise, as the IvIuslim army was able to advance a t  
once to the siege of Bukhilrii. There is some ground for 
the conjecture, however, that t l ~ e  death of WardZn 
I<hudiih had occurred in the interval and that Qutayba 
was opposed only by the local forces (7). This may also 
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tile liesitation of tlie forces of Samarqand t o  inter- 
,,crle, TIle battle before the walls of Bulthgrg is  dcs- 
cribcd by Tabari in a long Tamimite tradition reminiscent 
,f tile ancient " days," but tlie actual capture o f  t h e  c i ty  
is left to be iderred. This siege is transferred t o  
WnrdSna by Vambery (cf. Heart of Asia  P. 62) 
l,rObably on the authority of the Persian Tabari (Zoten- 1 
I , ~ ~ ~  111. l ~ i j ) ,  but Narshakhi, Tabari and all o the r  I 
nu~llor.itics quite definitely refer to BukhHriE. Abfi I 
'l]haydaEs tradition (Bal. 420) of capture by treachery is  
at best a confusion with the capture of Samarqand. All 
tlla details given in Narsllalthi relative to Qutayba's  
orgnnia;ltion of Uulcli%r% do not refer to this year ; m o s t  
lnoh11)ly the only imlnediate measures taken were t h e  
inllmsitioii oi a tribute of 200,000 dirhelns and the  occupa- 
tioli ol  t l ~ c  itadel by an Arab garrison. 
A tliplomatic success followed the victory a t  BukharB. 
firkhfin, king of Sanlarqand, opened negotiatio~is w i th  
(!t~t;qlba, who was represented by the commander of h i s  
llcrsi;~u corps, Hayy?in an-Nabati, and terms were a g r e e d  
I I ~ I O I I ,  probably on the basis of the old treaty m a d e  by 
Salm ibn Ziyiid. Tarlthfiil gave hostages for the p a y m e n t  
of tributc and Qutayba begail the march back t o  Merv.  
Cotrsolirlnlioic and Advance. 
If tllc Aral~s retunled in the autulnn of B0/709 e la ted  
nit11 tllcir success, they were soon given fresh cause f o r  
:lnxict~. NEzak, finally realising that all hope of recover- 
illl: intlependcnce must be extinguished if Arab rule was 
strengtll[!lle~l in I<hur&%n, and perhaps putting down  to 
weakllcss Qutayba's willingness to gain his ends if possible 
"Y di~llomacy, determined on a last effort to  overthrow 
JIusliln sovereignty in Lower Tukllsristsn, at the moment 
wl'cn it was least to be expected. Having obtained 
 mission to revisit his home, he left ~ ~ , t ~ ~ b ~  at ~ ~l 
and for Balkll, ,but escaped to Tulthsrista in 
avoid From here he correspollded with tile 
rlL1ers uf 13alkI1, blerv Rfidh, Tjlaqgn, F ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ,  and JGz- 
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jgn, urging tlleln to undertake a coilcertecl rising ill the 
s~rillg. Tile k h ~ g  of Chagl~%ni%i~ seenls to llave refused 
to countelllance tlle conspiracy, but the weal< ~ ~ b ~ l ~ ~  of 
T u l ~ h h i s t ~ n  was induced, possibly by force, to l,lalce 
common cause with NEzak, who hoped doubtless by this 
nleans to unite all the subject priuces in defence of tlleir 
suzerain. 
Qutayba's army was already cfisbandecl a11~1 the 
winter was setting in. All that he could do was to des- 
patch the garrison at Merv, some 12,000 men, under 
'Abclur-Rahma, with instructions to winter in Ball&, 
where they could counter any iinmecliate move by 
NEzalc, and advance illto TulthBrist%n in the spriilg. 
This resolute action made Qutayba master of the situa- 
tion and so intimidated the rebels that wllen, in the early 
spring, the Arabs marched through the clisaffected 
districts, scarcely a blow was struck and the princes either 
submitted or fled. The inhabitants were granted a 
colnplete alnnesty except at  TalBqkl, concerning which 
the traditions are hopelessly confused. According to one 
account, a band of robbers were there executed and 
crucified, but it is possible that it was selected for special 
severity because there alone the revolt had openly broken 
out (8). -There was probably also some reorganization 
of the administration of Lower Tulth%rista, in the 
direction of conferring fuller powers on the Arab governors 
installed ill each district, t h o ~ ~ g h  t e native prillces con- 
tinued to exercise a nominai authority. From Balltll, 
Qutayba marched forward and rejoi~led 'Abdu1.-Rah- 
mzn, With the assistance of the lesser princes they 
pursued and captured NEzalc, who was s~~bsequentl~ 
executed on direct orders from HajjBj, in violation of 
~ ~ t ~ ~ b ~ ' s  promise of pardon (8). How little this action 
was by the prevailing spirit of the age, 1 '0~- 
ever, is shown by the contemporary poelns quoted 
Tabari, laudillg the " defender of the precincts of Islam " 
alld his action to the measures formerly 
adopted against the Jewish tribes of Maclina. Yet even 
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a t  tllis time \\re find traces of the new spirit that was t o  
makc itself lllore felt in later years,and hear voices raised, 
like Tllabit Qullla's, against the " treachery that calls 
itself resolution." Tabari inserts at this point t h e  
Ilarl:lti\rc of tile p u t t i ~ ~ g  to death of the hostages of 
JfixjfiIl, ill retaliation for the lllurder of t he  Arab hostage 
In JtLjBn, a more excusable incident. BalEdhuri 
puts it at t ] ~ e  beginning of Qutayba's career, however, j 
as tllougll it bclo~~ged to  the first pacificatioll of Lower I 
l'~~kl~grisbdn, so that its position in Tabari may possibly 
IIC tluc to its superficial similarity with the case of NBzak. 
The results of this exl~editio~l were of the greatest impor- 
t;uncc : not only was NBzalc's scheme crushed and Lower  
'I'uklidrist311 heliceforth i n c o ~ ~ o r a t e d  in the Arab Empire ,  
I)ut also for the first tinlc Arab authority was extended 
cl\.csr tlic Jabghu and his immediate vassals in the O x u s  
1,asin. 'I'Jic fonner, exiled to Damascus, formed a valu- 
a l ~ l o  liostagc agaiust any attempt to  regain indepa~dence,  
;111tl it sce~us not improbable that the king of ChaghZniSn 
\US made rcgcnt for the young Jabghu (see above, p. 9) ,  
'Abtli~r-l<aki~~an was appointed governor of Balkh, in 
ortlcr to su11cl.vise the administration of the new 
l~o\~ince.  
Qutayba l~ad hardly returned to Merv before h e  was 
c:trlktl to deal with yet anotl~er revolt. The  king of 
Sl~ilmPri, taking advantage of the difficulties of the Arabs,  
their absence in the southe~n mountains, had re- . 
asscrtecl his indcpcndence in spite of t h e  col~ciliatory 
clffcrs of Sdlih ibn hlusliin. The full weight of Qutayba's 
l'owcr was now employed to crush him. His strollghold 
attacked wit11 siege artillery, the Iring himself l<ille,-J 
in a sortie and the garrison put to the sword. From tllis 
lmillt Shfiman and fxkharfin gradually drop out of t h e  
Arabic narratives altogether. Qutayba then resLulled 
Inarch tllrouk!ll the Iron Gate, reduced the  distric.ts of 
Nasaf, altd revisited Bukhsr%, Tilerc seems lo colltinud fnction betweell the Arab 
''Id tllc l~oi~ulatioll ((10) and it was felt that a drastic 
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re-orgalisation was necessary. Tughsh~da,  tllougll still 
a youtll, was restored to the position of Bl\lrh.&r-I<lLil&~ll, 
and the leaders of the hostile party (more probably thtlt 
of Khunulc XhudEh than Wardan IIl~udSll) were to 
death. By this means, Qutayba 110 doubt ilopctl lo 
secilre compliance and docility ill the native a < l l x ~ i n i ~ t ~ ~ -  
tion. TughshEda had been raised to the tllronc by tllc 
Arabs and it might be expected tliat he woul~l sictc witll 
them in consequence. A more solid guarantee for tile 
perlllallence of the conquest, however, was the establis11- 
ment of a military cololly in Bukli?ir~i. Following the 
precedent set in the coloriization of Merv, Arabs wcrc 
lodged in the houses of the inhabitants, wlcl it is saicl tllat 
the latter were encouraged to attend thc Priclay prayer 
and behave as Muslims by the distribution oi a small 
gratuity. The Rushan merchants left their honlcs and 
property rather than comply with these ordc1.s : I I I ~  
founded a new city outside tllewalls, but it is cviclc~~t t int  
the lsiamizatio~l of the city was not yot so thorough as 
the traditions assert (11). The bl~ildii~g of tlic &IOS[~IIC 
and the organization of the Friday services are tlntetl by 
Narshalrhi in 94 A.H., which points to a further orga~liaa- 
tion of the city after the capture of Sa~narcland. Thc 
organization of the new territories proceeded, in lact, 
pari passu wit11 the extension and consolidatio~l of t l ~ c  
conquests. So long as the Arab authority was insccurc 
in Cisoxallia, it was out of the question to cstablisll 
il 1011 either lnaitary colollics or an elaborate adnliuistr 1' 
beyolld the river. Consequently, it Was 0111~ llow tllat 
failure of Ntzak's revolt had clefinitely ~ecurecl tile 
~~~b dominion irl the former Eplithalite lands that i t  
was possible to talte the decisive stell of sctllillg an Arab 
garrison in Bukll&rH. The regularity wit11 wliich ~ ~ 1 1  
step followed the last suggests that it was dolie according 
to a prearl-angcrJ plall, or at least that some attention 
had been devoted to the question of the administratioil 
o~ the occupied territories in the event of the success of 
the military operatiolls. 
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Qutayba's reorgallizatioll was not confined to the 
civil government, however, but exiel~cled to tile army as 
well. Hitherto the jealousy of the Arabs for their 
exclusive rights as a warrior caste had strictly limited 
the number of Persians in the arinies, apart from the 
clients and camp followers. Thus we are told (Tab. 1290. 
20) that the armies of I<hurban at  this period were 
cornposed as follows : fro111 Basra - Ah1 al-'Aliya 9,000; 
Bakr 7,000 ; Tmnim, 10,000 ; 'Abd a1 Qays, 4,000 ; 
Azd, 10,000 : fro111 Kcfa, 7,000 : and alongside these 
47,000 Arabs only 7,000 MawSli, commanded by HayyS~l- 
an-Nabati, who is called variously a Daylamite and  a 
native of IU~ur&s&n, Now, however, Qutayba i~ll l~osed, 
first on BulthXrg, and later on each successive conquest, 
the obligation of providi~lg rul auxiliary corps of local 
trooys, amounting usually to some ten or twei~ty thousand 
men, to serve with the Arab armies. I t  is possible, if 
the story be true, that this was suggested by the precedent 
sct by Sa'id b. 'Othmb in tile conquest of Sarnarqand, 
but more probable that it represents an entirely new 
departure in the East, tl~ough it had long been a practice 
in other s~>heres of the Arab conquests. 
We are given no hint of the motives which led to  t he  
adoption of the new system, though it would seein t h a t  
tiley must have been of some force. Possibly i t  was n o  
more than a desire to keep the native armies occupied 
in the service of the Arabs rather than risk a revolt in 
their rear. H a j j ~ j  and Qutayba perhaps realised too 
that the Arab forces by themselves, after taking four  
Years to reduce Bukh~rii alone, were insufficient t o  ensure 
success in the greater task of subduing Samarqaild. 
Ullder the ncm systein-which recalls Pan-ch'ao's famous 
" Use barbarians to attack barbarians "-. 
each concluest in turn made the next more easy. T h e  
rapidity of Qutayba's later coliquests ill contrast with 
e x l ~  period is thus explained. I t  is just possible 
in this i > l ~  Qutayba had an ulterior motive as well : 
"le of a Persian amy ,  trained 011 the sallle 
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lines as the Arab forces, but more devoted to tile person 
of the ~overlior ancl able to take his part agaillst the 
Arabs. E I o ~  very nearly this plan succeeded, even hi 
~utayba's own case, the sequel was to show. 
The llractice of raising native levies, once started, 
appears to  have become general in I<hur%zn. We have 
no information as to  when the local forces of I<huZssn 
and Lower TulchBrist2n were incorporated in  tlie a m y ,  
nor in what proportions, but we have frequent evidence 
of tlieir presence and increasing prestige in thc wars of 
the next forty yeax  (i2). On the other hand, though 
contingents from the towns of Sogdiana were used by 
later goverliors if they were available, as ill 106 and 112 
A.H. ,  in view of the wealcer hold of the Arabs on Trans- 
oxmia Sogdian troops never formed a regular division 
of the Arab forces up  to the end of the Umayyad period. 
This distiiictioil between the two subject Iranian groups 
became, as will be seen, of some importance w11en the 
'AbbEsid propaganda began to tamper with the loyalty 
of the armies of I<hurb&. 
While Qutayba was occupied with the new organiza- 
tion of Bulchzrz, a detached force, sent under 'Abdiir- 
Raltma~ from I<ish t o  Sarnarqand to exact from Tarkhiin 
the tiibute agreed upon in the previous year, successfully . 
accomplished its mission. 'Abdur-Rafcmxn, after 
restoring the hostages to Tarlchfin, rcjoined his brother a t  
BulcliLrB, whencc they returned t o  Merv for the winter. 
One important vassal of TulthZrist&n, who liad 1o11g 
been a tliorn in the side of HajjZj, still remained unsub- 
dued. 'rllis was Rutbil or Zunbil, the Turkish ruler of 
Zgbulistsn (la). I n  91, the viceroy united Sijistsn to 
the proviilce d KhurZsBn, with instructions t o  Qutayba 
to unclertalce a campaign in person against Rutbil. In 
following year, therefore, thc expeditions into Trans- 
oxallia were interrupted, and the army agaill Inarched 
soutl1wards. To Qutayba's great relief (for he disliked 
to ulldertake a canlpaig~l against this fornlidable 
who llacl lnade Sijistan " ail ill-omened frontier ") 
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Rutbil hastened to tender his subnlission, and at the sarne 
time sent an embassy to convey his homage lo the 
Bmperor of China (14). Recognition of Arab suzerainty 
over Z?tbulist%n involved of course only the payment of 
a fixed tribute, ancl no attempt was made at a permanent 
occul~ation. 
Meauvllile a serious situatioil had arisen in Sughd. 
Tile l~lerchal~ts and nobles of Sa~narqand had resented 
the wealilless of their lcir~g and the payment of tribute : 
in Qutayba's absericc the party for resistailce d oztlraace 
gained the upper hand, and Tarkhtn, deposed on the 
grouilcl of incapacity, committed suicide. The choice 1 
of the electors fell 011 Ghiirak (15), a prince of whom we 
would gladly have known more. Under the ever incre'as- 
ing clificulties with which he was confronted during his 
twenty-seven years of rule, his consu~n~nate handling 
01 the nos t  confused situations shows to have beell 
at once statesnlan and patriot, and preserved his king- 
i 
donl fro111 repeated disaster. The action of the Sugl~clian 
nobles, lio~vever, the Arabic account of which is col~iirmed 
by the Chhcsc records, coilstituted a challa~ge t o  Arab 
pretensions whicl~ Qutayba could ]lot be slow in answer- 
ing. These considerations clearly disprove the  partial 
tradition of Abii 'Ubayda (Bal. 422), lo the effect that  
Qutayba treacherously attacked I<hw~riznl and Sanlar- I 
qm d  in spite of the treaties of Sa'id ib i~  'Othman, and the 
argument based upon it by van Vloten in L a  Dorni%atio,r 
Auabe, must also, in consequence, be somewhat modified. 
The winter of 931711, therefore, was spent in pre- 
paratiorls lor an expedition against Samarqand, but 
before the opening of the cainpaigning season, Qutayba I 
received a. secret ruission from the IChwLriz~n SllSh, 
wllo offered to beconie tributary if the Arabs would rid 
lliln of his rebellious bl-oilier I<hurrazZdl~. Qutayba 
agreed, and after publicly announcillg his intention of 
invdmg Sughd, suddenly al~pcared at Hazarasp. The 
followers of the I<h\vLrizm Shnh wcrc persuaded t o  offer 
no resistance for this year, at least, and accepted the i 
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terms, which included, ill accordance wit11 tllc llew 
scheme, the provision of a corps oi 10,000 at)lcbodied 
lllen as well as the usual tribute. Qutayba rclnnined ;,t 
tile capital (16) until tlie army was collcctcd, wllilc 
'Abdur-Rahm~n was employed, according to T'ahlri, ill 
reducing the Icing of RhLmjird, wlio from tbc l,arallel 
account in BalHdhuri is to be iclc~itified citller t$riill 
IChurrazLdh, or a t  least with his party. Tile lJcrsiall 
Tabari adds a long and cloubtless lege11da1.y ~ ; I ~ . I ~ L L I . C  
of liis surrender. Four thousa~~d prisoners were takcll 
and butchered, probably by order of the l<lnv%riz~n Sl~nll. 
The later history of IChw2rizm under Qutayl~a's rule 
is an unhappy one. His fiwt governor Iyas b. 'Abrlullal~, 
proved too weak for his post, ancl 011 Qutaybu's tvitll- 
drawal tlie KliwPrizmians rose in revolt and put to dcnt11 
the king who had betrayed them. ly% was rc~~l lcd  in 
disgrace, together wit11 the Persian Hayyan all-Nabati, 
who had been associated with hinl, and Qutayba's 
brother 'Abdullah (in BalZdlli~ri 'Ubnydnllnh) was 
appointed as temporary regent until, after il~c capture 
of Samarqand, a strong force uitder nl-hl~~gl~ira b. 
'Abdullah could be sent to effect a reconquest. Q~~tayl~n's 
retribution on this occasio~l exceeded eve11 tlic terror of 
Paykand and Shan~Bn. We am told by Al-UirlSni that 
the educated classes and more cultured clc~~tei~ts in 
Khw5rizm were slaughtered allnost to cxlinciiol~. Hc 
refers this by implicatio~l'to tlie seco~id expcditioll of 
Qutayba (though it does not appear tlrat t11c governor 
led the expedition in person), which is borilc out by \$,hat 
we know of Qutayba's methods in similar cnscs, while 
there js 110 instance in his career of such an action 011 a 
first conquest. ~t was in all probability the educatecl 
classes (including no doubt tlle hierarchy) \rho 
revolt against the traitor lting and lllus met wit11 l -1 '~  
severest punishment. The dynasty, llowcvcr, 
maintained, alld it  is not inlprobable that the Arab 
of which we hear shortly afterwards was settLcc' in 
Rhw2rizrn at the salne time (17). 
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The booty from the first expedition into I<hwZrizrn 
was enougll to satisfy Qutayba's ttoops, who de- 
mandecl to be allowed to return to their hoines, but a 
sudden thrust a t  Sarnarqand proiuised such success that 
Qutayba a11d his leaclers cleciclecl to malce the attempt. 
The Suglldia~ian army had,  apparently been disbanded, 
and  under cover of a false lnovement of the advance 
guard, the Arabs marched directly on Sarnarqand. The 
aclvwlce guard under ' Abdur-RalzmLn numbered 20,000 
men, while the main body included the new Persian 
co~ltingents from Iihwlrizm and BulthSrZ. The march 
occupiecl only a few clays and the slight resistance en- 
countered did not prevent the Arabs from proceeding 
a t  once to invest the city. Ghfiralr conducted the defence 
with vigour, however, and appealed to ShLsll and Far- 
gh&% for assistance, relnindiilg them that Sarnarqand was 
the  bulwarlr of the Jaxartes valley. A strong force was 
despatched from ShLsh with the intention of ~nalcing a 
surprise attack on the Arab camp, but was amnbushecl a t  
~i ight  by a pickecl troop oi Arabs and almost annihilated. 
This reverse, together with the continuous bon~bardlnent 
to  which they were subjected, disheartened the  Suglldians, 
but the wall l~ad  been breached and an entrance a11nost 
effected by t11e Arabs, stoutly assisted by their new 
Iratlian divisions, before Ghiiralt sued for peace. 
Qutayba's demands were unexpectedly light-an annual 
tribute, stateti in widely varying amounts, ancl a strong 
corps of Sugl~dians, together with a stipulation that the  
city sllould be cleared of its fighting men while the  Arabs 
boilt a ~nosque and celebrated the ritual prayers. Once 
~ ~ i t h i n  the gates, however, Qutayba refused to  restore 
the  city to Ghilrak : a strong garrison was established 
in tlie ciladel, under ale conlmaild of 'Abdur-RahmEn 
(so Ya'qBbi; in Tahari 'Abdullah) and drastic orders 
were isstled excluding all unbelievers except under strict 
surveillance, doubtless with the intention of avoiding 
a repetitioll of the friction that: had occurred at BukhLrs. 
Ghfirak cither could not or wo~llcl not place himself in 
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the humiliating position of Tugl~sl~Bda, and wit11 llis 
retinue, accompanied possibly by the merchants, witlldrcw 
from Samarqand altogether and built a nejv city, Iiarnrl- 
l a th ,  some four farsaklls distant ill the dircctioll 
Ishtikhan (18). Qutayba's doable-dcaliug ou tllis 
occasion, however, tarnished his reputation alllong bolll 
Persians ancl Arabs, far  more than liis severity to Paykarld 
and I<hwdrizm, and left a rankling menlory in Srlglld. 
In order to avoid the stigma of treachery attaching to 
their hero the Bzhilite tradition relates this cxpetlitiorl 
in an entirely different version (19). Qutayba, \17c arc 
told, after marching down the right bank of t l ~ c  0x11s 
and collecting his army at BulrhB1-2, advanced to Rabili- 
jZn where he was met by the Sugl~dians under Ghfimk, 
supported by the troops of ShZsh and Iiargli~na a~ltl tl~c 
Turks. The cncmy retired on Saniarqand but cngagcd 
in constant rearguard actions, the city being finally 
entered by  force after a decisive battle in tlic subu~~bs. 
Though this account is at  first sight borne out to son~e 
extent by Ghfiralc's own narrativc in liis letter to the 
Emperor of China, in which he claims an intitial succcss 
against the Arabs, but was unable to  prcvcnt their 
advance, both statements must be regarded as exngge1.a- 
tiolls in opposite interests. A t  all events it is quite 
certain that nonc but Sughdiw troops were involvctl at 
first. 
A further clevelopment of the Bd~ilite tradition lias 
given rise to some controversy. According to illis, 
GhErak appealed for help not o111y to ShSsIl but also to 
the RhBqgn, arid the squadron sent from Slitis11 apl,cars 
as a force of Turks, commanded by a son of tllc I < h B q i ~ i .  
This is, of course, an obvious exaggeration on the formel. 
narrative. In  tlie Turkish Orkhon inscriptions, liowcvcr, 
an expedition under the prince I<iil-tegin into Sogdiann 
" t o  organize the Sogdian people " is mentioned, followirig 
on a successful campaign against the Tiirgesh in 710/711. 
Marquart endeavours to prove that this cxl>edition 
occurred in 712 and is, in fact, co~roboralcd by (Ire 
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BZhilite tradition. Professor Houtsma has raised 
several objections to this view, the most important being 
that the cl~rouology of the inscriptions has lo be manipu- 
lated to allow of this date, as tlie natural date to assume 
froin the contest is at latest 711. These, together with 
the consideratiolis mentioned above, render Marquart's 
hypotliesis absolutely untenable. 
A sccond suggestion has been put forward by Professor 
Barthold, to which, however, Professor Houtsma's 
objections would apply with equal force (20). I n  the 
narrative of the historian Ya'qfibi (11. 314), there is a 
brief notice as follows : " Qutayba appointed his brother 
'Abdur-RnhinFm ibn Muslim goveillor of Samarqand, 
but  the Inen of Sa~narqand treacherously revolted against 
him, and l<ht%qai, lcing of the Turks, attacked him also. 
He  wrote to Qutayba, but Qutayba waited until the 
winter cleared, then ~narched to join him and routed the 
army of the Turlcs." Prafessor Bartholcl takes the view, 
therefore, that this is the expedition referred to in tlie 
iuscriptio~~s~ m c l  attril~utes the failure of the Turlrs to 
tliedisastrous effects of a winter campaign in a devastated 
la~ld ,  wliicli SO severely disabled them that they could 
not iace the formidable army that took the field under 
Qutayba in the spring. It is questionable, however, 
how far Ya'qiibi's narrative may be trusted. None of 
the other ldstorians give the slightest hint of this 
invasion, nor were the results such as we should expect 
after a Suglidian revolt. There was no ruthless re- 
conqnest, no stamping out of rebellion in blood. Neither 
docs the general tenor of Ya'qilbi's accounts of Qutayba 
inspire confidence. They are not only confused in detail 
and cl~ronology-the capture of Samarqand, for instance, 
is dated 94 AH.--but in some cases are talcell from wha t  
we know to be the Bahilite tradition, and in others, 
such as the narrative under discussion and the account of 
t he  collquest of Iihwiirizm, follow a tradition which 
s e e m  irreconcilal>le with our other infor~nation. Wl~i le  
i t  callnot be said definitely therefore, that Ya'qfibi's 
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statements in this case coiltai~i no trntll, it is certainly 
preferable to regard them as  a later development of the 
narrative, on the lines of the Bal~ilite tradition. 
If the chronological objectio~ls raised by Professor 
Houtsma are sound, there reinains still a third possible 
solution, which, however, as tliere is no con-oborativc 
evidence from either the Arabic or Chinese sources, must 
remain nothing bu t  a hypothesis. I t  is surely cluitc 
tenable that Icd-tegin's " organizatioil of t11e Sogdiall 
people " had something to do with t l ~ e  deposition of 
Tarkhfin and appointment of GMralc. With Sogclian 
trade playing the most important part which wc know 
in the Turkish lands, it would be well worth whilc to try 
to prevent the Arabs from obtaiuing control over it. 
The very unexpectedness of the description givcn to this 
expedition shows clearly that there was some motive for 
" organization " and it is clifficult to  see what other 
motive there could have been. These circumstnilces 
would render it quite probable that GhGralc did, in fact, 
appeal t o  the  IShBq%n .for assistance against the Arabs, 
but it seems that the growing power of thc Tiirgesl~ 
barred the way into Sogdiana against t l ~ c  Norlhern 
Khanate for the remainder of its sllort existence. 
By the conquest of Samarqaild Qulayba fillally estab- 
lished his position in Transoxania. It must not be 
assamed, however, as many of the Arab historians give 
the impression of assuming, that the holding of Samarqand 
meant the conquest of Suglld. All that had beell done 
was to settle an  Arab garrison in a colllltr~ as yet 
unfriendly. I t  was the cluty of the conllnanders at 
Samarqa1ld gradually to extend their a u t l l o ~ i t ~  over the 
the whole district of Sughd by expeditions and 
(91). There \"as thus a radical difference between the 
collquest of BukhSrZ and ' that of Samarqand. The 
former was the result of a series of campaips in which 
the resources of the  country had been exhausted and the 
province annexed piecemeal. The whole P ~ P ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~  had 
become subjects of the Arabs a i d  Were under constallt 
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surveillance : TughshS.da llimself held his ranlr on suffer- 
ance ancl was compelled to maintain a t  least an  outward 
show of loyalty. But: Sainarqancl had been captured 
in one swift thrust ; Sughd as a whole was still unsubdued 
and only from policy aclrnowledged the suzerainty of the 
Arabs for the time being. " Ghfiralr at Ishtilrhan was 
free to  tu rn  either to the Arabs or to the Turks " (18). 
Nevertheless in the years that followecl there is evidence 
that  friendly relations were formed between the Arab 
garrison and many of the local leaders and inhabitants 
(3). The whole country, however, had suffered terribly 
in the constant iilvasioils and counter invasions. A 
contenlporary poet gives a vivicl picture of its dissipated 
wealth, its ruinecl and desolate lands : 
' 
"Daily Qniayba gatbels spoil, increasing om. wealth with new 
wealth : A BZllilitc who has worn the crown till the hair that w a s  
black has whitencd. Sughd is subdued by his squadrons, i ts  
people left sitting in nalcedncss . . . As oft as he lights in a land, 
his horse leavc it furrowed and scarred." 
The Ex$editions iwto the Jaxartes Provinces. 
I t  might pcrliaps have been expectecl that Qutayba's 
next object after the capture of Samarqand would be t o  
establish Arab authority in Sughd as firmly as  had been 
done in BukllarE. I t  would probably have been better 
in the end liacl he done so, but for the moment the attrac- 
tions of the  " forwarcl policy " wllich had already provecl 
so successful were too strong. Instead of concentrating 
on the reduction of Suglid, it was decided t o  push the  
frontiers of the Empire further into Central Asia, ancl 
leave the former to be carried out at leisure. Qutayba 
therefore crossed to BulthhB, where 20,000 levies from 
.Khw&riz~n, Bulrhzra, Rish, and Nasaf had been summoned 
t o  ineet him, and marched into Sughd. If there was a 
Turkish army wintering in the country, it offered no  
considerable resistance to the advance of the Arabs. 
I11 Sughd Q ~ ~ t a y b a  divided his forces into two corps. 
The Persian levies were sent in the direction of Sh3,sh, 
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while he himself with the Arabs niarclled on I<llujnllda 
and ParghBna. Our information is brief and lackillg in 
detail. Of tile northern expeclitio~l we are told only 
that they captured ShBsh a n d  bunlt the greater part of it. 
Qutayba's own force had t o  overcome sonle resistance 
a t  Ichujanda, but eventually reacl~ed IGis~n, where it 
was rejoined by the other. The geographers refer also to 
a battle fought by Qutayba at  Minalc in Ushrfisana, but 
against wllorn is not clear (23). Tabari (1440. 7) 
preserves a tradition t h a t  Qutayba appointed an Amb 
resident, 'IsBrn b. 'Abclullah al-B~ihili, in Fargh8na. 
If this is true, as seems n o t  nnliltely, the appointment was 
probably macle during this  year. The details of the 
tradition are quite tunacceptable, however. No Arab 
governor would ever have taken up liis residence in a hill- 
pass in the remotest district of Farghjna, conlpletcly 
cut off from his fellow-countrymen. One of Bal&dhuri's 
authorities carries this 01- a similar tradition further by 
crediting Qutayba with the establishment of Arab 
colonies as far as Shssh and Farg113na. Here again at 
most only temporary military outposts can be in question. 
On the other hand, the extraordina1.y success achievcd 
by the Arabs on this expedition is apt to be ovcrloolied, 
and Qutayba might well l ~ a v e  imagined, as hc returned to 
Merv, that the latest conq~iests were as permsnelltly 
annexed to I<huBs~n  as  Sarnarqa~cI and I<hwiirizm. 
The helplessness of their  Turkisli suzerain in face of 
the victorious Arabs, however, caused a revival in Trans- 
oxania of the tradition of Chinese overlorclship. Al)pcals 
to the IChXqBn were of no avail, and in the minds of the 
Sogdian princes, seeltiilg for some counterpoise to tile 
rapid extension of the Arab  conquests, the idea of aplical- 
ing djrectly to  the Emperor was slowly ~natllring. Thougll 
no definite steps in this direction had as yet been taken, 
some inlrling of it m a y  have reached Qutayba. Tile 
Arabs were now familiar wit11 China through tile sea- 
bolne trade of the p e ~ s i a n  Gulf and at least after, if 
before, their collquest of thc cities which were already 
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becoming the headquarters of Central Asian comrnercc. 
must have become aware of the close commercial relations 
which these cities maiiltaii~ed.with China. Under tllcse 
circumstances, Qutayba (or possibly FIajjXj) clecided to 
send a mission ovedancl to the Chinese court, possibly 
to prevent their intervention in the West, but more prob- 
a 1011s. abIy with the intelltion of promoti~lg trade ].el t' 
As the princes of Sogcliana and Tulth?iristXn were much 
more alive to the advantages of preserviug their colllinerce 
ailcl to  the  dangers which might befall it under the ile\\. 
goverilme~lt than the Arabs could have been, i t  was 
probably on their suggcstio~l that the embassy was sent. 
They would, of course, have no difficulty in persuading 
governors oi the character of HajjZj and Qutayba that 
their own intcresls also lay in safeguarding ancl encourag- 
ing the tracle which brought such wealth to Transoxanin. 
If the intervention of the Turlts had been caused by their 
collcerll for Sogclia~l trade, it became cloubly importa~lt 
for the Arabs to  show their practical interest in its welfare. 
Apart from the immcdiate gain to the treasury which 
would accrue, such a11 action might reasonably be expectccl 
to secure t l ~ e  acquiesceilce of the Sogdians in Arab rule. 
The clate of the mission is fixed as 713 by the Chinese 
recorcls, which adcl also that in spite of the refusal of the 
envoys to  pcrform the customary kow-tow it was favour- 
ably received by  the Emperor. Both statements arc 
co~~firmed b y  Tabari's remark that the leader was sent 
to  Walid on his return, which must therefore be datecl 
between the death of Hajjfij and the end of 714 (24). 
Unfortunately the Arab records of the mission have been 
confused with the legendary exploits of Qutayba two 
years later, becoming so disfigured in the process as to  be 
almost worthless. The wisdom of this step must have 
been justifiecl by  its results, though there are no effects 
appareilt in our histories and the relentless march of 
Chinese policy was uot affected. This embassy is 
mentioned by the  Arabic llistorians as if it were an isolated 
incident, but it was, as I have shown elsewhere (25), 
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only the first of many such sent by the governors of 
IChurCsjn to maintain frialclly relations with the Chinese 
court. It cannot be doubted that in the majority of 
cases at least the object of these missions was commercial, 
particularly where joint embassies were sent with one or 
other of the Sogdian principalities. 
In the following year 951714 the raids on the Jaxartes 
provinces were renewed. I t  wlould seem on comparing 
Balsdhuri's account with Tabari that Qutayba made 
ShXsh his headquarters and worked northwards as far as 
Isbijiib. The prince of Shash appealed to China for 
assistance, but without effect (26). Qutayba's plan 
therefore was to follow up the important trade-route 
which led from Turfan clown the Ili valley, along the 
northern edge of the Thian-Shan mountains, through 
Tokmak and Tariiz into Shiish and Samarqand. Though 
the economic importance of controlling this trade-route 
may have had its part in this decision, especially in view 
of their new patronage of Sogdian trade, it is probable 
that this was less in the mind of the Arabs than its 
strategic value as the road by which the Central Asian 
. . Turks debouched on Transoxania. Towards the end of 
the summer, the expeditions were abruptly interrupted 
by the news of the death of Hajjsj, which had occurred 
in Shawwd (June). Deeply affected by the loss of his 
patron and not a little uncertain of the effect on his own 
fortunes, Qutayba disbanded the army, sending garrisons 
to BukhjrB, Icish, and Nasaf, and returned to Merv. 
i WaIid, however, allayed his fears by an encouraging letter, 
and made his province independent of 'IrBq. But the 
death of Hajjjj llad affected IChurBsBn too deeply for 
such a simple remedy. The Arabs had gained wealth in 
their expeditions, they were weary of the constant 
campaigns and anxious to enjoy the comforts of peace. 
Factional feeling was merely slumbering, and a new ele- 
ment of unrest had been added by a ICfifan corps under 
Jahm b. Zahr, which had been transferred to IChurXsiXn 
from India by Hajjgj in his last year. All parties among 
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tllc ~~~b~ were alienated froin Qutayba ; even g a y s  had  
been estranged by his highhanded actioll in t h e  first 
place ,vitjl the iiouse of Al-Ahtam and again b y  his f eud  
waltiC b,  Abi Siid, the chicf of Tamiln (27) ; more- 
o,rcr, were suspicious of his lneclizing tendencies. 
rimollgst the Persians he was popular, but H ~ Y Y S ~  all- 
Naba& tllougll restored to  his position in command of the 
I+rsian Lrool~s, had not forgiven Qutayba for his disgrace 
a t  I<llwzrizm. It seems extraordinary that the  general 
Ililnscll should have been blind to  any intel~lal  danger 
and was clltircly confident in the loyalty of his army. 
On re-opeiiing the campaign in 96/716, therefore, his  
oilly 1)rccautions consistcd in the removal of his family a n d  
l)crsollal property fro111 Mcrv to Samarqand a n d  the  post- 
ilig ol n guard 011 the Oxus, in view of a possible restora- 
tion io fnvonr of Yazicl b. Muhallab. It is unliliely t h a t  
()t~taybn coulcl have hacl in mind the possibility of 
\Valid's death ; what he feared was more probably a 
~rlfiproclrel>re+tt bctwcen the Caliph and his heir SulaymSn, 
who was liis biitcr encmy. 
Thc object of this last campaign was probably t h e  
colilplete s~~bjugation of FarghZua. Having established 
his authority over the important section of the Middle 
Jaxartes and its trade route,it rclnained now t o  round off 
11is conquests by cxtmdiug it also over the central t rade  
rontc between FarghZna and Kashgaria. The accoullt 
~vliich Tabari intends to convey, however, is that  Qutayba 
mnrcl~ecl first into FargllZila and from there led a n  
expedition against Icashgar, with complete success. In 
article of mine published in the Bttlletir, of the 
School of Oriental Stztdiss (11. 467 ff.), all our eviclei~ce for  
tllis cx~eclition has been critically discussed, and showll to  
bc against tile autI~enticity of the tradition. It is un- 
I1eceSSalY, therefore, to do more than summarise very 
the WgutIIents there put forward. (1) Nolle of 
llistorians earlier than or contemporary with ~ ~ b ~ ~ i  
colltain ally reference to a raid on I<ashgar, ancl even 
Tabxi's own stateinelit is not borne out by the autllor- 
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ities 011 whicli it professedly rests. Only one 01 these 
. . 
relates an expedition to I<ashgar, and that under the 
command of a n  ullk~lown leader. (2) Thc interval 
, , between the opening of t11e campaign and tlie cleat11 of 
Qutayba in FarghBna in August or Septeiuber does not 
allow time for such an  expedition, especially in view of 
the ~nut i~lous attitude of the army after the death of the 
. , Caliph. (3) The Chinese account of Arab interference in 
. . FarghBna cannot refer, for clironological reasons, to 
. . Qutayba's expedition, and in any case is silent on any 
attaclc on Icashgaria. 
That an expedition of this sort sliould have been 
attributed to  Qutayba is not surprising, in view of tlie 
tradition of the embassy to  China, and of the greatrenown 
which attached to h is  memory. Later tradition (28) 
recounted that Hajjzij pledged the governorship of China 
to  the first to reach it of his two governors in the East, 
Mulzammad b. Qxsi~n and Qutayba. " Sin " was, of 
course, not the sharply, clcfined c o ~ ~ ~ i t r y  of our days, but 
rather a loose term for the Far East, including even tlie 
Turltish lands in the North-East. Qutayba had probably 
done little Inore than malte preparations for his campaign, 
perhaps to the extent of sending out millor raiding 
expeditions, when the news of the death of Walid brought 
everything t o  a standstill. 
The historians give the most contradictory accounls 
of the events that followed : accordi~~g to Bal%dhuri 
the new Caliph SulaymLn confirmed Qutayba in liis com- 
mand but gave perlnission to the army to disband. 
Tabari's narrative, with which Ya'qfibi's in general 
agrees, is fully discussed by Wellhausen (274 ff.), togetller 
with a valuable analysis of Qutayba's position. Tile 
story of his l1ighhauded negotiations wit11 SulaymZll 
is too well ltnown to ileecl repetition. Fiiidiug the nrlny 
disik~clined to follow him,  he  completely lost his head and 
roused the mutiny in \v11ich he was ltilled. The Persia11 
levies, who were inclined to side with him, were dissuadc(1 
by Ilayyan an-Nabati, n~ ld  at tlie last ollly his owl 
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family and bodyguard of Sogdian princes remained 
faithful. 
The death of Qutayba marked not merely the end of 
t]le Arab conquests in Central Asia for a quarter of a 
century, but tlie beginning of a period of retrogression. 
Under Waki' b. Abi SBd, his successor (20), the armies 
melted away. Mulrhallad, the son of Yazid b. Mul~allab 
and his lieutenant in Transoxat~ia, canied out summer 
raids on the villages of Sugl~d, but an isolated attempt on 
the Jaxartes provinces by 'Omar's governor, Al-JarrZlt 
b. 'Abclullah, met with ignominious failure. It is possibly 
to this that the tradition, mentioned by Barthold 
(Turbcsta~, 160), of the disaster met with by a Muslim 
army refers. On the other hand an embassy was sent in 
tlle name of tlie Caliph to renew relations with the 
Clliliese court, and a third in concert with tlie ltingdoms of 
TulltBrist%n and Samarqand, etc., during the reign of 
'Omar (25). There is mention also of an expedition into 
ICliuttal wl~ich regaitled some territory. But it was 
Qutayba, with Hajjiii a t  his baclr, who had held his 
conquests together, and when lie disappeared there was 
neither leader nor organisation to talte his place. The 
history of the next decade clearly shows how loose and 
unstable was thc authority of the Arabs. It was force 
that had made the conquests, and only a settled policy 
of force or coilciliation could hold them. The first was 
absent. " Qutayba in chains at the worId's end is more 
terrible to us than Yazid as governor in our very midst " 
is the graphic sumnlary put into the mouths of t h e  
conquered, while of Rutbil, king of Zibnlistiin, we are 
told expressly that after the death of Hajjzj "he paid 
not a ccnt of tribute to any of the govenlors of Sijistiin 
on behalf of the Umayyads 'nor on behalf of Abii 
hluslim." (30). 
Nor was 'Omar's policy a true policy of conciliation, 
based as it was iiot on the maintenance of the Arab 
collquests but on the co~nplete vacuation of Transoxania. 
His orders t o  that effect were of course indignantly 
rejected by Llle Arab colonists ul Bulthiira and Samaqand, 
but together with his appointment of the feeble and 
ineffective 'Abdur-Rahrn~tl b. Nu'ayin al-Qushayri as 
governor, such  a policy was naturally coilstrued by the 
Sogdialls as  mere weakness, and an invitation to regain 
their independence. In addition to the embassies to 
China, to be related in the next chapter, and possibly also 
some negotiations with the Tiirgeslr, Ghiirak sought to 
win back h i s  capital by playing on 'Omar's piety. The 
Caliph sent envoys t o  the princes of Sogdiana calling on 
them to accept IslBm, and Ghiirak, outwardly professing 
his adherence, sent a deputation to 'Oinar urging that as 
"Qutayba deal t  with us treacherously and tyrannically, 
but God h a s  now caused justice and equity i-o reign " 
the city should be restored to the Sughdians. The 
commonsense of the judge appointed to try the case on 
'Omar's instructions by the governor of Sanlaqand, 
SulaymZn b. Abi's-Sari (himself a mawlii), solved the 
problem in a n  eminently practical manner, and we are 
told that his decision, so far from being " malicious," 
was satisfactory to both the Arabs and the Suglidians, if 
not perhaps to  Ghiirak. Beyond the relnission of ltl\araj, 
it is doubtful whether 'Omar's administration benehted 
the subject peoples in the slightest, and the ~.enction 
which followed his brief reign only aggravated the 
situation. Already before its close the Sughdians had 
withdrawn' their allegiance (31). 
Thus within six years from the death of Qutayba, 
rnuch of his work was undone. He had laid the founda- 
tions on which the later rule of Islam was built, and laid 
them well, though his own superstructure was too flimsy 
to withstand the tempests of the years ahead. But the 
fault was n o t  entirely, perhaps not even chiefly, the fault 
of the builder. He was snatched away before his work 
was done, even if in his latter years he tellded to  neglect 
everything else for military glary. AS we shall see, there 
was no peace in Transoxanja until other men arose, great 
and strong enough to adopt and carry out tile best of 
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llis The nlthlessness and ferocity of his conquests,. 
llowever, llave been mnch exaggerated. He was always 
ready to use cliplomacy rather than force if it  offered ally 
]lope of succc~s, SO much so that his lenience was mis- 
cotlstrucd 011 occasion by both friends and foes. Only 
in cases of treachely aud revolt his punishment came swift 
alld terrible. That he did not hesitate to take vengeallce 
011 bis private enemies is to say no more than t h a t  he  was 
Arab. I t  was ilot without reason that in later days 
the Muslir~ls of Central Asia added Qutayba's name to  
thc roll of nlartyrs and that his tomb in FarghZna became 
a favourite place of pilgrimage (32). 
To surn up the position in Central Asia in the years 
i~nmecliaiely following Qutayba's conquests :- 
(1) Lower Tukharistan and CliaghZniSn formed an 
integral part of the Arab Einpire. 
(2) Tnklialistxn, now in the decay of its power, was 
hcld as a vassal state, together with the Transoxine 
provinces oI ICliuttal, ICum~cIh, etc., where, however, the 
Arab authority was rnuch weaker. 
(3) In Sogcliana, Bultl~drZ was regarded a s  a per- 
rnanent conquest and gradually colo~lized ; Sughd  was 
still hostile territory held by strong outpost garrisons in 
Samarqand and ICisll, co~~nected to Bukhba by minor 
posts. 
(4) I<hwaizm as a military power was negligible and 
was permanently colonized. 
(5) The kingdoms beyond the Jaxartes 1-emained 
independent, hostile, and relatively strong, supported 
by the Turltish power to the North East and also by the 
intervention of China. 
(6) Usllriisana, tllough u~lsubdned, does no t  seem t o  
have offered ally obstacle to the passage of Arxb armies. 
(7) existing dynastic houses were everywhere 
as 1-epr.ese11tatives of the collquered 
l?eo~les aid vellicle of the civil administratioIl., The 
administrative and financial authority in their 
I-. 1:': 
. . 1: 1.: 
territories, however, passed l o  the Wiili, or agent of the 
Arab governor of I<huriisZn (33). 
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IV. THE TURKISH COUNTERSTROICE (1) 
THE princes of Transoxania had so long been accustonled 
to regard the Arabs as  mere marauders that it was some 
time before they could realise the loss of their indepen- 
dence. Though necessity fo~ced them at first to adopt a 
conciliatory spirit (as, for example, in their acceptance 
of Isl2m under 'Omar II), they were dismayed to find a l l  
the machinery of permanent occupation set in motion, 
and their authority Aouted by tactless and g~eedy Arab 
officials. Such a s ta te  of affairs was tolerable oiily in the 
absence of any countering force. The situatioii was not 
stationary for long, however; even before Qutayba's 
death other and disturbing factors had begun to enter. 
Our best clue to  the complications in Transoxania during 
this period is the at t i tude of Ghtilak, king of Sugl~d, of 
whose movements, fortunately, sufficient indications havc 
been preserved. In maintaining a precarious balance 
between the Turgesh and the Arabs, his true statesman's 
instinct seldom misled him in judging l~ow and when to 
act to advantage tl~roughout his troubled reign. In 
addition to this we have  the evidence, unreliable in detail 
but confirmatory in ille mass, of the embassies sent by 
the subject principalities t o  the Chinese court. Doubtless 
they were despatched in the guise of commercial missions 
and in Inany cases were trulyso, bnt that they frequently 
possessed a political character can hardly be denied. 
The dates of these embassies as given in the authorities 
translated by Chavannes fall natu~.aDy into fo111. periods. 
I n  the following list all embassies have been onlitted in 
which the Arabs are known to have participated or urhose 
object is known to  have  had no connection with the Arab 
conquests, as weL1 as those which appear to be dui)licated, 
and those from the minor states : 
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1. 717-731 Suylld 11, i h k l ~ i r i s t r i ~ ~  G.Uul~l~?~rh 2, Arabs 4. 
2 ,, none ,, 1(733). 2. 782-740 ,, nolm ,, 
3. 741-787 ,, 4 3 , 1 , ,  4 
4. '780-785 , 4 2 , 3 ,, 0 
Thesc four periods, as will be seen, closely correspond 
t o  the fluctuations of Arab autllority in Transoxania. 
In the same year, 713, that Qntayba first led his army 
across tile Jaxartes, a new era of westward expalision 
opened in China with the accession of EIiuen-Tsong. 
In 714 the Chinese intervened in the affairs of the Tell 
Tribes and obtained their iinmediate submission, while 
in the followillg year they restored the deposecl Icing of 
FargllSna. In 716, 011 the death of Me-chu'o, Khan of 
t l ~ e  Northern Turks, the powerful tribes of the Tiirgesh 
asserted their independence, and under their chief Su-Lu 
establisl~ecl, with Chinese assistance, a new ltingdom in 
the Ili basin. The princes of Transoxahia eagerly sougllt 
to profit by these developnlents to free tl~cillselves froill 
the Arab yoke. In 718 a joiilt emnbassy was sent to China 
by Tuglishfida, GhBrak, NarayZna king of ICuiniidh, 
and tlle king of Chaghanifin. The first three presented 
petitions for aid against the Arabs, which are give11 in full 
in Cliavannes' Doct.~ntetcts. I'ughshZda asked that  the 
Tiirgesh might be ordcred to attack the Arabs, Ghfiralt 
related the capture of Samarqand and aslted for Chinese 
troops, Narayaa conlplained of tlle seizure of all his 
treasures by the Arabs and asked that represe~ltations 
might be made to induce them to remit their crushing 
taxation. It is significant that the king of ChaghSniiin, 
acting for his suzerain, the Jabgllu of Tukh%ltstBn, did 
not coinproinise himself by joining in these requests. 
But beyo~lcld " fair words " the son of Heaven took no 
action, and no Chinese forces appeared West of the Jaxar- 
tes, i n  spite of the repeated entreaties addressed by the 
princes to their self-elected suzerain. 
The Tiirgesh, however, were not Iong in iiltervening on 
their own account. Whatcver opport~uity the Arab 
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governnlellt had  to pacify the Suglldians was lost by n 
succession of incoinpetent govenlors. Alrcacly in the 
reign of 'Omar 11, as has been seen, they had withclrajvn 
their allegiance froin tlie weak 'Abdur-Rahm?in 11. Nn'aym. 
For a moment the situation seemed to improve at tlle 
beginning of the governol-ship of Sa'id " IClludi~ayna " 
(102/720) owing to the  firm handling ol Samarqaild by 
his lieutenant Shu'ba b. Zuliayr. But disturba~lces 
broke out a n d  Sh~l 'ba was recalled, perhaps in a vain 
attempt to appease the insurgents. It would seen1 that 
the Sughdians appealed to the new Turkish powcr in 
theEast ancl Su-Lu, unable to ~nalte headway against the 
growing influence of China, \irillingly scized the oppor- 
tunity of diverting his armies into Tcansoxania. A small 
Tiirgesli force was sent under Icol-cliur (called by Tahari 
ICLirsiil) (2) to ma le  comlnon cause with tlic Sughclian 
rebels in the following spring (end of 102). Sa'id abvolce 
to iind the whole country in arms, a Turltisli force rnarcli- 
ing on Sarnarqand, and the local priuccs, with few 
exceptions, aiding the  invnders. The ~ i r a b  commanders 
could not rely on their levies and a small garison at  
Qasr al-B8hili was evacuated only wit11 llie ut~nost 
difficulty. The tale of their relief by a srnall force of 
volunteers is one of tlie most spirited narmtives of 
adventure i n  Tabari. But such episodes did not aflect 
the gcileral success of tlie Turltish forces. I<iirstl 
continued h i s  advance through Sughd witliout opposition, 
avoiding Sanarqand,  until at last Sa'icl was roused by 
public reproach lo march agaiust the Turlrs. After a 
small initial success, which he refltsed to follow up, he 
was severely defeated and confii~ecl to tlie neighbourhod 
of ~ a r n a r ~ a n r l .  The Turks werc not strong enough to 
undertalce a siege' of the city, as the wliole operation 
seems to  have  been little more than a recon~laissance in 
force combined with a raiding expedition. As the 
Tiirgesh retired, the Arab cavalry folloaed UP as 
far as Waraghsar, the head of the canal systelnof Sughd. 
Gllijrak appears to have refrained from colnlnitting him- 
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self by openly aiding t l ~ e  rebels, and doubtless recognised 
that  the Arabs were not so easily to be dislodged. Prom 
t l ~ e  fact t l ~ a t  Sa'id's camp was pitched at Ishtilthan, 
in close proximity to him, it may even be conjectured 
that lie outwarclly supported the Arabs. 
But  the new governor of 'Iraq, 'O~nar b. Hubayra, 
was not the-man to stand idly by in face of the danger 
that  threatened I<hur&Bn. The wealcness shown by 
RhudhLyna and the conlplaints of oppression from his 
subjects, were sufficie~~t reason for his recall, and Sa'id 
b. 'Amr al-Harashi, a man of very different stamp, was 
installed in his place. The transfer may be placed in 
the late autumn of 103/721. The ncw governor's first 
act was 1.0 summon the rebels to submit, but a large 
number of nobles ancl merchants, with their retainers, 
either fearing that they could expect no mercy, or anxious 
to  free themselves altogether fro111 the Arab yoke, pre- 
pared to emigrate to Farghala. Ghlirak did his utmost 
to persuade them to remain, but without effect ; their 
absence would no doubt affect the revenues, and a certain 
emphasis is laid OII the point in Tabari's account. Leaving 
hostages behind, the malcontents nlarched towards 
FarghBna and opened negotiations with the lciilg for the 
occupation of 'Islm. The majority settled in the interval 
a t  Ichujanda, but other parties actually entered FarghZna, 
and one body at least occupied a fortified position on the 
Zarafshsn. Al-Harashi followed up his demands by 
marching into Sughd and encamped near Dabfisia, 
where he was with difficulty persuaded to stay until 
sufficient contingents arrived. On advancing, h e  was 
met b y  a messenger from the Icing of FarghBna, who, 
outwardly professing to assist the Sughdians, had secretly 
decided to rid himself of them by calling in the Arabs 
against them. Al-Harashi eagerly seized the oppor- 
tunity and pressed forward, receiving the allegiance of 
Ushrfisana as he passed. The emigrants, although urged 
by their leader Karzanj either to take active measures or 
to submit, decided to risk a siege in Ichujanda, trusting 
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to the protection of the king of Fargh~na.  
~~i 
Sa'id set about the siege in earnest, and they realised 
that they had been betrayed, they surrendered on 
unexpectedly easy terms. Sa'id divided tlleln, placing 
the nobles and merchants in a camp apart from 
soldiers. By the execution of ThCbit, a noble from 
Ishtilcllan, he provoked a revolt, under pretext of which 
he massacred the nobles and the troops, sparing the 
merchants, who nuinbered four hundred, only in order to 
squeeze them of their wealth. Tabari's account very 
thinly veils al-Harashi's responsibility for this wanton 
act of atrocious cruelty, which could not fa11 to embitter 
the feelings of the whole population of Transoxania. 
I t  is curious that the Persian Tabari (Zotenberg IV. 268) 
has an entirely different story, which is found in none of 
the Arabic authorities. The refugees who escaped 
eventually took refuge with the IChSqHn of the Turgesh, 
wheie they formed a regiment (no doubt continually 
recruited from new emigrants) which particularly dis- 
tinguished itself in the war against the Arabs (3). 
The expedition to Khujanda may be put in the 
spring and summer of 722 (end of 103, beginning of 104), 
though the chroilology here, and indeed for all this period, 
is uncertain. The piecemeal reduction of the fortresses 
in Sughd occupied the remainder of the year, a series 
of operations whose difficulty is sufficient witness to the 
effect of the news from Ichujanda in stiffening the 
resistance to the Arabs. The first fortress to be attacked 
was that of Abghar, in which a band of the emigrants 
had settled. The attack was entrusted to  SnlaymBn 
b. Abi's-Sari, with an army composed largely of native 
levies from Bukhara, KhwXrizm, and Shfimsn, accom- 
panied by their princes. SulayrnSn persuaded the 
dihclzn to surrender, and sent him to al-Hamshi, who at 
first treated him well in order to counteract the effect of 
the massacre of Khujanda, but put him t o  death after 
recapturing Kish and RabinjBn. The most inaccessible 
fortress and the crowning example of A l - H ~ r a s h ~ ' ~  
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I,crfidy were left to the last. The dillqzn subuqri 
still llcld ill the fortress of IIhuzar, to the south of 
Nnsaf ; unnble to take i t  by force, Al-Harashi sent 
fi[usnl.h,l b. Al-Rhirrit, a personal friend of Subuqri, 
to orfer llinl a parclon. On his surrender, he was sent to 
ifcrv 1l11t to death, although the amnesty, it is said, 
llad been confirmed by 'Onlar b. IIubayra. 
The \\'llole of Sughd was t1111s once more in the hands 
t]lc Arabs. The nearer districts, I<hwZrizm and Buk- 
l~firci, had remained loyal and the Oxus basin seems tohave 
been unaffected. But to malte a solitude and call it 
1,Pnce did not suit the aims of the Arab government 
and Al-fkiraslii found that his " policy of thorough " 
olily provided Ibn Hubayra with an excuse for super- 
seding hiin, During the winter, illerefore, he was re- 
plncctl by Muslim b. Sn'id al-I<il%bi, who, as the grandson 
of t\slniii b. Zur'a, came of a house long familiar with 
l<l~urBstin. Tlle clanger of the movement of revolt 
slwearIing to the Irailians of KhurBs%n seems to have pre- 
occupied tllc Arab government during all this period. 
Sa'itl I<lludhayna had poisoned the too-influential 
IlayylTu an-Nabali on suspicion of rousing the Persians 
against tllc governnlent and that it was felt even in Basra 
rn:iy bc see11 f ron~  Ibn EIubayra's advice to his new 
go\relno~., " Let your cha~nberlain be one who can lnalte 
peace with your inaw3li." Muslim, in fact, favoured 
tllc Pcrsinns ancl did all in his power to appoint officials 
acccptnble to thein, the Mazdean Bahrsm Sis, for example, 
llcing appointed Marzuban of Mew (4). But all such 
menStIlZS nrere nlercly palliatives and coulcl not materially 
affect the growing discontent in Sugl~d and ~ u l c -  
Il:il.iStfill. nuring his first year of ofice it is recorded 
(if tile nal.rative is not, as ~e l~ l l ausen  thinlts, a duplicate 
of the raid on FarghZna in the following year) that 
iVruslirn inarched across the river but was met and 
hack illto I<lluras%n by a Turlcish army, narrowly 
esca~)ing disaster. I t  is not improbable that the local 
were again assisted by Tiilgesh on this occasion, 
In the following year, however, before the close of 105, 
a second expedition gained some success at Afsllina, 
neat' Samarqand. Rileanwhile Hisll~in had succeeded f 
Yazid 11 as Caliph, and 'Omar b.  Hubayra, whose Qaysite 
leallings were too pronouncec~, was recalled in favour 
of Kh2lid b. 'Abdullah al-Qasri of Bajila. The tralsfer 
toolr place most probably in March (724), though 
another account places it some months later, iVIuslim 
was now preparing an expedition into Parghala, but the 
Yemcnite troops a t  BalBh held back partly through 
dislike of the campaign a11d doubtless expecting the 
governor's recall. Nasr b. Sayyzr was sent with a 
Mudarite force t o  use compulsion ; the mutinous 
Yemenites were defeated at  Bartiqgn and unwilli~igly 
joined the army. It is noteworthy that troops irom 
ChaghBniBn fought alongside Nasr in this engagement. 
Before leaving BukhZrS Musliuz learnecl that he was to be I superseded, at  the same time receiving orders lo continue 
his expedition. Four thousand Aedites, how eve^, took P 
the opportunity of withdrawing. The remainder, 
accompanied by Sughdian levies, marched into FargllZ~la, 
crossed the jaxartes, and besieged the capital, cutting 
d o ~ n  the fruit trees and devastating the land. Here 
news was brought that RhZqZn was advancing aeninst 
them, and Muslim hurriedly ordered a retreat. The 
Arabic accounts grapllically clescribe the headlong flight 
of the Arabs. On the first day they retired three stages, I 
the next day they crossed the WBdi Sabiih, closely pursued 
by the Tiirgesh : a detachment, largely cornposed of 
mawzli, which encamped separately, was attaclced and 
suffered heavy losses, the brother of Gllkrak being 
alnongst the killed. After a further eight days' n-~arcll, 
continually harassed by the light Turkish horse, they 
were reduced to  burning all the baggage, to the value of a 
million dirhems. On reaching the Jaxartes following 
day, they found the way barred by the forces of Sllzsh 
alld Fargl laa,  together with the Sughdians who had 
escaped from Sa'id al-Harashi, but the desperate and 
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thirsty troops, hemmed in by the Turgesh from behind, 
cut tlleir way through. The rearguard lnade a stand, 
but lost its cominander. At length the remnants of t he  
allny reached Icltujanda, where 'Abdur-RaJbmzn b. 
Nutaym tool< coinmand on behalf of Asad b. 'Abdullah, 
mlcl made good his retreat to Sarnarqand. 
This disaster, which is known as  the " Day of Thirst," 
marks a period in the history of t h e  Arab conquests. It 
was practically the last aggressive expeditioil of t h e  Arabs 
illto Transoxania for fifteen years, but of much greater 
i~n~or t ance  was the blow which it struck at  Arab prestige. 
TIlc rales were reversed ; from now onwards the Arabs 
found tl~einselves on the defensive and were gradually 
ousted from aln~ost every district across the Oxus. No 
woncler, therefore, that the  ineinory of the " Day of 
l'l~irst " rankled even long after i t  had been avenged 
(5) .  Accordii~g to the Arab traclition, the Tiirgesh armies 
were led olt this occasion not by Su-Lu himself, but by  
one of llis sons. Unfortunately t h e  accounts of Su-Lu 
in sucli Chinese worlts as have been translated are  silent 
on his Westcrn expeditions, and the Arab historians 
arc our only authorities. The immediate result of the  
Arab defeat, not o111y in Sughd b u t  in TukhBristai and 
the southern basin as well, was to stiffen the attitude of 
passive resistance to the Arabs t o  the  point a t  which it 
only ncecled active support to break into a general 
conflagration. From this time, if not  before, the subject 
princes regarded the Turgesh as the agents of tlleir 
deliveraice, coinmissioned by China in response t o  the 
urgent cntreaties they had addressed to the Emperor 
for aid in their struggle. We find this actually expressed 
in a letter sent three years later by the Jabgllu of Tu- 
kllzrista, whicl~ is, in Chavannes' words "but  one long 
cry of distress" (6). "I am loaded with heavy taxation 
by the Arabs ; in truth, their oppression and our misery 
arc extreme. If I do not obtain the help of the (Chinese) 
I k a n  . . . my kingdom will certainIy be destroyed 
alld dismembered . . . , I have been told that  the 
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Celestial Icagan has given this order to the I<agau of the 
Tiirgesh To you I delegate tlle affairs of the Far West ; 
you must at once send soldiers to drive out the Arabs." 
The point of view here expressed is of course that of the 
ruling princes, whose resentment at the curtailment of 
their authority is understandable. Besides malting 
alh'ance for some natural exaggeration, it would be 
dangerous to assume that this was as yet fully shared by 
the people. In all probability, ii we may judge from 
historical analogies, there was also a pro-Arab party in 
Sogdiana, who felt that the best interests of the cot~ntry 
lay, not in an opposition whose final issue could scarcely 
be in doubt, but in co-operation with their new masters 
as far as was possible. The tragedy of the Arab adminis- 
tration was that by alternately giving and refusing co- 
operation on its side, i t  drove its supporters in the end to 
make corn~non cause with its opponents. 
But though the situation was steadily deteriorating 
the decisive moment had not yet come. The new gover- 
nor, Asad b. 'Abdullah, seems to have seen something of 
the danger though factional feeling was running so high 
that the administration was almost helpless in face of it. 
He tried to continue Muslim's policy of conciliatioll by 
appointing agents of known probity. Tawba b. Abi 
Usayd, a mawlE who had been intendant for Muslim, and 
who " treated the people fairly, made himself easily 
accessible, dealt uprightly with the army and maintained 
their supplies," he persuaded to remain in office under him. 
1 '  b. HEni', tlie financial intendant at Samarqand, 
was unpopular ; he was recalled and Al-Hasan b. Abi'l- 
'Amarrala of Kinda, who was in sympathy wit11 the 
mawai, appointed in his place. With him was associated 
ThzMt Qu$na, who had been a leader of some repute 
under Saiid Khudhayna, " gallant warrior, distin- 
gllislled poet, confidant of Yazid b. Muhallab, 
universa]lJ~ popular " (7). Still more significant is the 
fact that one of Asad's earliest actions was to renew the 
practice, neglected since the days of 'Omar 11, of sending 
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all elllbassy to the Chinese court. A s  before, however, 
tile Arabs resented the favour shown to  the Persians, 
tile military wealcness of I b n  Abi'l-'Anlarrata roused 
tllel~l to open anger. Strong Turkish forces, probably 
guerilla bands swollen by refugees and malcolltents froln 
wasted districts, spread over the country and appeared 
evcil beiore Samarqand. The governor made some show 
of opl)osition, but avoided coming to grips with them, 
tlius inter~sifying his unpopularity. 
Sainarqa~ld indeed was gradually becoming more 
more isolated, bot no assistance could be given from 
I{huriis%n. During his three years of office Asad's 
attention was wholly engaged with the  situation in 
TuldlRristZn and the South. E v e n  here his constant 
expeditions, to Gharjisth, Ichuttal, and elsewhere, met 
with 120 success. Worse still, in 1081726 he found his 
forces in Ichuttal opposed by t h e  IChBqSn with his 
Tiirgcsll. The princes of Tulrharistan had taken to  
heaxt the lessons of the " Day of Thirst  ", and the powerful 
chief wl~o had already all but drive11 the Arabs out of 
Sogdiana was now called in to expel them from the 
Osus basin as well. Asacl visited his failure on the 
Mudarites, whom he may have suspected of treachery, 
but the indignation callecl out by  his treatment. of such 
nlell as  Nasr b. Sayyar, 'Abdur-Rahmiin b. Nu'aym, 
Sawra b. AI-Hurr, and Al-Balrhtari, made his recall 
inevitable. Nor had his measures removed the distrust 
ant1 hatred of tlie subject peoples. The land was wasted 
a11d desolate (a), the crushing taxation was not lightened, 
and all Persian governors were not of the s tamp of Tawba ; 
mally of tlxern were but too ready t o  rival their Arab 
rulers ingreecl and cruelty. Asad may have gahed  the 
irienckllip of many di11qLns (Q), b u t  that was an  easier 
matter tha~l to placate the population. In  such an  
atmosphere it was only to be expected that  Shi'ite and 
'Abbjsid propaganda, though actively combated b y  the 
administration, iound a fertile field among the &Iuslim 
Converts in I ~ h ~ r M n  and Lower T u k h ~ r i s t w ,  and 
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already beginning to  undermine the whole fabric of Arab 
government. 
For a momellt the  Ilopes of a radical change of policy 
entertained by  the maw317 and  the clearer-sighted Arabs 
were raised to  the  highest pitch bytheappointlnellt (in 109) 
of Ashras b. 'Abdullah as-Sulami, accompanied by the 
separation of IChur%s&n from I<hKlid al-Qasri's province 
of 'IrZq. It is unnecessary t o  recapitulate here the far- 
reaching concessions by which he hoped to secure, and 
actually did for a t i m e  secure the allegiance of the 
Sughdians, or the methods by which the local princes, 
especially Ghfirak, succeeded in checking the movement 
(10). It is gellerally assumed that the hostility of Ghfirak 
was due to the serious fall in revenue wliich would result. 
Though this was doubtless the plea put fonvard and 
accepted by  Ashras i t  can scarcely have been the true 
issue. Ghfiralr's aim w a s  not to mainlaill himself on good 
terms with the Arab  governors but to recover his 
independence. If once  the people became " Arabs" 
all hope of success m u s t  have been lost. It was a game 
with high stakes and Ghiirak won. It must not be over- 
looked, however, t h a t  the  account as we have it is 
traditional and may often be mistaken 011 the sequence 
of. cause and effect. The astonishing reversal of the 
measures adopted b y  Ashras is more probably to be 
explained by pressure from above, not from below, and 
our tradition may really present only the popular view of 
the Caliph Hisham's reorganizationof the financial admillis- 
tration (11). The Arabs resorted to brutal methods LO 
wring the taxes f r o m  the new converts, and with 
incredible blindness selected the dihqgns for special 
indignities, It is n o t  unlikely that NarshaM~i's story 
of the martyrdom of native Musli~ns in BulchZrB is con- 
nected with this event ,  though there are inany 0 t h  
possible explanations, such as, for example, an attempted 
Hzrithite movement  (see below, p. 76f.) The reaction 
swung the whole population of Tra~soxania, ai1lqgns 
and peasalltry alike, in to  open rebellion. The first small 
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party of cn~igmnts who quitted Samarqand, althougll 
supllOrted by a iew Arabs, were induced to Surrender and 
return (121, b11t witliin a lew months the dreaded IchZqxn 
\"itl1 his 'firgesh had joined forces with the rebels and 
swept tl,e Arabs acl.oss the Oxus. Eve11 Buktlara \\'as 
lost (13) and only Samarqand with two minor Posts 
on the ZarnfshLn, IIa~nnrjs and Dabiisia, held out. 
Ghilrak, llo~vever, still supported the Arabs, as 
Samarqand, althoiigh besieged, seems to have been in 
no tlangcr, \\fhilc his so11 Mulchtgr, doubtless to keep a 
footil~g in the opposite camp, joined with the Tiirgesh. 
The pressing danger sobered the Arabs and tempor- 
arily ur~ited all parties and factions. The army was 
concentrated a t  Anlul but for three inonths was unable to 
cross the rivcr in the face of the coinbilled native and 
'l'iirgesli ar~nies. A small bocly under Qatan b .  Qutayba 
\\!l~icll 11ad already crossed and fortified itself before the 
arrival of the Turks was beleaguered. The Turkish 
cavalry even made raids 011 Khurassn with an  excess of 
I~olclncss whicll was punislled by a ~nounted force under 
TllXbit Qntna. At lengtli Ashras got his forces across 
and, joining with Qatan b. Qutayba, advanced on 
l'aykand. Tlic enemy cut off the water supply, and had 
it not been for thc gallantry aild self-sacrifice of Hjritll 
b. Surayj, Thdbit Qntna, and their conlpanions, an even 
greater and more irretrievable " Day of Thirst " had 
resulted. In spite of their wealcness, Qatan and the 
cavil1r)rof Rays and Ta~nim charged the enemy and forced 
them back, so that Ashras was able to continue his 
ntlvallce towards Bukh%r,i. In the heavy fighting the 
Muslin1 forces were divided, Ashras and Qatan gave each 
0 t h  UP for lost, and Ghiirak jndged that the time had 
come to tllrow in his lot with the T ~ ~ r k s .  Two days later, 
ho\vever, armies were reunited and on the retiral d 
'rnrks encanlpecl a t  Bawgdara outside tile walls of 
Bnkhjl-a, \\,hence ihelr prepared to besiege the city. 
Ghfirak also retrievecl his error and. rejoined ~ ~ h ~ ~ ~ ,  
T1lc IcllB'lh inwithdrew towards Samarqand, but sat  down 
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before Kamarja, expecting to take it by storin in a few 
days a t  the most. The Arabic iiarratives of these events 
are confused in several places, which has given rise to 
many incorrect statements, such as that Ghiirak was 
beleaguered with the Arabs in Icamarja and that tile 
garrison consisted of Qatan and his forces. ICamarja was 
not in thc neighbourhood of Payltancl, as Wellhausen 
states, but a few farsalchs west of Samarqand (14). Wheil 
the garrison would not yield to assauk IChBqiin tried 
other methods. Accompanying his expedition was 
I~husrB the son of Per62 and grandson of Yazdigird, 
heir of the SHsXnid kings. This prince was sent to parley 
with the garrison, but when he claimed the restoration 
of his lringdom allcl promised them an amnesty, it is not 
surprising that the Arabs indignantly refused to hear him. 
N o r  would the appearance of a Sasznid prince cvolre 
much enthusiasm amongst the Iranians of Transoxania. 
As the  SZsZnid house had talten refuge in Cllina, Ilowever, 
the presence of Kliusrfi might be talcen as an indication 
that the rebels were receiving encouragement from China 
also, though the Chinese records are silent on this 
expedition. ICh&qLn1s second proposal, that he should 
hire the Arabs as mercenaxies, was rejected as derisively 
as the  first. The siege was then pressed with renewed 
vigour, both sides putting their prisoners and hostages 
to death, but after fifty-eight days ICliBqSn, on tlie advice 
of the son of Ghiiralc and tlie other Sughdia~l priuces, 
allowed the garrison to transfer either to Samarqand or 
Dabiisia. On their choosing the latter, the terms were 
faithfully carried out after on exchange of host%=. 
The fame of the defence of ICamarja spread far and 
wide, but it brought little relief to the pressure on the 
Arabs in Tralsoxania. Eve11 IChwHrizm was affected 
by the movement of revolt, but at  the iirst symptoms of 
open rebellion it was crushcd by the local Muslims, 
*robably Arabs settled in the district, wit11 the aid of a 
force despatched by Ashras. The reference lnade in 
7'abari to assistance given to the rebels by the Turlts is 
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probably to bc discounted, as is done b y  Ibn al-Athir. 
I t  is of course quite possible that the moveilleilt was 
illstigated by t l ~ e  Tiirgesh, though no such exl~lanation 
is necessary, but if any Turlcs were engaged they were 
probably local nomadic tribes. Ashras seems to  have 
reinaincd before Bukhara during the winter, possibly 
in Payltand ; the Tiigesh  roba ably withdrew towards 
ShPsli and Farghiina. 
I n  the following year, 130/111-112 (15), thc attacks on 
the army of Ashras were renewed. The course of events 
can only be gathered from the accounts given of the 
difficulties experienced by the new governor, Junayd 
b. 'Abdur-Iialtm&~~ al-Murri, in joining the army before 
BukhBrB. Iiis guide advised him to levy a force from 
Zanim and t l ~ e  neighbouring districts before crossing the 
Oxus but Junayd refused, only t o  find himself after cros- 
sing put to ihe iiecessity of calling on Ashras for a body- 
guard of cavalry. This force narrowly escaped disaster 
on its way to meet Junayd and fought a second severe 
engageineilt on the returli journey before reaching 
Payltancl. The eneiny are variously described as " men 
of BulthtirB and Sughd " and " Turlis and Sughdians " ; 
it iliay therefore be assumed that they were the  same 
forces against whom llshras had fought the previo~is 
year. Wellhausen is probably correct in supposing that 
Ashras was practically beleaguered, though not in 
BukliBrZ. The recapture of this city and the retiral of 
IClltiqPn took place shortly after Junayd's arrival, in 
circumstances ~vhicli are not described (16). The 
attitude of Tugsh%da during this episode is not recorded. 
It is practically certain, however, that he remained in 
Bulch&r~%, and after the reconquest was able to make his 
pence with tlie Arabs, probably on the excuse of force 
mrrjerrre. At all events lie retained his position, possibly 
because Junayd thought it iinpolitic in the face of the 
situation to victimise the nobles in the reconcluered 
territories and thus provoke a more stubborn resistance 
in the rest of the country. The Arabs seem t o  have 
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fol1owed up the Turks towards Samarqand, pl.obably to 
relieve the garrison ; the two armies met again at 
ZarmWJ1, seven farsakhs irotn S n n ~ a i - ~ a ~ ~ d ,  where the 
Arabs claimed a success, one of t~leir  prisoners bcillg a 
nephew of KhBqPn. From S11ghc1 the army lllarched 
to Tirmidh where Junayd halted for two moilths in the 
friendly atmosphere of ChaghZni~n before retul1ling to 
Merv. His intention was no doubt to malte arrangements 
for the pacification or reconquest of Tultharistan and 
Khuttal ; in the following year his troops were actually 
engaged in this direciio~l when the Tiirgesh invasion of 
Suglld forced hirn to change his plans. Balgdhuri 
quotes Abfi 'Ubayda for the statement that Junayd 
reconquered certain districts in T t ~ k l ~ x r i s t a  invhich had 
revolted. 
How lightly even yet factional feeling was sluinbering 
was shown after the return of the army, when the 
Bghilites of Balkh had a chance to retaliate on Nasr b. 
Sayyzr for their discomfiture a t  Bart iqa~.  Though 
Junayd was prompt t o  pu~lish the oifendir~g governor, 
the incident throws a strong light on one cause of the 
weakness of the Arabs in these campaigns. 
Early in 7311112-113, the Tiirgesli and Suglidia~~s 
gathered their forces for the investment of Sarnarqand. 
Ghfirak now openly joined the IihBqLn. Sawra b. 
I Al-Hurr, the governor of Samarqand, unable to face the enemy in the field, sent an urgent message to Junayd for 
assistance. The governor hastily recalled his troops, 
but  crossed the river without waiting for than  against 
the advice of his generals. "No governor of KhurZs~n," 
., 
said al-Mujashshar b. MuzBlzim, one of the ablest of the 
Arab commanders, " should cross the river wit11 less than 
fifty thousand men." Accompanied only by a mall  
force, Junayd reached Iiish, where he raised sane  local 
levies and prepared to march, on Samawand. The enelnY 
I in the meantime, after blocking up the water supplies 
on his road, interposed their forces between Samarqand 
and the army of relief. Junayd thereupon decided 
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follow the direct route across the Sh%wd%r mountai~ls 
in the hope of avoiding an engagement, but when only 
four farsalrlis from Sa~narqand was surprised in. the 
defiles by IZhBq3n. The advance-guard was driven in 
and the main body engaged in a furious struggle in which 
both sides fought to a standstill. The Arabs, hemmed in 
on all sides, were forced to entrench ; stragglers, refugees, 
and baggage, collected near IZish, were attacked by a 
detachment of Tulks and 'severely handled. KhBqZn 
renewed his attacks on the camp the next day, all but 
overwhelming Junayd, and settled down thereafter to 
beleaguer him. In this predicament there was only one 
course open to  Junayd. Had his force perished, Samarq- 
and would certainly have fallen in the end and two 
disasters taken the place of one. He therefore adopted 
the more prudent, ii unheroic, course of ordering Sawra 
to leave a skeleton garrison in Samarqand and march out 
to join him by way of the river : Sawra, however, took 
the short cut across the mountains, and was actually 
within four iniles of Junayd, when the Turltish forces 
bore down on him. The battle lasted into the heat of 
the day, when the Turks, 011 Gl~iirak's advice it is said, 
having first set the grass on fire, drew up so as to  shut 
Savra off froin the water. Maddened by heat aid thirst, 
the Arabs charged tlie enemy and broke their ranks, 
only to  perish miserably in the fire, Turks and Muslims 
together. The scattered reinnants were pursued by the 
Turkidl cavalry and of twelve thousand men scarcely 
a thousand escaped. While the enemy were engaged with 
Sawra, Junayd freed himself from his perilous position 
in the defiles, though not without severe fighting, and 
completed his march to Samarqand. Tabari gives also 
a variant account of the " Battle of thepass," the main 
difference in which is the inclusion of the Jabghu on the 
side of the Turks. In view of the Arab expeditions into 
TukhHristEn, it is  improbable that the Jabghu, even if 
he was present personally, which is doubtful, was 
accompanied by any of his troops. The Persian Tabari 
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also contains all ontirely difierent version of the Battle 
of the Pass and the fate of Sawra. The original version 
is amply attested by contemporary poets, who show 
mercy to  Junayd. Whatever credit the Arabs gained ill 
this battle is reflected on Nasr b .  Sayykr and the mawzli, 
Junayd remained a t  Samarqand for some time, recul,erat- 
ing his forces, while couriers were sent to Hisham kt11 the 
news of the disaster. The Caliph immediately ordered 
twenty thousand reinforcements from Basra and &ifa 
to be sent to XhurBsBn, together with a large number of 
weapons and a draf t  on the treasn~y, at the same time 
giving Junaycl a free hand in enlistment. 
The Turks, disappointed in their attack on Samarqand, 
withdrew t o  BulchZra, wliere they laid siege to Qaian b. 
Qutayba. Here they were also on the natural lines of 
communication between Sarnxqand ancl Ifiurasau. 
Junaycl held a council, and of three alternatives, either 
t o  remain in Samarqand and await reinforce~nents, or 
to retire on IChurBsZn v ia  Kish and Zarnrn, or to attack 
the enemy, chose the last. But the morale of the Arabs 
was saclly shaken ; a garrison of eight hundred men for 
Samarqand was scraped togetlier only by granting a 
considerable increase in their pay, while the troops 
openly regarded the decision to face I<hBqh inand the 
Turkish hordes as equivalent to courting clestruction. 
J~ulayd now marched with the utmost circumspection, 
however, and easily defeated a small body of the enemy 
in a slrirmish near I<arrninia. The following :day 
RhBqgn attacked his rearguard near TawZwis (on the 
edge of the oasis of BulhBr.rB), but the attack had been 
foreseen and was beaten off. As it was now well into 
November, the Tiirgesh were compelled to withdraw 
from Sogdiana, while Junayd entered B u ~ ~ L I %  ill 
triumph on the festival of Mihrjln. In ChagllbiSn he 
was joined by the reinforcements, I V ~ I O I ~  lie sent 011 to  
Salnarqand, the remainder of the troops retullling to 
their winter quarters. 
Junayd seems to have been content wit11 saving 
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Sanlarclaad ancl BukltRrB. As no further expeditions 
are recorded of his two remaining years of office it lnust 
be nssunicd that the situation in Sughcl remained ull- 
cllanged and that the Tiirgesh irruptiolls also were 
suspencled. Though tllc Arabs still held Samarqand 
alicl ihe territories of BuJtharCi and I<ish, they were in all 
probability confined to these, while in the southern basin 
their authority hardly extenclecl beyoild Ballch and Chag- 
hXi1iX11. Both sides inay have awaited the first move 
by the other, but were surprised by thc appearance of a 
new Iactor, wllicl~ threatened the existence of Arab 
sovercigilty in the liar East more seriously than any 
cxtcrnal danger. I t  is note\vortliy illat in his last year 
of office (115/733) Junayd resumed relations with the 
Chinese court. Tlle Turltisll title of the leader of the 
embassy, llo-se-lan Tarkan, suggests that none of the 
ambassaclors were actually Arabs, but that the governor 
had co~nmissionecl some dignitaries from the subject 
slates to represent the Arab government. ' The only 
embassy recorded in this ycar from a native state, how- 
ever, came fro111 I<huttal. I11 the sallle year KhurRsiin 
was visited by a severe drought and famine, and to provide 
for the needs of Merv, Junayd commandeered supplies 
from all the surrounding districts. This, added to .  the 
rnilita~y disasters of the last few years a n d  the 
insinuatiolls of Slli'ite propaganda, provolced open 
discontent in the district which had hitherto bee11 out- 
wardly faithful to itIerv, namely the principalities of 
Lower Tukl~ZristSn. The leader of the malcontents was 
Al-Hgrith b. Surayj, who was flogged in consequence 
by the governor of Balkh. The discontent flared into 
open revolt on the death of Junayd in Muharram 716 
(Feb. 734). IlZrith, assisted by  the princes and people 
of JUejSn, Fgrybb, and TSlaqSn, marched 011 Balkh and 
captured it from Nasr b. Sayylr. The versions leave 
it uncertain whether HBrith defeated Nasr and 
the11 capturecl the city or whethcr he enterecl the city 
first and beat off an attempt a t  recapture by Nasr. 
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(bellhausen's reference to the Oxus is due t o  his so mis- 
%derstanding the " river of Balk11 " ill Tab. 16GO. 2. 
h a t  it  refers here, as freclueiltly, t o  the Dehas river is 
clear from the  distance to the city (2 farsalrhs, whereas 
the Oxus lay twelve farsaltlls from Ballth) as well as from 
the mention of the bridge of 'Alii.) From Ballth he moved 
against the new governor 'Asim b. 'Abdullah al-Hilai, 
at Merv, capturing Merv-Rtdh on the way. 'Asim found 
a large section of the inhabitants in league with Hzrith, 
but on his threatening to evacuate Mcrv and to call for 
Syrian troops, the local forces rallied round him. At 
the first reverse, the princes of Lower TukhBristLn 
deserted HBrith, whose army fell from sixty thousand to 
three thousand. He was thus reduced to making terms 
with 'Asim, but early in the following year renewed his 
revolt. 'Asim, hearing that Asad b. 'Abdullah was on 
the way a s  his successor, began to intrigue with HBrith 
against him. The plan miscarried, however ; IIBrith 
seized the governor and held him to ransom, so that Asad 
on his arrival found the rebels in possession of all Eastern 
Rhuriis%n, and Merv threatened both from Cl~e East and 
from the South. Sending a force under 'Abdur RzthmBn 
b. Nu'aym towards Merv Rildh to lteep H5rith's main 
body in check, he marched himself against the rebel 
Iorces at Anlul and Zamm. These took refuge in the 
citadel of Zamm, and Asad, having thus checked the 
insurgents in this quarter, continued his march on Balkh. 
Meanwhile HHrith seems to have retreated before ' Abdur- 
R d z m ~ n  towards Balk11 and thence across the Oxus, 
where he laid siege to Tirmidh. Lower Tulthikistiin 
returned t o  its allegiance; on the other hwld IIFILith 
was now supported not only by the ltings of KIluttal 
and Nasaf, but also; as appears from later events, by 
the Jabghu of TukhkristBn. The government troops were 
unable t o  cross the Oxus in the face of HHrith's army ; 
finding, however, that the garrison was well able to defend 
itself, they returned to Balkh, while H ~ r i t h ,  after fallillg 
out with theking of Khuttal, seems to have retired into 
TulchZrist3n. I-Iere, iollowing the example of MfisZ 
b. IChBzi~n at  Tir~nidh, he made a safe retreat for l~imself 
~~ ~ 
in BadaltllshEn. 
Tlic motives of Hgrith's rebellion have been most 
variously estimated. In spite of the unctuous sentiments 
whicll he is represented as uttering on d l  occasions, it  
is hard to find in him the " pious Muslim, ascetic and 
reformer " whom van Vloten too sllarply contrasts with 
tllc government officials (17). In spite too of the 
prominent position given to him in the Arabic cl~ronicles, 
it inay even be questioned whether he and his small 
personal following were not rather the tools than the 
leaders of the elements making for the overthrow of the 
Uinayyad administration in I-ChurBsZn. At all events the 
weak~iess of his hold over his temporary followers is 
unuch more striking than his transient success. Further 
evidelice oi this is given in a most important narrative 
prefaced by Tabari to his account of Asad's expedition 
illto Sugl~d. Except for the scantiest notices, the Arabic 
historians have nothing to say regarding the effects of 
tlle war in I<hurBsan on the situation in Transoxania. 
Wellhausen's conclusion (based apparently on Tabari 
1890. 6) that " H L i t l ~  first unfurled the black flag in 
Transoxai~ia in the last year of Junayd " is scarcely 
tenable. There is further no evidence at  all for his 
assumption that Samarqand had fallen into the hands 
of the Harithites, especially as Bulchara remained loya l to  
the administration. That Asad's expedition was not, 
in fact, directed against WBrith follows in the clearest 
possible manner from the narrative referred t o  (Tab. 
1685. 6-16), 
"Then Asad marched towards Samarqand by way of Zamm, 
and when he reached Zamm, he sent to Al-Haytham ash-ShaybZni. 
one of Hirith's follow~e~s, who was in BBdhkar (the citadel of Zamm), 
saying "That which yon have disowned in your own people is oniy 
their evil ways, but that does not extend to the women . . . nor lo 
the co)tgzrest by the unbelievers o/such as Samnrqamd. Now I a m  on 
my way to Samarqand and I take a n  oath before God that no harm 
shall befall you on my initiative, bnt you shaU have friendly and 
honour8ble treatment and pardon, you end those with you. . . ,, 
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So Al-EIaYtharn calllc ant t o  join hi111 011 t h e  condition of ,x,rdol, 
wllich he had givcn h im,  nrld Asad pnrdoa~ed him, olld ~ l . ~ ~ ~ ~ l l ~ ~ ~ ,  
marched wit11 him to Samarqmd nncl Asad gave them dolllllu ,,;,,,." 
The expeditioll therefore was obviously against 1111- 
believers. That the whole of Sughd was lost to the Arabs 
is clear from the fact that Asad found it necessary to take 
provisions for thc army with him from Bulth%r,?. 1-le was 
not S~ccesSf~l  in recapturing the city, however, and 
attelnptecl no more than the damming of tlle calla1 
sluices at  Waragl~sar. 
The fate of the garrison of Sarnarqand has thus been 
passed over in silence, unless, perllaps, it is hinted at in 
Asad's reference t o  the capture of bl~uslim rvomc~l. 
Whether GhGrak recaptured it with his own troops or 
with the aid of the Tiirgesll, it can scarcely be doubted 
that he had taken advantage of the clissensio~ls in  
IChurPsZn to realise his ainbition and at last drive thc 
Arabs out of his capital. Of all the conqncsts of Q~~taylia 
beyond the Oxus, Bul<h&r?t, ChZglianiln, aucl perhaps 
IIish alone remained to  the Arabs. A co~~firnlatory 
detail is the cessation of Sugl~dian embassics to Cl~i~la 
between 731 and 740 : no\[? that independe~icc (eve11 if 
under Tiirgesh suzerainty) had been won agai~i, tllcrc was 
no need to invoke Chinese support. Negativc c\,idence 
of the sanle I h d  is afforded by thc absence of any Arab 
embassy during the same period. Had the Arabs been in 
possession of Sughd, it is practically certain (bat Asacl, 
as he had done before, wo~rld havc renewer1 relatiol~s with 
the Chinese court. Against this view may be set tlle 
statement in Tab. 1613. 6 that IIliZqTil \was preparing an 
army to  invest Samariqand a t  the time of his assassina- 
tion. This report is, however, fro111 its llature ulltnlst- 
worthy, and is contradicted by the preseIlcc of the kink! 
of Sughd wit11 Sughdian troops in tlle T~rgcsh army in 
119/737 as well as by Nasr b. SayyBr's expeditioll to 
Snmarqand two years later. Snghd tllus elljoyed Oilcc 
more a brief period of independence. 111 Or 738 
Ghfirak died and his kingdom rvas divided amongst his 
heirs. I-Ie was succeeded at  Sainarqand by his son Tn-110 
(? Tarlchfin), formerly prince of I<abudl~%n. Another 
so11 Me-chu'o (? MulchtDr) was already king of MXyainurgh, 
while the king of Ishtikhan in 742 was a certain Ro-lo- 
pu-lo who may perhaps be identified with Ghfirak's 
brother Afarfin (18). 
The year after the campaigns against IIBrith, 1181736, 
was devoted by Asad to the reorganisation of his province, 
including a measure which, it seems, he had already 
projected in his first tertn of office. This was the 
removal of the provincial capital from hferv to Ballch 
(19). Since no other governor of I<hurBsLn followed 
his example we must seek the motive for the innovation 
either in the contemporary situation in I<l~ur%s%n 
and Trai~soxania or in Asad's personal views. Explana- 
tions based on the former are not hard to find. Asad, 
on  taking office, had been faced with a serious situation 
both in  Lower TulchBristBn and across the river. H e  
had  obviously to establish a strong point d'afifzbi. The 
loyalty of the garrison at Merv was not above suspicion 
b u t  the garrison a t  Ballth was composed of Syrian troops, 
who could be trusted to the uttermost (20). Merv was 
also less convenient for reaching TukliBristBn, which was 
at the moment the main area of operations. More 
important still, perhaps, Balkh was the centre from which 
all disturbances spread in Eastern I<hur%s%n, as in the 
revolt of NEzak and the recent atteinpt of HZrith. As 
the holding of Balkh had enabled Qutayba to forestall 
NBzalt, it is possible that Asad felt that in Balkh he would 
b e  in a position to  check all similar tnovements at the 
beginning. Other considerations may also have disposed 
h im to  take this view. Balk11 was the traditional capital 
a n d  on it, as we have seen, was focussed the local senti- 
ment of Eastern I<hurLs%n. Merv, on the other hand, 
h a d  always been the capital of the foreiguers, of the 
Sassnians before the Arabs. Asad's personal friendship 
with the dihqzns may have given him some insight into 
t h e  inoral effect w11icl1 would follow from the transference 
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of the adnlinsitration to the centre of the national life. 
Still greater would this effect be when the rebuilding was 
carried out not by the Arabs themselves but by lllcir 
people under the supervision of the Barinak, tile llere. 
ditary priest-rulcr of the ancient shrine. (Suitc apart 
from this, however, the rebuilding of Ballch was all event 
of the greatest significance, and once restored it sooll 
equalled, if it did not  eclipse, its rival Merv in size and 
importance. While the new city was being built, the 
army was employed in expeditions into Tukli~ristSn, 
for the most part under the command of Juday' al- 
I C a r i l ~ ~ i ,  who achieved somcsuccesses against thcfollowers 
of HHrith and even succeeded in capturing their fortress 
in BadalcshhBn. Other raids were undertal~ccn by t11c 
goveillor himself, but without results of lnilita~y 
importance. 
Asad now planned a more ambitous expedition against 
IChuttal, partly in retaliation for the assistance given to 
HZritll, partly, it may be, to wipe OH an old score. The 
chronology presents some ciifficdtics at  this point. 
Tabari relates two expeditions into I<hattal in thc salnc 
year 119/737, both from the same source, but that wliicll is 
undoubtedly the earlier is dated towards the closc of the 
ycar (RomadZn = Septcnlber). Wellhausen avoids the 
difficulty by referring this expedition to 118, reckolliling 
back from the appointment of Nasr b. SayyPr, the data 
for which are full and unimpeachable. This would scelll 
the obvious solution were i t  not that the datc given in 
t he  Chinese records for the assassination of Su-Lu, 
738 (RI), agrees perfectly with Tabari's dating of 
Battle of Kharistsn in  Dec. 737. The presence of Asad 
on the secolld expedition would then liailg together wit11 
the " somewllat legendary " nairativc of the hfihrjgn 
feast. There seems reason, therefore, for dating this 
expedition in 120/738 and rcgarcling i t  as having been 
despatched by Asad, though not actually a c c o m ~ ' ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~  
by him, Tabari fortunately preserves also a sllort notice 
the situation in  Ichuttal. The heir of as-Saba', 
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whose name is to be read as Al-Hanash, from the Chinese 
transcription 1.0-kin-tsie (22), had fled to  China, possibly 
on accou~~t  of factional distnrbances. On his deathbed 
as-Sabal appointed a regent, Ibn As-Sg'iji, to  govern 
the country until Al-Hanash could be restored. The 
moment was certainly opportune for malting a n  expedi- 
tion and Asad at first carried all before him. On his first 
appearance, however, Ibn As-SB'iji had appealed for aid 
to Su-Lu, who was a t  his capital Nawgkath (on the Chu). 
The ICl~aqZn, with a small mounted force including the 
Sugltdian refugees, marched from StyZb (near Toltmak, 
on the Clir~) to I<huttal in seventeen clays, only t o  find 
Asad, warned of his approach by  the regent, who was 
endeavouiing to play both sides off against each other, 
in precipitate retreat. The baggage train had  been 
despatched in advance under Ibr2him b .  'Asim with a 
guard of Arabs and native troops from ChaghZnign but 
the main body was overtaken by  the Turlts as i t  was 
crossing the river and suffered severe losses. Asad, 
considering himself safe with the river between his army 
and the enemy, encamped and sent orders to Ibrahim 
to halt and entrench his position. The Turks, however, 
were abIe to effect a crossing ; after an uilsuccessful 
assault on Asad's camp, they hastelled to  overtake the 
richer prize while tlie governor's troops were too worn out 
to protect it. By sending a party under cover t o  fall on 
the troops of ChaghZni%n from the rear while he  himself 
attaclted in front, the IChsqfm forced an  entrance into 
IbrBhim's camp. Ch2ghBn Khudah, faithful to t he  Iast, 
himself fell with the greater part of his forces bu t  the 
remainder of the garrison were saved b y  the timely 
arrival of Asad. According to the main account, the 
Arabs were allowed to withdraw to Balkh without 
further serious fighting. A variant account given by  
Tabari relates an uns~~ccessful assault by  the Tiirgesh on 
Asad's camp on the morning following the " Battle of 
the Baggage," which happened to be the  feast of Fitr 
(1st October 737). On the retiral of the Arabs, the 
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Ic l lWn,  instead of returning to his capital \\riCl1 tllc 
Il0noul.s of the day, ren~ained in TulthBrjstiin. 
Here he was joined by IAiirith, who aclvised li i l l l  to 
ulldertalte a winter raid into Lo \~e r  T u l t l l ~ ~ i ~ ( ~ ~ ~  \,,hilt 
the Arab troops were disbanded, undoubtctlly ill tllc 
expectation that the local princes \vould again ullitc 
with him against Asad. The governor rclaillcd ]lis a m y  
at Balkh until the winter had set in, and in tllc ~ c a ~ ~ t i l ~ l c  
the XhlqLn summoned forccs to join him from suglltl 
and the territories subject to TultldristZn. T l ~ e  cnumcra- 
tion which Tabari gives of the troops accompn~lyi~lg tlrc 
Ich%qLn on this expedition shows very clearly how c o w  
pletely Arab rule in Transoxania and the Oxus basill 
had been supplanted by that of the'rurlzs. We arc told 
that  besides thc ICh.?q5nPs own Turkish troops nlld 
Hl r i th  with his followers tllere were present the Jabgl~c~. 
the king of Sughd, the prince of Usrilshana, and the rulers 
of ShZsh and Rhuttal. It is fairly certain, of course, 
that the list is exaggerated in so far ns the nctnnl prr!sc~lcc 
of the princes is concerned (it is in iact partially ccnllm- 
dicted in other parts of the narrative), l~clt it call 
scarcely be doubted that forces from some, if not :dl, of 
these principalities were engaged. 011 the cvcning of 
the 9th Dhu'l-Hijja (7th Dec.) news reached R:~llih tli:tt 
the Tiirgesh with their auxiliaries, nunibcring sorlic 30,000, 
were a t  Jaaza. Asad orclel-ecl signal f rcs to be lit t~ntl 
with the Syrian garrison of Balkh and what other troops 
h e  could muster from the district n~arclleci out agai~lst 
them. The governor of IChulm sent ill n second rc1)ol.t 
that  the Khfiqsn, been repulsed in an attack On tllc 
town, had marched on towards PBr6z i'J:~lih~l~B~. ill the 
neighbourhood of Balkh. From this point t l ~ c  cllemIr, 
avoiding Ball&, moved on JilzjZn and occtlpictl 
capital (23). Illstead of continning his ad~~ance  iln- 
mediately, the I(hgq& halted here and Sent Oclt raidirlg 
parties of cavalry in all directions, an action \llicll ' it 
beyond doubt that theimmecliate object of the cxpeditio1l 
was not the capture of Merv but  tile rousing of 1..oWpr 
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TnkhBristBn against the Arabs. Contrary to Hgrith's 
expectations, however, the king of JfizjBn joined with the 
Arabs, who marched towards Shubfirqgu by way of 
Sidra and I<harist%i1. From the conflicting narratives 
in Tabari, it seems that Asad surprised the I<hBqBn in 
the neighbourhood of I<haristBn (or SBn) at a momeut 
when his available forces amounted only to 4,000. A 
furious struggle ensued, which was decided in favour of 
the Arabs by an assault on the KhBq%n from the rear, 
on the initiative of the king of JfizjBn. It is in connection 
with the battle, which he describes as if it were a set 
engagement in which the whole of the opposing forces 
were engaged, that Tabari gives his list of the combatants. 
Rut as only 4,000 out of the total of 30,000 troops with the 
I<h%q%n were involved, the list is obviously ont of place 
and the whole narrative shows the marks of rehandling. 
The Muslims gained an overwhelming success : the 
Xh%q%ll and Htr i th ,  having narrowly escaped capture 
in the confusion, were closely followed by Asad as far as 
Jazza, when a storm of rain anrl snow prevented further 
purs~lit. They were t l~ns  able to regain the Jabghu in 
TulthSristh, with happier fortune than the raiding 
parties, whose retreat was cut off by the vigilance of Al- 
KainlZni, and of whom only a single band of Sughdians 
made goocl their escape. 
On this sltirmish a t  I<llarist%n, for it was little more, 
hung the fate of Arab rule, not only in Transoxania, but 
possibly even in I<hur%~n,  a t  least for the immediate 
future. Though the princes of Lower Tulth%ristBn 
fought for Asad in the first place, there can be little doubt 
that a victory for Su-Lu would have swung them back to  
the side of HBrith and the Turks, who would then have 
been in aposit ion to follow up their attacks with the 
advantage of a base a t  Ballth, solidly supported by the 
Oxus provinces. From such a danger the Arabs were 
saved only by Asad's resolution,and fort~u~ate s lection 
of Balk11 as his residence. The account given of H i sha ' s  
incredulity on hearing the report shows how very serious 
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the outlook llacl been and the extent to which thename of 
the IChEqhn had become an omen of disaster. I<llaristiln 
was not only the turnilig point in the fortunes of the Arabs 
in Central Asia, but gave the signal for the downfall of 
the Tiirgesh power, which was bound up with the personal 
prestige of Su-Lu. The princes of TulchlristLll and 
Transoxailia fonncl it expedient to treat him with respect 
as he was returning to NatvCltath, but in his own country 
the dissellsions long fomented in secret by the Chinese 
broke ant. Su-Lo was assassiilated by the Baga Tarlc- 
ha11 (RiirsEl) ; the ltingdom fell to pieces. " the Turlts 
split up and began to raid one another," and the coup 118 
g~ l icc  of the Rhatlate was delivered at  Sf~yiib in 730 by 
the faction of ICiirsiil, supported by the Chinese and 
with the assistance of Al-Ishkand and contingents from 
ShEsh and Farghfina (24) (25). With the collapse of the 
Tiirgesh kindgom disappeared the last great Turltish 
confederation in Western Asia for inore than two 
centuries to come. The battle of I(11aristEn assurecl 
the supremacy of the Muslim civilisation ul Sogdiana, but 
it coulld not have attained the richness of its full develop- 
ment tllerc unless all danger froin the steppes had been 
removed. That  this secnrity was attained was due not 
to the Arabs, but to the Chinese diplomacy, wllich, by 
brealcing clown the greatest external obstacle to the 
Muha~ninadail penetration ol Central Asia, brought itself 
face to face with the Arabs. This could scarcely have 
beet1 realised a t  once, however, by the Arabgovernment, 
whose immediate t-ask was to restore its lost authority 
in Transoxania. 
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p. 1610: thas~rnil tahawwala (ashrashu) ilB marjin yuq5111 la lm bawH- 
darntun Jn'nfdhwrrl sababatun . . . wallurn nuzOlun bikarnarjata.  The 
context Lhows that i t  was not to Ashras that SabSba came b u t  t o  tllc 
garrison of ICnlnarja ~v i th  the news t ha t  thc I<hBq&n was ret ir ing past 
them (rnBrun bilo~ml. 
16. Tho chronological dillictu'lties are explained by Wellha~lscn 286 ff.  They  are 
of  smilli irnuortancc I~o\vever, and i t  seems erelerable to follow h i s  dates 
in. 
10. 
ior t l~wc  campaigns. 
Cf, Tab. 1628. D. with 1620. 6 f. 141. 
Van Viotc", o p .  cit. 20 11. : Wclll~al~sen 280 ff, (cJ, 302 f.). Another account u l  
Hiri t l l  is given by Gvrdlri ap. Ilarthold Turkcstan. Texts  pp. 1-2. 
Cbnv. Doc. 210, 130. 140 ; Barthold, Arab, Qucilen 21, n. 8. 
Tab .  1400, 1601. 18 : U'ellhausen 202 and 284 n. : Barthold in Zcitscl~ri l t  
f u r  Assgriolagie XXVI (1011) 201. 
Tub. 1600, 6. Tllefe does not seem to  be any record of when these  Syrinns 
\\,ere acttlcd a t  Balkh. 
Wieger 1043 : Chav. Doc. 284 f. 
Chav. Doc. 108. 
As JOzjiin is distinguished from SltabOrqZn in T5b. 1608. 17. i t  i s  pmbablc  
t h a t  this was ihc town I<undnrm or QurzLnlin mcntiancd in Ya'qilbi's 
Geog. 287. 
Tab.  1013 : Ci~av. Doc. 83 f., 122 n.  As regards thc adjective I a ~ a r l u k h i  
applied to the Jabgllu in 1012. 10, t h e  m a t  satisIadory expianation is 
t h a t  given by Marquart. Hist. Glossen 183 1. 
Tllc f q u c n t  relercnccs in the Chineso minais to the association of Se-irin-L'i. 
king of I<ish, with the Tilrgesh raise nn interesting problem. Tllerc can 
b c  no doubt that hc is tllc stma prince as Al-Lhkand, ruler of Nasaf, 
in the Alabic records. The name is I r a n i ~ n  and personal, not dynastic. 
(Sec Juati's Iranisclles Namenbnch), Al-Ishknod i s  first mentioned in the  
account 01 the BaLtle 01 the  Pass, (Tab. 1612. 8) where hc  nppcar3 in cam- 
ruaad 01 a cavalry lorce on the side of the I<hBqBn, tltough Kish and 
Nasof were both in the hands of the Arabs (1646. 1). The forces ~vhiclt 
11s colnmanded were tllemforc not the  ordinary local troops. During 
HBrith's siegc 01 Titinid11 he received reinforcements from Al-Lhl<8nd, 
b u t  no statement is made on the compcsition a1 his farces. Ho i s  
mclrtioned again as accompanying thc I<hlqla  and the Sughdiass in the  
attaclr on Asad boforc the "Rattle a1 the Baggage" (1607. 17-18, rvlterc 
the loading 'Ispahbadh of NasS' is probably an  error in the tradition. 
Again tllere can be no question here of local troops from Nasuf or I<isb. I n  
the Chincscreeordr Sc-ldu-l'i appears as thecommandcr of an indcpondsnt 
iorce, not znerelv a detaclzrnent of T u r h  or levies from SllPsli o r  I i a r ~ h l n a .  
- 
The rrrost rcasonnblo conelusion is that Al-Irlrkand rvos t he  commander 
of the carps 01 Stlghdian reluKees. This ivould explain tlre title " King of 
thq,warr&rs "by which he isson~ctimes "lention& in tlie Cltinesc records 
(Chav. Doc. 147 n. 1 and 313). Thc actual Lorm (Chikar) from xvhich 
the title was derived docs not appoar in t he  Arabic histodcs in this con- 
nection, but i t  is perhaps possiblc that  a variant of the nanlo (dcrivcd 
from 111~tn) is to be read in Tab. 1014. 2 for thc meaningless " rardbin &I- 
Itissi." In 1000. 16 a force of " Bgbiya " i s  mentioned along with tllc 
Sughdiaus, and tltc name, though unrecognisablc, probably relrrs to some 
forces connected u.Ith Sugld. Wollhausen's conchlsion tha t  the Sugll- 
dlans and " Bibiyr"  formed part of the personnl following of fignth Ir. 
Sumyj seems to form the counection in  the tos t  t m  k r  (hamala ' 1 - h ~ l l h o  
lvamnn ma'nltu rnin alili's.suglldi wal-blbiyati). On the other h m d ,  
since el-Ishkand appears as t l ~  ally of Haritll, w e  may mncludc t h a t  
some understanding crirted botlveeu the lattcr and the Soglldinns (and 
titerelore tho Turlcs) a t  the time of his revolt. It is probable that  tho 
Sughdian corps assisted in the recovery of Samarqand from tho Arabs. 
V. TI-IE RECONQUEST OF TRANSOXANIA. 
THE reaction produced by the do\vnfall of the Tiirgesh 
power was manifested in Transoxania in the first place 
by an increased regard for China. The princes had found  
the Tiirgesh yoke no less galling in the end than t h a t  of 
the Arabs (1) ; the country was as wasted and im- 
poverished by their continual raids as it had been under  
the latter. Tlle profitable native and transit trade, the 
source of the entire wealth of the cities, must have shrunk 
to ilegligible proportions if it bad not wholly ceased. 
All classes of the people therefore were weary of war and  
s o u ~ h t  only a peace consonant with their self-respect. 
For the attainment of these aims it was vain to look to 
China ; the granting of bombastic titles to a few princes 
brought neither comfort nor aid. A final opportunity 
was thus offered to wise statesillanship to swing the whole 
country round to the Arabs almost without a blow. 
For two years, however, the situation seemed to remain 
much as it was, except for an expedition into IChuttal, 
probably on the pretext of assisting the ruling house 
against a usurper from BamiyZn. Nevertheless some  
progress had been made by the administration in regaining 
the prestige it had lost. This was due not n~erely t o  t he  
effect of the victories over HZrith and the Tiirgesh, b u t  
even inore to Asad's personal relations with the dihqzns. 
He had, as we have seen, gratified the ilatiol~al p r ide  
of the people of TulchBrist2.n by transferring the sea t  of 
power from Merv, the capital of the foreigners, to Ballch, 
the centre of their national life. As had been the case 
eve11 in liis first term of office, he was able to attract  to 
his side many of the more influential elcmellts in Lower 
Tultl~Brista and the Ephthalite lands-to this, in fac t ,  
was largely clue his success in the struggle wit11 the Turks.  
More striking evidence still is afforded by the conversion 
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of the dihqsns at this period, arnongst the111 tile Inillor 
chief SamZn-I<hudah and probably also tile Barmak, 
BY this means Asad laid the foundatiolls for a trlle 
recollciliation ancl Narshalthi's work amply attests tile 
honour which later generations attached to llis name. 
His atorlr was of course incompicte in that it was practi- 
cally confinecl to the rulillg classes and naturally <lid ,lob 
extend to the now independalt dihqtins of Sughd. 
Early in 120/738 Asad died, and after a lapse of sonle 
months the govemorsl~il~ was conferred by I-Iisl~snl on 
Nasr b. SayyrZr. For the subject pcol~les I I ~  choice 
could have been Inore opportullely made. Nasr was 
one of the few Inen who had come with honour and 
reputation il~rougll thc external and internal conflicts 
of the last thirty years. Belonging to the small and 
allnost neutral tribe of ICinZna, his posilio~l bore a strong 
similarity to that d Qutayba in that both wcrc more 
dependent on the support of a powerful patroll t11an on 
their tribal connexions, and tl~erefore, tllougli [:rvouri~~g 
Qays, less frantically partisan. In contrast to Qu~taybn, 
however, Nassr, after thirty years of nctivc lcadcr- 
, , 
ship, knew the situation in 1<11urEsS11, Im~lsoxarlia, 
and Central Asia as no Arab governor 11nd cver ctonc. 
He had seen the futility of tlying to hold tile coul~try 
by mere brute force, and the equal futility 01 tryirlg to 
dispense with force. While he llelcl L11e support of 
Hishgm, therefore, he set himself to restorc Arab aull~ority 
in Transoxania. The al>pointment of (?aim b. @taJ'ba. 
wllo had inherited I I ~ U C ~  of his fatiler's abilily, to 
command the forces beyond the river gaVC carllcst 
of an  aggressive policy. The appointment llot to 
Samarqand, as Wellhausen saJlS, but " over S"ghd~" 
i , e . ,  the garrisons in BultharS and probably Kisll, who \"ere 
respoI~~ible ill the first place .for keeping the surro'lndjng 
districts in subjection. The governor hirnsclf the11  am^^^^ 
out a brief intended apparcn t l ~  PL"'~~" 
some rebels in the ~le ighbourh~~d of the Iroll 
possibly in ~ l ~ ~ ~ ~ ,  1-laving thus villdicated tile 
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authority of the  administration, Nasr returned to Merv 
and delivered the farnons Ichutba in which the system of 
taxation and conditions of amnesty were at  last laid down 
in a korm satisfactory to the n~awiili and the subject 
peoples (2). Thc iesults were as lie had foreseen. The 
princes and people of Transoxania submitted, as far as 
we call j judge, without opposition when Nasr with his army 
inarched through Sughd to re-establish the Arab garrison 
and administratio~l in Samarqand. 
This expedition may in all probability be dated in 
121/739. A year or two later, Nasr collected his forces, 
whicli included levies from Transoxania, for an attack 
on ShHsli. Wellha~~sen considers that the first two 
expeditions were only stages of the third, but the 
expedition to ShLsh can hardly have talten place earlier 
than 122/740, in view of the fact that the annies of ShHsh 
ancl F a r g h b a  were engaged with the Tiirgesh in 739, 
and of Narshalhi's statement (3), which there is no reason 
to dispute, that  Tughshada was assassinated in the thirty- 
sccond year of his reign. Recltoning in lunar years this 
gives 122 (91-122), in solar years 123 (710-741), as the 
date. This is confirmed by the Chinese record of an 
embassy from ShSsh in 741 complaining that " Now 
that the Turlts have become subject to China, it is only 
the Arabs that are a curse to the I<ingdoms" (4). 123 is 
also the date given for the return of the Sughdians (5). 
It is most unliltely that the intervening year or years 
passed without expeditions altogether, and the most 
reasonable supposition is that they were occupied in the 
pacification of Sughd. The expedition marched easi- 
ward through Ushrnsana. whose prince, as usual, paid 
his allegiance to the  victor on his passage, but on reaching 
the Jaxartes Nasr found his crossing opposed by the army 
of ShLsh, together with Hgrith b. Surayj and some 
T~~r l t i sh  troops. I t  would seem that he was unable to  
come t o  blows with the main body of the enemy, but 
made a treaty with the king by which the latter agreed 
to accept an Arab resident and to expel H&rith, who was 
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accordingl~ deported to FBrab. As ~ ~ s u a l ,  later. tradition 
magnified the exl~loits of the Aral~s by ccretlikillg Nnsr 
with the capture aid execution of I<iirsfil, tllc ,riirgcsIl 
leader who had been scarcely less redoubtable than tilc 
IChaqBn himself. If the story has ally fountlatioll it is 
probably a legendary dcvclopmcnt from the caplure 
of a Turkisll chief Al-Akhran~, related by Tabari in a 
variant account. The presence of ICiwsgl wit11 a Tiirgcsll 
force on this occasion is not in itself impossible, but if his 
identification wit11 Baga Tarld~an is sound, we lcnorv that 
he was executed by the Chinese in 744/126 (0). The 
expulsio~l of H ~ r i t h  was probably the object lor wliicl~ the 
expedition had been undertaken ; before returning, 
however, the Arabs entered Parghiina and pursued its 
king as fal. as Quba before bringing llirn to tcrrns. Tl~e 
negotiations were carried out l~etween Sulayn~an b. 
SB1, one of the princes of JUrjBn, and i l ~ c  Queen-hlotl~er. 
This invasion of Farghana is related in il~rce (01. four) 
different versions, some of which may possibly rcfcs to n 
second expedition mentioned by ?'al,ari latcr. 111 thc 
same year, on returning fsom thc exl~edition to Shiisll, 
Nasr was met a t  Samarqand by the Bukl13r IihutlR11 
Tughshada and two of his dihqlns. T i c  nobles laid a 
complaint against the prince, but as Nasr seemed intlis- 
posed to rearess their grievance, thcy aktenll~tctl to 
assassinate both the Bul<ltgr I(l~uddl ant1 illc i h b  
intendant a t  Bukhbrii, WWsil b. 'Amr. Tl~e forrucr 
was mortally wounded, and succeeded by his sot1 yuta~ba, 
so named in honour of the conqlleror. The illci(l(:nt is 
related also by Narshakhi with some additio~lal details 
which profess to  the assnssinatioil. The t\''o 
narratives present such a remarkablc si~niiarity of p[lruc, 
llowever, even though tliey are in different l ~ ~ W " c s ~  
that it is rathe]. more likely that t l ~ e  Persian \'el.;ion has 
elaborated the story than that 2'abari dclibcr;~t~ly 
suDDrRssed anv offensive statemnlts, as W9"W 
~ f o i e n  (7). 
Except for a possible second expeditio~~ to l:argllaa, 
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no other campaigns into Transoxania are recorded of 
Nasr, unless Balzdhuri's tradition (from Abii 'Ubayda) 
of an unsuccessful attaclc on Ushrfisana refers to  a 
separate expedition. This is unlikely, and the account 
conflicts with that given in Tabari. Ushrfisana, however, 
was never really subdued until nearly a century later. 
TukhZristh~, if i t  llad not already been recovered by 
Asad, may have made submission of i ts  own accord. 
Since the defeat of the Tiirgesh and the flight of HBrith 
it llad ceased to hold any inenace to the Arabs, and Nasr 
llad accordingly retrailsferred the capital to Merv oil his 
appointment. 
The governor now tunled his attention to restoring 
the prosperity of tlle country and developing a policy 
of co-operation with the subject peoples. Nasr was the 
first Arab ruler of Transoxania to realise that the goveril- 
ment depended for support in the last resort on the 
middle classes and agriculturalists. Both these classes 
were of greater political importance perhaps in Trans- 
oxania, with its centuries of mercantile tradition, than 
any other were in the Empire. I t  was in the same 
way that in later years the Tahirids and SBmSnids 
established their ascendancy (8). He was thus able not 
only to  complete the work begun by Asad b. 'Abdullah, 
but to  settle i t  on more stable foundations. Shortly 
after his recapt~ire of Sanlarqand he had sent an embassy 
to China. This was followed up in 1261744 by a much 
more elaborate embassy, obviously intended to regulate 
commercial relations in the most complete manner 
possible, in which the Arabs were accompanied by 
ambassadors not only from the Sogdian cities and 
'Tulch%ristZn, but even from ZBbulistZ~~, Shzsll, and the 
Turgesh. Two other Arab embassies are also recorded 
in 745 and 747. There can be no doubt that it was not 
so nlucll the justice of Nasr's rule as  his personal influence 
and honesty that reconciled the peoples of Transoxania. 
Even the Sughdian refugees, stranded after the dissolu- 
tion of the Turgesh confederacy, trusted him to honour 
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the conditions upon wliich they had agreed to return, 
and were not deceived although his concessions raised 
a storm of protest, and thc Caliph himself was brought 
to confirm them only for the sake of restoring peace, 
I t  is not surprising, however, that the princes were 
dissatisfied with the success which had attended the 
pacification of Transoxania. The people were " becom- 
ing Arabs " too rapidly and their own authority was 
menaced in consequence. They were still hopeful of 
regaining their independence, especially when Nasr's 
position became less secure after the death of HishBm. 
We hear therefore of sporadic embassies to China, such 
as Chat sent from Ishtikhan in 745 aslting for annexation 
to China " likc a little circumscription." That the 
governor was aware of this undercurrent may be judged 
from the fact that he felt i t  necessaly to have Harith b. 
Surayj pardoned, in case he should again bring in the 
Turks to attack the government (9). But the people as 
a whole held for Nasr. The respect and even affection 
which he inspired held all Transoxania true to him 
during the last troubled years. No tribute could be more 
eloquent than the facts that not a single city in Trans- 
oxania took advantage of the revolutionary movements 
in Khurasal to withdraw its allegiance, that Aba Muslim's 
~nissionaries went no further than the Arab colonies at  
Amul, Bukhara, and I<hwBrizm, and that the loyal 
garrison of Balkh found first support and then refuge in 
Cl~aghEnib and TukhZristBn. On . these facts the 
various authorities whose narratives are related by 
Tabari completely agree, and by their agreement disprove 
the exaggerated account given by Dinawari (359 f . )  that 
" Abii Muslim sent his envoys (du'8t) to all quarters of 
KhurHsb, and the people rallied en mnsse to Abfi Muslim 
from RerEt, Biishanj, hierv-Rfidh, TslaqEn, Merv, Nas% 
Abiward, Tfis, Naysxbcr, Saralhs, Balkh, ChaghHnib, 
Tultllgrist&n, KhuttalB11, Kish, and Nasaf." Dinawari 
llimself states a little later that Samarqalld joined Abfi 
Muslim. only after the death of Nasr. Aba Muslim's 
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main strength, in fact, was drawn froin Lower TukhBri- 
st5n and the neigl~bourliood of Mcrv-Riiclh, several of the 
princes of which, including the ruler of Bfishanj and 
IIhalid b. Barmak, cleclared for him. But even here the 
people were not solidly against the administration. 
We are told that a camp was established at  Jiranj 
(south of Merv) " to  cut off the reinforcements of Nasr 
b. Sayyar from Merv-Rtidh, Balkh, and the districts of 
(Lower) TukhBristZn." Herat fell to Abfi Musliin 
by force of arms. The Syrian garrison of Balkh, together 
with the Mudarite party, were supported by the rulers 
of both Upper and Lower Tukhtirist~n, and twice re- 
captured the city froin their stronghold at Tirmidh. 
An example of Abti Muslim's efforts to gain over the 
Iraniails is affordcd by an incident when, having taken 
300 KhwZrizmian prisoners in an engagement, he 
treated them well and set them free (10). 
The tradition of the enthusiasm of the Iranians for 
Abii Muslim is true only of the period after his success. 
In our most authentic records there is no trace of a mass 
movement such as has so often been portrayed. His 
following was at  first comparatively so small that had the 
Arabs been more willing to support Nasr at  the outset, 
it is practically certain that it would have melted away as 
rapidly as the following of Hiirith b. Surayj at  the first 
reverse. " Nothing succeeds like success," and Abfi 
Muslim, once victorious on so imposing a scale, and that 
with the aid of Iranians, became a heroic figure among 
the peoples of Eastern IChur%sZn. The legend penetrated 
but slowly into Transoxania. When by 1301748, however, 
the whole of Eastern IIhurZs%n had fallen to Abfi Muslim 
and Nasr no longer held authority, his governors in 
Transoxania were replaced by the nominees of Abfi 
Muslim without outward disturbance. But the recru- 
descence of embassies to China shows that under the 
surface currents were stirring. Shgsh had already 
thrown off its allegiance and the Sogdian princes had by 
no means lost all hope of regaining independence in 
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spite of the tranquillity of the last few years. As it 
happened, however, the first revolt was not on their part 
but b y  the Arab garrison of Bultli%rB under Sliarilt b. 
ShayIch in 133/760-751. The rising, which was due to 
their resentment a t  the seizure of the Calipliate by tlic 
'Abb5sids and the passing over of the 'Alid house, Fvas 
suppressed with some difficulty by Abil Muslim's lieu- 
tenant Ziysd b. Sslih assisted by the BukhBr I<hud%li. 
The fact that the BulthBr-I<hud~11 assisted tlie troops of 
AbCi Muslim against Sharik might be regarded as an 
indication that he belonged to the party of the former, 
This inference is more than doubtf111, however. Of the 
30,000 men, who, we are told, joined the rebels, probably 
the greater part were the townsmen, or " popular party," 
of BulrhBr5. The revolt thus assumecl tlie domestic 
character of a movement against the aristocratic party, 
who, lecl by the BulthBr-IThnd%h, naturally co-operated 
with t h e  Government in its suppression. The events 
of the following year are sufficient evidence against any 
other explanation. According to  Narslialtl~i, who gives 
by fa r  the fullest account of this revolt, Ziyad hacl also 
t o  suppress a similar movement in San~arqa~ld. In  
the same year an expedition was sent into IChuttal by 
Abfi Di%~vud, the governor of Balkh, Al-FImash at 
first offered no opposition ; later in the campaign he 
attempted to  hold out against the Arabs but was forced to 
fly t o  the  Turlts and thence to China where lie was given 
the t i t le of Jabghu in recompense for his resistance (11). 
By this expedition I<l~uttal was effectively annexed t o  the 
Arab government for the first time. 
Of much greater, and indeed decisive, importailce were 
the results of an expedition under ZiyXd 11. S~l ih  into the 
TurBisli lands beyond the Jaxartes. I t  is surprising to 
find no reference t o  this either in Tabari or any other 
of t he  early historians. A short notice is given by Ibn 
al-Athir, drawn from some source which isnow apparently 
lost. The earliest reference which we iiad in the Arabic 
histories seems t o  be a passing mention of b. 
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Siili1~'s expedition " into Sin" in a monograpli on 13;c!:h 
diid by Ibn Tayffir (d. 260/983) (12). For a ilcI:ti~~-l 
account of the battle we are therefore depenclent trn t l ~ t t  
Chinese sources (13). In 747 and 749 the Jal1gl~11 
Tukh%rist?in liad appealed to China for aid ;1g:ri1151 
certain petty chiefs whowere giving trouble in the Gilgllit 
and Chitral valleys. The goveinor of Kucha despal~r l~~+l  
on this duty a Coreau officer, Iho-hsien-shill, \ r l ~ c ~  
punished the offenders in a series of amazing camp;ri::~~r 
over the high passes of the Karalcorum. Before rctur~~in:: 
to ICucha after the last campaign he was called in I)!. t 1 1 t t  
Icing of Fargllana to assist him against the kil~g o f  
ShBsh. Kao-hsien-shih at  first came to termswith t l l tnl i i~~~ 
of ShBsh but when on some pretext he brolce his wort1 i i l ~ l l  
seizecl the city, the heir to the kingdom fled to Suglitl I I I ~  
assistance and persuaded AbC Muslim to intcrvv~~r.. 
A strong force was accordingly despatched under %i\.;icl 
b. Salih. The Chinese, with the army of Farghiinn arrr1'tlic. 
Icarluks (who hacl succeeded the Tiirgesh in t11c l t t y t ,  
mony of the Western Turks), gave battle a t  At l~l ;~kl~,  
near Tariiz, in July 751 (Dhu'l-hijja 133). Durir~g thtr 
engagement the ICarluks deserted and Kao-hsicn-sl~ih. 
caught between them and the Arabs, suffered a crusl~il~g 
defeat. Though this battle marlcs the end of C ~ I ~ I I ( Y H  
power in the West, it was in consequence of intc.rl~:~I 
disruption rather than external pressure. Nothing W;IS 
further at first from the minds of the princes of Suglitl t11;cu 
the passing of the long tradition of Chinese soverciglity. 
indeed it blazed up inore strongly than ever. For 11:ctl 
not a Chinese arnly actually visited Shash on their v c ~ y  
borders ; even if the Arabs had won the first battle, \voul;l 
they not return to avenge the defeat ? For the last 
time the Shao-wu princes planned a concerted r i s i~~g  in 
BulzhBrH, Iiish, Sughd, and Ushrfisana. But China gave 
neither aid nor encouragement ; the presence of r\ba 
Muslim at  Samarqand overawed the Sughdians, and only 
at Kish did the revolt assume serious proportions. i\b?~ 
DXwud's army easily crushed the insurgents in a pitched 
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battle a t  Kandak, near ICish, killing the icing Al-I];hrid 
and many of the ottler dihq&ns. Aniougst the treasllres 
of the royal palace which were sent to Samarcpnd 
" maly  articles of rarc Chinese worl<ma~ls]~i~,, \resscls 
inlaid with gold, saddles, brocades, and other objects 
d'art." The BulthPr-IChudZh Qutayba and the dihqalls 
of Sughd also paid for their colnplicity wit11 their 
lives (14). 
So ended the last attempt at restori~ig an indcpendei~t 
Sogdiana nnder the old 16gime. For some years yct tile 
priilces of Sughd, Khwiirizm, and l'slclliiristiin contin~l~tl 
to send appeals to  China. Thc Emperor, iio~vcver, 
I ' preoccopied with maintaining peace, praised thcln all 
and gave them consolation, then having wanled them sent 
them back to assure tranquillity in  the Wcste1.11 la~itls." 
Abii fi1uslim had also, it would seem, realisetl the 
importaiice of inaintaiuiog relations with t l ~ e  Cl~iiiesc 
court, for a succession of e~l~bassies from " the hra~bs 
with blaclc garments " is reported, beginning in tlie ycar 
following the battle of the Talas. As many as tliret: arc 
mentioned in a single ycar. I t  is possil~le that tl~ese 
embassies were in part intended to  keep the go~rc.rr~~~ic.nt 
informed on the progress of the civil wars i l l  CLlil~n, 
though the active interest of the new aclmi~lislratiol~ in
their cominerce would, as before, tend to reconcile t l~c 
influential mercantile co~nniunities to 'Abbiisid rulc. T~IC 
actual deathblow to Lhe tradition of Cliinesc o~~erlorclsl~ip 
in Western Central Asia was given, not by ally sllch 
isolated incident as the battle of the Talas, but by the 
participation of Central Asian co~~tit~gcnts in the 
restoration of the Emperor to his capital in 757 ,715). 
Men from the distant lands to whom China llnd seemed 
an immeasurably powerful and ~mconquel.able Empire 
now saw with their ovn eyes the fatal wealcllcsses that 
chinese diplomacy had so.slcilfully concealed. this 
blow Chinese prestige never recoverccl. 
~h~ sl~attering of the Wcsterll Turkish 
empires by the Chinese policy l ~ a d  also pllt an entl to all 
B 
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possibility of intervention from that side. Transoxailia, 
therefore, was unable to look for outside support, while 
the reorganization of the Muslim Empire by the early 
'AbbHsid Caliphs prevented, not indeed sporadic though 
sometimes serious risings, but any repetition of the 
concerted efforts at national independence. The Shao- 
wu princes and the more important dihqzns continued to 
exercise a nominal rule until the advent of the S%mZnicls, 
but many of them fo~und that the new policy of the Empire 
offered them an opportunity of honourable and lucrative 
service in its behalf and were quick to talte advantage of 
it. On the other hancl the frequent revolts in Eastern 
IChurBsBn under the guise of religious movements show 
that the mass of the people remained unalterably hostile 
to their conquerors (16). In none of these, however, was 
the whole of Transoxania involved until the rising 
organized by RBfi' b. Layth three years after the fall of 
the Barmaltids. The extraordinary success of his 
movement may partly be ascribecl to resentment at their 
disgrace, but it perhaps counted for something that he 
was the grandson of Nasr b. SayyBr. Though the revolt 
failed it led directly to the only solution by which Trans- 
oxania could ever become reconciled to inclusion in the 
Empire of the 'AbbBsids. Whether by wise judgment 
or happy chance, to Ma'mGn belongs the credit of laying 
the foundations of the brilliant Muhammadan civilisa- 
tion which the Iranian peoples of CentraI Asia were to 
enjoy under the rule of a dynasty of their own race. 
NOTES 
1.  Cf. Tabari 1694. 14 : 1013. 3 : Chavannes. Doc~~lnents 142. 
2. The details oi this measure are discussed by Wellhauscn, Das Arabische 
Reich 297 ff., and van Vlotcn. Domination Arabe 71 1. Note Lhat Tab. 
1680. 6 expressly reieax to them as "conditions of peace.' 
3. NarshakhI 8. 18. 
4. Chav.. Doc. 142. 
6. Tab. 1717 f ,  
0. Chnv., Doc. 280. 
7. Iran Irioten, a$. cil. 20. Cf. 8 . f .  Tnb. 1004.1 with Narslr. 00. 3-5. 
8. Barthold. T~rrkcstnn 218. 
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Tab. 1801. 
Tab.  1060. 11 ; 1SUO. 10 ; 1007fl. (tllis passagoisunlortannloly dcfcctivcnnd 
has been supplo~iienled by thc crlitor from lbn al-Alhir) ; 1010. 0. The 
popularity of Nasr is dcnlonrtratorl also by the  gro\~th 01 a tradition coulld 
his nome. This appears io Tabaui sornewhut unoblr~tsively in isolated 
passages, u~lforturlatcly rvltho!!t quotalion 01 hluds'ini's ahllllorilicr. 
According ta tho " Fibrirt " (103. 12) nlad8'ini wrotc iwo booLs 01) tile 
administrations of Asad b. 'Abduliah and Narl. b. Sayyjr, a fact whicll 
confirms the special lmportnr~cc oi t l~cse two iovcrnors in the history u l  
IChurBBn. Probably Asad was luoro popular with tho dihqzns asd 
Narr wit11 tho people. 
~ h a v . ,  Doc. 108 : cf. hlarquart. Br5nellahr 303. 
ICitlb BaghdZd, Band VI cd. 1-1, I<ctler, p. 8. 12. 
Chav.. Doc. 207 1. ; Wieger, Toxtes Historiq~ncs 1047. 
Tab. 111. 70 f. : Narsh. 8 fin. : Chav., Doe. 1'40. Notes Addit. 80 nnrl 01. 
Wiegcr 1084 8. : Chav., Doc. 168 s. 4 and 2081. Cf, my article "Chincso 
rccords of the Arabs in Central ,\sin" in Lhc Bullclin of tho School oi  
Oriental Studies, 11. 018 f. 
A hdl aecount of these risit~gs is given by Prol. E. G. Bcorvne in " L i l c ~ i l r ~  
History of Pcrsia " vol. I, 308 ff. 
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